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
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

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CHINESE EMPIRE

From *A Wayfarer in China*
by Elizabeth Kendall

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Railroads

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA

BY

KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE

D. Willis James Professor of Missions and Oriental History in Yale University

FOURTH EDITION, REVISED

BOSTON AND NEW YORK
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY

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THE author wishes to express his appreciation of the courtesy of the late Professor F. W. Williams, of Yale University; Professor A. Forké, formerly of the University of California; and Professor W. F. Ogburn, of the University of Chicago, to whose careful and kindly criticism is due a large part of any value that this book may have.

PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION

This book was revised in 1924, but such important developments have taken place in the Chinese situation in the little over four years that have elapsed that it has seemed wise to add to and rewrite the latter half of the sixth chapter and to rewrite the entire seventh chapter. At the same time such mistakes in the text as have been disclosed in the years that the book has been in use have been corrected and a few titles of the better recent works on China have been added to the bibliography. It is hoped that because of these changes the book may be of larger use to those who, either as teachers or as students, wish an introduction to the history, culture, and problems of the great Asiatic republic.

June, 1928

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INTRODUCTION

THE eyes of the world are more and more turned toward China. We are coming to be profoundly interested in the fate of that greatest of Asiatic peoples. And it is well that we are. No other existing nation can look back over as long a past of continuous development as can China. When the foundations of Greece and Rome were being laid and when the great Hebrew prophets were in the midst of their ministry, a nation was being shaped and a civilization formed which have come down through the centuries with a comparatively unbroken history. There have been changes, but none of them as violent as those which have shaken the West during the same period. Only two other cultural groups — that in India and that in the Mediterranean Basin — have had as dominant an influence over as large a section of mankind. For Chinese culture has not only spread gradually over what is now China proper, with its three or four hundred million inhabitants, but it furnished the model for the old Japan, and has been to the widely scattered

peoples of the vast outlying sections of the Chinese Empire — Mongolia, Manchuria, the New Territory, and Tibet — what that of the Mediterranean world was to the Germanic peoples of Northern Europe. The history and the fate of a culture of such antiquity and of such influence, and of the people that could produce it, must be a matter of world interest.

The Chinese are numerically the largest fairly homogeneous group of mankind. No one knows their exact number, but there are probably between two hundred and fifty and four hundred millions of them. They form between a fifth and an eighth of the population of the globe. Their future cannot fail to be of vital significance to the entire world. This is especially true since they are among the ablest of mankind, as is shown not only by their civilization, but by their industry, their thrift, their commercial ability, their physical vitality, and the achievements of their students in the universities of the West. Chinese students in American universities have frequently carried off high scholastic honors in open competition with the flower of our youth.

Mighty changes are taking place in China. It is undergoing a transformation whose re-

sults no man can foresee. Those who know her best are the slowest to make dogmatic prophecies. It is certain, however, that the outcome will profoundly affect the entire world. The United States faces China from across the Pacific and will be especially interested. If Americans are not to blunder, if they are to make to the new China the unselfish contributions of which they are capable, if they are not to stumble into unnecessary conflict with Japan, if they are to share to the utmost in the trade and the industrial development of the new China, they must know her and must know her better than they do now.

There are already many books on China in English, and a number of excellent histories. The author has felt, however, in his own teaching the need of a short sketch for college courses which devote, as is the case with most courses on the Far East in American institutions, only six weeks or so to China; a sketch which in the light of the best modern scholarship will give the essential facts of Chinese history, an understanding of the larger features of China's development, and the historical setting of its present-day problems; a sketch which does not burden the student with unnecessary details of

unfamiliar names and dates and which gives him the main movements that have led to the China of to-day. It is hoped that such a book will be of use as well to the general reader as an introduction to larger and more specialized works. The plan followed is: first, the development of China to the time when contact with Europeans first began to have a profound effect on her, or about 1834; second, a description of the civilization of China as it was before it had undergone the changes which have followed that contact; third, the history since the contact with Europeans; and fourth, the changes and the problems brought by that contact. At the end there has been added a brief critical bibliography for the use of students who may wish to go somewhat further into details than the text has done and who have neither the desire nor the leisure for the detailed works of specialists. A somewhat greater proportion of attention has been paid to American relations with China than would have been wise had the book not been intended primarily for use in the United States.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA

CHAPTER I

GEOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND OF CHINESE HISTORY

China as we see it on the map is composed of two parts. The smaller and the more important is China proper, or the Eighteen Provinces. Three provinces have been added in the last few decades by extending the provincial form of government to Manchuria. There are thus twenty-one in all, but Manchuria scarcely belongs geographically to China proper and it is better here still to speak of the eighteen as a unit. The larger borders on China proper and is made up of various districts that have been conquered at one time and another, usually in an endeavor to protect the Eighteen Provinces against attack and to extend China to its natural boundaries. The Eighteen Provinces are the historic China and the main home of the Chinese people. The outlying districts, with the exception of Manchuria, have not been

extensively settled by Chinese and are mostly semi-autonomous states inhabited by alien peoples.

China proper is eminently fitted by nature to be the home of a great civilization. It has a soil of fabulous fertility. For thousands of years its best sections have been subjected to nearly continuous farming, and, thanks partly to the skill of the cultivators and partly to its own original strength, it still shows no signs of exhaustion. In the North is the loess, very fertile, in places hundreds of feet deep, and possibly built up by the dust from the plains of Central Asia carried south and east by the winds of many millenniums. In the central and northeastern districts is the great alluvial plain formed of deposits laid down through the ages by the muddy waters of the Yangtze and the Yellow Rivers. In other sections there are numerous smaller plains and valleys; as, for example, the valleys that debouch at Canton, and the highly cultivated area around Ch'engtu,[1] the capital of the chief province of West China.

Added to the fertility of the soil is a favorable climate. China lies almost entirely in the

[1] For pronunciation of Chinese names see note on p. 117.

temperate zone, which with its marked seasonal changes seems to be favorable to the development of a vigorous race. The summers are hot, and in places the humidity makes them enervating, but even in the South the winters bring a stimulus to greater activity. The heaviest rainfall comes as a rule in the late winter, spring, and summer when it is of most use to the growing crops.

Then China proper is well supplied with rivers. It is, in fact, largely made up of the great valleys of the streams that drain the eastern slopes of the high plateau of Central Asia. These streams not only provide for irrigation where this is needed, but furnish easy and inexpensive means of communication and transportation. Large ocean steamers go to-day without difficulty to Hankow, six hundred miles up the Yangtze River. The level stretches of the Great Plain — the most densely populated section of China — lend themselves readily to the construction of canals, so that the natural waterways have for generations been connected by artificial ones. The Grand Canal, designed originally to carry the tribute rice to the capital, reaches from Hangchow on the south to Peking on the north.

a distance of a thousand or twelve hundred miles. Even in these days of railroad transportation the streams seem destined to hold their own as an inexpensive means of moving bulky, imperishable freight. This facility of communication and the absence of serious mountain barriers have made it comparatively easy to unite the Eighteen Provinces and hold them together as one political, racial, cultural, and economic whole. China proper seems destined by nature to be the home of a united nation. It is significant that it is in the southern and western sections, separated from the North and subdivided within themselves by more marked mountain barriers than exist in the central and northern provinces, that the greatest variations of language and race appear and that political unrest most frequently originates. The greatest differences in dialect are to be found in South and Southeast China and it is in these regions that rebellion against the centralized authority of the North has often begun.

China is well supplied with minerals. The precious metals are not plentiful, but the minerals used in industry are fairly abundant. Every one of the Eighteen Provinces has work-

able deposits of coal, and while earlier estimates were probably excessive, China has a sufficient supply for a moderate factory development. There are numerous deposits of iron, although not of such a nature as to permit of as large a steel industry as in America or Europe. Antimony, tin, and copper are found in quantities. When one remembers that coal and iron are an indispensable basis of our modern industry, one sees that China is fairly well fitted to take her place among the manufacturing lands of the globe, especially since these gifts of nature are supplemented by an industrious, numerous, and intelligent population, and an enormous supply of food products and raw materials.

With this natural endowment it is not strange that the land has become the home of an able people, or that this people has achieved unity, and has given itself largely to the material side of life. The Chinese are primarily men of affairs, administrators, merchants, farmers. Their scholarship and religion have a preëminently practical turn. For this their natural surroundings seem in part responsible.

The boundaries of China have had a great influence on her history and on the character

of her people and civilization. On the east is the Pacific Ocean which in the old days discouraged rather than encouraged commerce. No great peoples on its shores invited to intercourse. Even Japan had little to give in exchange in trade. In the South, which was nearest India and the West, and where frequent harbors are to be found, there did indeed grow up some commerce. But until very recently the South has not been predominant in moulding Chinese life. To-day, the Pacific invites to commerce, and the Chinese in the future may not be as exclusively a landsman as he has been in the past. To-day the sea is a highway over which come commerce, invaders, and new ideas and influences. The steamship and the cable have made of it the path by which the new era has come to China. But until the last century the sea was a barrier across which but little trade made its way. It shielded China from outside influences and the Chinese showed little disposition to cross it.

China's land boundaries reinforced her isolation. On the west, northwest, and southwest are great mountain chains, some of them among the highest in the world. They are buttressed by vast elevated semi-arid plateaus.

In the old days these formed barriers which shut her off from the rest of the civilized world, and were the homes of those nomadic peoples whose pressure into the fertile valleys to the east and south has been so large a factor in her history.

The isolation was nearly complete. On the southeast and the northeast, to be sure, the barriers are not so effective, but until the last hundred years there were not in either of these immediate regions peoples from whom China could learn much. A long caravan route led from the most northwesterly province, Kansu, across the plateaus and the mountains to the modern Turkestan, Persia, and the Near East. By this route commerce was carried on with Central and Western Asia and the Mediterranean world. By this route Buddhism first came to China, and the early travelers from Western Europe, the Venetian merchant Marco Polo and the Franciscan missionaries of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, found their way to distant Cathay. Some Greek influences, Nestorian Christianity, and other cultural contributions from the West came to China by this path. Relatively speaking, however, the intercourse was scanty and intermit-

tent. Man and nature conspired to hinder the merchant and the traveler. The warlike nomads of the Central Asiatic plateau made the journey perilous or impossible. At intervals strong rulers in China reduced the tribesmen to submission, and trade revived. The mighty generals of the Han and the T'ang dynasties maintained a fair semblance of order along the road. So did the Mongol and still later the Manchu emperors, but for the most part the fierce tribesmen and the petty states of the district made commerce dangerous or impossible. Then, too, the route was a long one. From the western gate in the Great Wall that separated China proper from the lands of the nomads it is between twelve and fifteen hundred miles to Kashgar and the eastern end of the pass that leads across the continental divide into western Asia and to the eastern outposts of the Occident. These hundreds of miles are across deserts broken by infrequent oases. Even in earlier days when the rainfall through that arid region seems to have been greater than now, and when the oases were larger and more frequent, the journey was an arduous one.

This isolation by land, added to the scanty

access by sea, meant a number of things for China. In the first place, her older civilization received relatively few contributions from the outside. Some early cultural influences may have come from Central Asia and the Euphrates-Tigris Valley. A few traces are found of Greek influence from the outlying fragments of Alexander's broken empire. Buddhism entered, and with it contributions of religion, art, philosophy, and language from India and Central and Southern Asia. The Arabs brought to Canton and other southern ports some knowledge and some products from the West. These contributions, however, with the exception of Buddhism and possibly some others in prehistoric times, had, as far as we now know, comparatively little influence on the formation of Chinese culture. There was lacking that intimate contact between different cultural groups that has been so large a factor in the growth of the Mediterranean world and Western Europe. Our Western civilization is of composite origin. To it Babylonians, Egyptians, Cretans, Phœnicians, Persians, Hebrews, Greeks, Romans, and Northern Europeans have all contributed. From Babylonia we get part of our moral code; from Egypt comes our

calendar; from Crete came much that shaped the Greek world; from the Phœnicians we get our alphabet; from the Persians came a stimulus to a simpler faith and the vision of a well-organized world-empire. The Hebrews have given us our religion; the Greeks the basis of our philosophy, our art, and our science; the Romans the foundations of much of our law and government; and the peoples of Northern Europe have given us our blood, our love of freedom, and our representative institutions. The stimulus that comes from the constant touch of one people and one cultural group with another, made possible by geographic conditions, accounts in no small degree for the progress of the West. Even the civilization of India owes more to outside influence than we have sometimes thought. In China this stimulus has, until the present age, been almost entirely lacking. Its absence has meant that progress has been at a slower rate than in the West. It partly explains that retardation that has seemed to so many Westerners stagnation and even decline. The wonder is not that progress in civilization was slow, but that civilization continued to exist. Chinese culture, produced almost unaided by one race, is a monumental

tribute to the ability of that race, and a sound basis for optimism for the future.

This lack of intimate contact with other cultural groups bred in the Chinese a feeling of intense pride and disdain. They had not known well another people with a civilization equal to their own. Outside races, as far as they were aware, had usually derived their culture from the Middle Kingdom. Japan and Korea, for example, had copied the arts, the literature, the religion, and the government of their larger neighbor. What wonder that the Chinese, especially the educated Chinese, should have a profound contempt for foreigners! To him they were barbarians. They were tributary to his emperor. If at times they overran the Middle Kingdom, they did so only to be assimilated and to lose in time their racial and cultural identity. It was but natural that at first Europeans should be regarded as another group of barbarians who had nothing to teach the Celestial Empire, and who, even if they triumphed by force of arms, would in time return home or be absorbed or become tributary to the Son of Heaven. It was but natural that for decades, even after their first disastrous defeats at the hands of Europeans, the Chinese

should refuse to adopt Western methods or make use of Western inventions and learning. It was but natural that they should be outdistanced by Japan. Japan, in addition to being smaller and more highly centralized, had been accustomed through the centuries to adopt and adapt to her needs the alien culture of China and found no especial difficulty in treating similarly the civilization of Europe. China had no such precedent. All her precedents were, in fact, to the contrary. As a result she was slow to awake and begin adjusting herself to the new era.

The great land barriers that shut in China from the rest of the civilized world have as well been the homes of those nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples who are such a constant factor in her history. Central Asia has been the source of those waves of invasion that from time to time have swept down into Western Asia and Europe. Huns, Turks, and Mongols, to mention only a few, have in turn burst out of the East and carried devastation to the West. But these peoples had their homes nearer China than Europe and pressed far more insistently on the occupants of the fertile valleys and plains of the Middle Kingdom. It is but a part

of that struggle that has been so frequent a factor in human history, the effort of the people of the hills and the deserts to obtain possession of fertile, well-watered valleys, and the more sunny lands of the South. Egypt, the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, the Mediterranean world of Imperial Rome, each had much the same experience. Yueh Chi, Hiung Nu (possibly identical with the Huns), Tatars, Mongols, Manchus, and many others have each in turn pressed southward and ruled for a time part or all of China. Each in turn was partially or entirely assimilated by the conquered, and over each in turn the Chinese reasserted their independence. So constant and so powerful a factor has left its indelible impress on Chinese history and on the Chinese of to-day. Frequent infusions of the blood of the peoples of the uplands have gradually modified the original stock. In the North where the mixture has been more marked the people differ materially in appearance and language from their kinsmen in the South. The Great Wall, extending for hundreds of miles along the northern marches, is an impressive monument to the defense measures of the Chinese government. Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet, most of the vast

districts of the empire that fringe the Eighteen Provinces, were conquered by vigorous monarchs largely in the effort to prevent future invasions by reducing the barbarians to submission in their own homes. The Han, the T'ang, the Yuan, and the Ta Ch'ing dynasties each carried the war into the enemies' territory and secured peace by adding their lands to the imperial domain.

Such is the geographical setting of Chinese history. It is now our duty to enter upon the narrative of that history itself.

CHAPTER II

ORIGIN AND FORMATIVE CENTURIES

THE origin of the Chinese people and of their culture is shrouded in obscurity. Chinese annals know of none other than an indigenous source. Foreign scholars have spent much time on the problem, but have as yet failed to trace any definite, undisputed line of descent to immigrants. Recent discoveries, near the heart of the older China, of a neolithic culture with utensils like those of later centuries both throw new light on the problem and raise fresh questions. One interesting theory, supported by some brilliant students, attempts to assign the earliest Chinese culture to the Sumerians, the founders of the civilization of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley. Another theory finds in Central Asia the common source of both primitive Chinese and the earliest Mesopotamian cultures. We must wait for further discoveries in China and Central Asia before we dare give a final opinion. We do know, however, that Chinese culture first definitely

appears in what is now North Central China. It is significant that this is where the trade routes across Central Asia from the West enter China, and that Chinese civilization is probably not as old as that of the ancient centers of the Western world. One cannot help but suspect something more than a coincidence.

In the beginnings of Chinese history it is difficult, as in that of all peoples, to separate the mythical from the true. Native historians profess to take us back to three thousand years or more before Christ and to give us a long list of the monarchs who reigned from then to the better-known, historical periods. Some of these characters like Romulus and Remus were more real to later generations than many whose existence is better authenticated. Every Chinese schoolboy is familiar with the names of Yao, Shun, and Yü, the last of whom is said to have drained the land of a great flood and to have founded the first dynasty.[1] This dynasty and a second [2] passed, however, before we come to a point where we feel ourselves on fairly solid ground. Each of these two dynasties is reported to have fallen as the result of the wickedness of a final representative

[1] Hsia. [2] Shang.

who gave himself to debauchery and misgovernment. A few bronze utensils have come down to us from these ages, and attempts have been made to reconstruct critically an accurate picture of the culture they represented, but very few facts are as yet certain. We do know that during these centuries the Chinese people were gradually spreading from their home in North Central China, driving out or absorbing the earlier non-Chinese inhabitants of the land, and slowly developing in culture.

When we come to the third dynasty, that of the name of Chou, we find ourselves on firmer ground. The date usually given for its beginning is 1122 B.C. It was founded by a group of vigorous men. The prince of the feudatory state of Chou, Wên Wang, protested against the misrule of the decaying dynasty. He was imprisoned for his pains and was released only on payment of a heavy ransom. After his death his son Wu Wang raised the standard of revolt to avenge his father and to end tyranny. He became the first emperor of the new dynasty. The brother of Wu Wang, known to posterity as the Duke of Chou, consolidated the power of the new royal house while acting as regent for the second emperor. The names of these

three men, Wên Wang, Wu Wang, and Chou Kung,[1] have come down to posterity as household names, lauded by the Classics and by orthodox scholars of all the centuries. So well had the founders done their work that the family held the throne until 256 B.C. This nearly nine centuries of rule is, with but one exception, — that of the ruling house of Japan, — longer than any other known to history.

By the time the Chou dynasty began, Chinese civilization had already begun to take on very definite characteristics. The government was patriarchal and was under the emperor, the Son of Heaven, in whose hands was centered the power of the state. The state was divided, however, into hereditary principalities, over which succeeding emperors exerted less and less authority. The people were already living a settled agricultural life. Irrigation was in use, intensive farming was practiced, and a carefully ordered system of land tenure had been worked out. Religion consisted partly in animism, — the worship of spirits in natural objects, in the earth, the air, the

[1] "Wu" means "military" and "Wang," "king." "Wên" means "literature" or "civilization." "Kung" means "duke."

water, — partly in the veneration of ancestors, and partly in a belief in a Supreme Being. There was a system of divination, part of which consisted in heating bones and tortoise shells and in the interpretation of the future and the will of Heaven by the cracks left on the surface in the process of cooling. There were the beginnings of writing, the first of those characters that have been developed into the written Chinese language of to-day. There was a vigorous rude art that has come down to us in the form of sacrificial vessels, decorated with the figures of mythical monsters, among them the predecessors of the familiar dragon and phœnix of Chinese art of to-day. The family was the strongest social unit, as indeed it has been through all the changes of the succeeding centuries.

During the nearly nine centuries of the Chou dynasty, Chinese culture continued to develop and took on more and more the forms of thought and social organization that are the foundations of the China of to-day. The race gradually expanded into new territories. In the process of expansion, however, and as weaker rulers succeeded the vigorous founders of the dynasty, the authority of the emperor

declined until it became a mere shadow. The government was increasingly decentralized, and fell into the hands of the territorial princes. China was, in fact, gradually resolved into a group of many states, virtually independent of each other, owing only a nominal allegiance to the emperor, and organized on a basis corresponding somewhat to the feudal system of Europe. The constitution of the China of the Chou dynasty has been compared, not inaptly, to that of the Germany of the early eighteenth century. But for later developments China might have separated permanently into a number of independent nations of closely related language and culture, and so have come to resemble ancient Greece or modern Europe. There were the beginnings of formal international law and even of diversity of culture. Wars were frequent, both between the states and with the neighboring non-Chinese peoples. Some of the latter were beginning to adopt Chinese manners and to be gradually incorporated into the Chinese race.

The dynasty is especially noteworthy, however, for its literature and for vigorous thinkers and seers whose influence has moulded all succeeding generations. The Chinese written lan-

guage took on a form that with some modifications has persisted until to-day. The literary language of the period differs no more and possibly less from the literary language of to-day than does the English of Chaucer from the English of the twentieth century. The founders of the dynasty had begun the organization of schools and had encouraged scholarship by choosing officials through competitive examinations. Partly as a result of these schools and partly as the result of the principle that the prince must govern by the aid of the most intelligent and best-educated men of his domains, there grew up a class of men who were at once statesmen, scholars, and philosophers. Most of these had given themselves to public life as administrators or as advisers of princes, and looked at ethics, philosophy, literature, and all formal learning from the standpoint of men who are interested first of all in the welfare of society. The names of numbers of philosophers have come down to us. Four of these, Lao Tzu, Confucius, Mencius, and Mo Tzu, are in their influence on posterity so much more important than the others, that we must pause to describe them.

Of Lao Tzu but little is known. Some

scholars have even questioned his existence. We do not know exactly when he lived, although one insistent tradition puts him in the sixth century B.C. as an older contemporary of Confucius. We are not at all sure that the book ascribed to him[1] was written by him or that it contains any of his exact words. His teaching was apparently rather obscure, and consisted partly in an insistence that true peace was to be attained only by ceasing to strive and by ordering one's life by the fundamental principles embodied in the older Chinese term Tao, meaning "way" or "reason." For the material trappings of civilization he had but little use. Civilization to his mind had largely failed, and he saw the cure apparently in inaction and a return to a simpler, less formally cultured life. The faith that grew up from his teachings is called "Taoism." We shall later see how this faith, always too mysterious and too difficult of understanding to be followed by the masses, underwent a complete transformation and to-day preserves but little if any of the spirit of its founder.

Of Confucius (551–479 B.C.) we know a great deal more. He was born in a feudal state,[2] in

[1] The Tao Tê Ching. [2] Lu.

what is now the Province of Shantung. Part of his life was spent in administrative offices and his outlook was always that of an official. His ethics, his religion, his entire thought had running through them the desire to direct all learning, all art, and all religious ceremonies to the service of society. His most important office was that of prime minister in his native state, and in a truly characteristic manner that ministry was ended by his resignation when his prince began to give himself to sensual indulgence and to neglect the affairs of state. He gathered around him a group of pupils, whom he carefully instructed, always with the aim of producing men of cultured character for the service of the state. From the plentiful sayings that have come down from him, collected by his faithful disciples, we see a man of keen moral insight and high purpose, persistent, well poised, reserved, with a belief in a ruling Providence, but speaking of it so little that he has been regarded by many as an agnostic, and preserving a discreet reticence on the subject of the popular superstitions and worship of the times. He deplored the current disorders and sought the cure for them in a return to the principles of the great philoso-

pher-monarchs of antiquity. He claimed for himself no originality, but desired merely to transmit and interpret the best of the past. Perhaps this voluntary identification with the best of the scholarly traditions of the nation accounts in part for his influence on China. He is the embodiment and the model of that class of statesmen-scholars that has moulded China.

A name associated closely with that of Confucius is Mencius. He was born *ca.* 372 B.C., not far from the birthplace of Confucius. He was an ardent admirer of his great predecessor, but did not give himself to slavish imitation. An original thinker, he was a profound believer in the native goodness of human nature, and battled manfully with rival philosophers who believed in original sin, either in the form of total depravity or as an admixture with original goodness. Possibly as a corollary to this conviction he believed much more in the ordinary man than did Confucius and distinctly held that the subject had the right to rebel against a tyrannous prince.

Mo Tzu or Mo Ti lived in the fifth and possibly on into the fourth century B.C. He believed that the Power back of the universe was

a personal being who loved men, and that all men, as their dominant principle of life, should love each other. He also held that human institutions should be tested by their utility in promoting man's welfare.

The chief literature of the Chou dynasty has come down to us in what are usually known as the "Classics." These are the Four Books and the Five Canons. The Four Books are the "Analects," [1] the sayings of Confucius and his disciples, the "Doctrine of the Mean" [2] and the "Great Learning," [3] two short treatises on ethical culture compiled by successors of Confucius, and the "Book of Mencius," [4] comprising the teachings of that philosopher. The Five Canons are the "Canon of Changes"; [5] the "Canon of History," [6] a compilation of the historical records of the past; the "Canon of Odes," [7] a collection of the odes and ballads current among the people of the time; the "Canon of Rites," [8] a collection of rules describing the ceremonies in use in the nation; and the "Spring and Autumn Annals," [9] or the annals of Confucius's native state, com-

[1] Lun Yü. [2] Chung Yung. [3] Ta Hsüeh.
[4] Mêng Tzu Shu. [5] I Ching. [6] Shu Ching.
[7] Shih Ching. [8] Li Chi. [9] Ch'un Ch'iu.

piled by the great teacher himself, and a rather dry chronicle. These Classics became the standard literature of the nation.

The Chou dynasty is notable as a period not only of vigorous thinking, but of active internal commerce. The various states strove to strengthen themselves by encouraging trade. Foreign commerce may even have grown up across the caravan routes of Central Asia, and Chinese products may have found their way to the West and Western ideas and objects to China.

Toward the end of the dynasty changes began to take place which were to lead to the consolidation of China and the formation of the Chinese imperial government much as we know it to-day. The closing centuries of the dynasty are known technically as the period of the "Contending States." The different principalities that made up the empire fell to warring with one another on a gigantic scale with fearful results in carnage and in destruction of property. The imperial dignity was reduced to a shadow. Gradually by sheer strength and skill out of the struggle emerged as a leader the state of Ch'in. After years of warfare it succeeded in conquering the other states, in putting an end to the remnants of the power of the

Chou dynasty, and in giving its name to a new dynasty which ruled from 255 to 206 B.C. This state of Ch'in was situated in Northwest China, and had developed its military strength in guarding the frontiers against the nomads of the desert. It is quite probable that it embodied strong strains of nomad blood. It had certainly evolved a superior military and political organization and by force of merit had succeeded in making its ruler the master of the empire. The princes of Ch'in, after subduing the other states, finally assumed the imperial throne made vacant by deposing the last of the Chou monarchs. The first of the new line to take the title of emperor is one of the greatest rulers of history. He was not only a vigorous warrior, but an able administrator. He felt it to be necessary to found the Chinese state entirely anew. To this end he wished to abolish the last traces of disunion and to make of the empire a highly centralized monarchy. He called himself the "First Emperor," [1] as he apparently wished to divorce the new imperial title and functions from the traditions of the helplessness of the later rulers of the house of Chou. He even went to the extreme of at-

[1] Shih Huang, or Ch'in Shih Huang, as he is better known.

tempting to destroy most of the existing literature of the preceding ages. Apparently the old order was to his mind so hopeless that it was better to eradicate all records of it and to start afresh. Copies of the existing books were not so numerous but that it was possible to collect most of them for burning. He vigorously defended the northern frontiers against the invasions of the nomadic peoples and completed the Great Wall, that artificial barrier which stretches for so many hundred miles along the northern boundaries of the Eighteen Provinces, the mightiest piece of construction done by hands of men until the nineteenth century. Beside it the seven wonders of antiquity dwindle into comparative insignificance. It is a happy coincidence that from the word "Ch'in" our word "China" is possibly derived, for to this vigorous monarch of that state and dynasty must be given the credit for the first union of China in a form resembling that in which we now know it. At least one connection with the past he did not break. Taoism as it came from the hands of its founder was not a cult for the mass of the common people. It was too abstruse and too inactive. It early began to decline from its

pristine purity and fell largely into the hands of demon exorcists and of searchers for physical immortality. These strove to find the elixir of life and to drive out the demons that to the mass of the Chinese then as now are omnipresent and the cause of disease and death. To this degenerate doctrine of Taoism, a doctrine that with modifications has come down to the present, the First Emperor gave willing and fearful heed. Its survival may be partly due to his patronage. Nor was this vigorous ruler opposed to learning as such. His opposition was only to the reactionary form that he felt it had taken during the past few centuries. Under him writing was further developed, and the invention of the writing brush and the forerunner of paper is ascribed to his reign. Other phases of the national life aroused his interest. He encouraged commerce. He was a great builder. He was a vigorous administrator of justice. Because he antagonized the so-called "Confucianists," he has not been popular with orthodox Chinese historians, but he was one of the greatest creative minds and one of the most vigorous rulers that the nation has produced. His achievement in uniting China is in some respects greater than would have been

that of Charlemagne had he succeeded in welding together Western Europe so permanently that the subsequent disunion into warring nations would have been impossible.

The effort of uniting the empire seems to have exhausted the house of Ch'in. The feeble successors of the First Emperor could not hold together the dominions of their illustrious progenitor. When once the heavy hand of the strong man had been withdrawn, the latent dissatisfaction with the new order of things broke out. The old local princes strove to regain their power and to restore the system by which they had profited during the last days of the Chou. The scholars of the old school that had been ruthlessly opposed by the Ch'in were still numerous and influential. Civil strife broke out; the Ch'in dynasty disappeared, and for a number of years war was the order of the day. So thoroughly had the First Emperor's work been done, however, that the anarchy of the later years of the Chou could not permanently return. Out of the struggle emerged the founder of a new dynasty, the Han. This dynasty lasted, with a marked division caused by a usurpation early in the first century A.D., from 206 B.C. to 214 A.D., and its four centuries

are among the most notable in the annals of China. The work of consolidation begun by the First Emperor was carried on and completed. That strong man's policy of vigorous centralization which had aroused so much opposition was followed, but in a milder form. The feudalism of the Chou was reinstituted, but was much modified and curtailed. The power of the emperor was supreme and under a number of vigorous monarchs became increasingly such in practice as well as in theory. The system of civil-service examinations, so prominent in later dynasties, was partly developed and became for the first time a prominent feature of the constitution of the state and a means of strengthening the central power. By these examinations candidates for office were chosen, not on the basis of birth, but of merit and education. The system led to a bureaucracy, admission to which was competitive, a bureaucracy which centered in the emperor and strengthened his power in contrast with that of the local hereditary chieftains. Care was taken to give to the new dynasty the forms and the sanctions of antiquity. The learned men, so frowned on by the First Emperor, were encouraged to come out of hiding. Confucius

was accorded higher official honors than in any preceding age, partly perhaps because it was seen that in him, a revered teacher of antiquity, there was a real friend of benevolent absolutism, and partly to win the support of the influential scholar class and to use them through the civil-service system to offset the power of the local princes. The constitution of the Han, while not so radical a departure from the past nor so highly centralized as that of the First Emperor, was built on the model furnished by him. It has endured, with natural developments and modifications, but unchanged as to essentials, through all the changing centuries, and is to be found at the basis of the political organization of even the new China.

The Han period was as well one of extensive conquests and territorial expansion, largely under the direction of the ruler who is rightly called the "Military Emperor." [1] At the accession of the dynasty China included roughly only that part of the Eighteen Provinces which lies east of the great western province of Szechuan and in and to the north of the

[1] Wu Ti, known as Han Wu Ti, to distinguish him from emperors of other dynasties with the same title.

Yangtze Valley. Under the generals of the Han the Chinese conquests were extended until the boundaries of the empire inclosed nearly if not quite as large an area as that occupied by its Western contemporary, the Roman power, at its height. On the south and southwest they reached beyond what is now the southwestern boundary of China, and into what were later to become the southwestern and western provinces (Yunnan, Kweichow, and Szechuan). These sections were not at this time to be permanently incorporated into Chinese territory. That was to be postponed for some centuries. But they were marked out as part of the logical possession of the Chinese. On the north, part of what is now Southern Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and Northern Korea was subdued. But the great wars of the times were against the nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples of the North and Northwest, some of whom were probably the ancestors of the Huns who were later to work havoc in Europe. In a series of campaigns these were pushed back or subjugated. This apparently was done, partly to rid China of her traditional invaders, and partly to open up the overland trade routes to the West. In our own day intrepid exploration has

brought to light the fortified outposts of the Han generals, extensive, long-abandoned frontier walls so situated that they could protect the Chinese end of the road to the Occident.

Along this overland route there was intercourse with the West. Just how extensive it was we do not know. It must at best have been difficult. The great distances, the elevation of the passes, the desert nature of much of the road, and the dangers from robbers must have prevented it from growing to any great volume. Chinese products we know went to the West. Roman ladies wore Chinese silks, and other products that combined light weight and small bulk with large value found their way to the markets of Egypt, Syria, and Rome. Chinese travelers penetrated as far as the Persian Gulf and brought back some knowledge of the Roman Orient. Traces of Greek culture left in the wake of the conquests of Alexander long survived in Persia and in the districts to the northwest of India. Some of them made their influence felt in China. There was some Greek and Central Asiatic influence on art. Grapes, glass, and many other fruits and objects seem to have been introduced into China during this period and some

of these at least are called in Chinese by what are probably modifications of foreign names.

The most influential foreign contribution of the period, however, was Buddhism. Gautama Buddha, the founder of the faith, had lived and taught in India at about the time that Confucius was teaching in China. He represented a development from the older Indian faith, the predecessor of present-day Hinduism. After a long search for the light through the traditional religious channels of his time, and after long struggles and agony of soul, he came out into a peace and a joy which with the enthusiasm of a discoverer he tried to communicate to others. His teaching, briefly summarized, was as follows: Human life is filled with suffering. Suffering is caused by desire, desire for the gratification of the senses, for prosperity, and for an eternal life of bliss. If one would be rid of suffering he must rid himself of its cause. Desire, Gautama taught, was to be conquered by following an eight-fold path. This path especially emphasized the impermanence of all things and a life full of self-forgetful service. If the eight-fold path were faithfully followed it would lead to the extinction of desire, Buddhahood (enlightenment), or Nirvana. As

taught by Gautama the system was not in the strict sense of the word a religion. One was neither to look for nor to receive divine aid in achieving enlightenment, or salvation. There was no ever-present, unchanging, supreme God. The gods of the older faiths might have an actual existence, but like man they were subject to change and were inferior to the enlightened man. They had best be ignored. A life of righteousness, of self-forgetful, loving service, was the only life that would avail to free one from the chain of existence and suffering.

After Gautama's death his teachings underwent great modifications. His way of life and the spiritual rebirth it necessitated could be intelligently followed only by the few. His doctrines were popularized and were patronized by the state, but in the process they became the foundation of Buddhism, a religion, which, while professing loyalty to the simple ethical teachings of the founder, differed from them materially and deified Gautama. This transformation proceeded with the years until the founder would hardly have recognized the system that bore his name. In some states to the northwest of India it underwent still fur-

ther transformations [1] and in its art at least came under Greek influence. These states to the northwest of India were directly in touch with China by the overland trade routes opened up by the Han generals, and it was only natural that Buddhism should find its way to China. This it did as early as the first century after Christ. It did not, however, achieve an immediate, widespread popularity, and it was some centuries before it obtained a firm foothold.

The Han dynasty, with its long period of peace and unified rule, was marked by an advance in many elements of Chinese culture. Literature was highly developed. The written character took on the form which it has kept, with only slight modifications, to the present time. The literary style then developed is still a standard and is greatly admired and even followed by present-day writers. Histories were composed, among them one of the most famous ever produced by a Chinese,[2] one which will compare favorably with the works of the great Greek and Roman historians. The

[1] Especially under the King Kanishka, of the Kushan dynasty.

[2] That by Ssu Ma-ch'ien, now partially translated into French and edited by E. Chavannes. (See Bibliography.)

writings of Confucius were recovered and edited, and extensive commentaries were written on them. Under state patronage, the Confucian school became more and more dominant among the intellectual classes. Its teachings, it is true, underwent modifications and reflect the influence of the current Taoist thought, but in their essentials they held firmly to the spirit of the great sage. Taoism, in the corrupt form it had taken on in the days preceding the Ch'in dynasty, was extremely popular. With its demonology and with its promise of immortality it appealed to the popular mind, for then as now the mass of the people were profoundly superstitious and craved a more definite answer to the problem of life beyond the grave than was supplied by the pragmatic school of Confucianism. Painting developed, although no examples of the work of the time have come down to us. Sculpture was in wide use, as the many examples that still exist testify. It was of a very different type from that of to-day, for it had not yet been influenced materially by Indian Buddhistic art. Great developments were made in the potter's art. True paper was possibly made for the first time, and naturally helped in the dissemination of thought. Alto-

gether the Han dynasty covers one of the main formative periods of Chinese culture. The China of the later ages then first took definite form, and it is likely that a Chinese of the early nineteenth century would have had but little more difficulty in feeling at home in the Han period, had he by any chance found himself transferred there, than would an Englishman of the Early Victorian period in the age of Elizabeth.

CHAPTER III

FROM THE HAN DYNASTY, THE END OF THE FORMATIVE PERIOD, TO THE FIRST WAR WITH ENGLAND, THE INITIAL SHOCK OF THE WESTERN IMPACT ON CHINA

After more than four centuries of rule the Han dynasty became hopelessly corrupt and inefficient. Once in the first century after Christ it had been so weak that a usurper[1] had succeeded for a time in seizing the reins of power, but it had enjoyed a rebirth and for a time its glory seemed as great as ever. During the second century after Christ, however, the dynasty gave indications which show the astute observer that it was about to forfeit permanently its right to the imperial title. The emperors were elevated to the throne during boyhood or even infancy and were dominated by regents. The power of the palace eunuchs increased, always a sign in China of dynastic weakness. Misrule became fearfully evident and rebellion arose. The empire was divided into warring states and Chinese unity and the Han dynasty disappeared.

[1] Wang Mang.

Then followed nearly four centuries of disunion characterized by civil strife and foreign invasion. First was what is known to the Chinese as the period of the "Three Kingdoms." The empire broke into three parts, each with its prince, and each struggling for the mastery. One of these parts perpetuated for a time the Han name. Great generals were developed and mighty deeds of strategy and prowess were performed.[1] It is a period looked back upon by later generations as one of adventure and military skill and is renowned in song and story. But continued division meant continued weakness. Short-lived rival dynasties arose, each seeking to conquer the other. One or two achieved a complete or a nearly complete union of all China, only to disappear in a few years. Non-Chinese peoples on the north and west took advantage of the disunion and increased the disorder by repeated invasions and conquests. They established themselves in North China, and for a time the country was divided by the Yangtze River between

[1] The most famous man of the time was Chu Ko-liang, prime minister and general of the kingdom in West China which perpetuated the Han name. He subdued the wild tribes of the West and waged successful war against rival Chinese states. He was noted for his strategy and his invention of war machines.

the non-Chinese states on the north and the dominions of the native Chinese on the south. It was one of the many times in which a political division has existed between the North and the South. A difference in spirit and tradition exists to-day, in spite of political unity, and is one of China's ever-present problems. The non-Chinese invaders adopted Chinese customs and were assimilated by their more civilized subjects. They left permanent traces of their conquests in a large infusion of blood and in a modification of the language. The Chinese of the North are still racially and linguistically different from those of the South. They are larger physically, and the dialects of the two sections are often so different as to be mutually unintelligible. It is interesting to remember that about this time a similar conquest of the civilized Roman Empire was being made by Northern barbarians, and that the Huns who had a share in that conquest were probably closely related in blood to some of the peoples who were overrunning North China.

It would only be introducing useless confusion into a work of this length to enumerate the dynasties and states and the famous rulers,

generals, statesmen, scholars, and priests of these centuries of disunion. It was not, however, a period barren of progress in civilization. Occasional ruling houses were able to maintain peace over limited sections for long periods. Under them the arts of peace flourished. Strangers were coming from the outside; new blood and possibly new ideas were coming in with the Northern invaders. It was a period of flux when the hold of the past on the nation was weakened and new ideas were being eagerly welcomed. China was probably more open-minded and plastic than it was again to be until the twentieth century. The strongest moulding influence from abroad was Buddhism. It was important, not alone for its religious effect, great as that was, but for the cultural influences from Central Asia and from India for which it was the vehicle. While Buddhism had come in during the Han dynasty, it had not achieved wide popularity. During the centuries of disunion, however, it found a different reception. Many Buddhist priests now arrived from India. Some came by the overland route across Central Asia, others by sea to the southern ports of China. They translated the Buddhist scriptures into Chinese and revised

existing translations. They were welcomed as a rule with great cordiality, for not only were the people more receptive to new ideas in general, but a religious awakening had taken place in China after the downfall of the Han. It had shown itself in a decline in the popularity of the less mystical Confucian school and in a more enthusiastic adherence to the more mystical Taoism. Although at times vigorously opposed by reactionary monarchs and by Confucian scholars, the more highly organized Buddhism, with its impressive ritual, its elaborate philosophy, its well-organized priesthood, its popularized system of ethics, and its ready tolerance of non-Buddhist beliefs, achieved on the whole a widespread acceptance among people and rulers. Chinese were for the first time allowed to take the vows of the Buddhist priesthood. Chinese monks traveled to India to visit Buddhism in its native country and to bring back relics and manuscripts of sacred works.[1] The earliest and most famous of these, Fa Hsien, spent fourteen years in a most ardu-

[1] Buddhism was at this time gradually disappearing from India. It was in part obliterated by persecution and it was in part absorbed by orthodox Hinduism. It is interesting to note that its period of rapid expansion into Eastern Asia coincides with the period of decline in the land of its birth.

ous and hazardous journey, going out by way of Central Asia and returning by sea to the south coast of China with his coveted scriptures. The narrative of his adventures and observations still makes interesting reading and is one of the best sources for the history of mediæval India. Buddhism was becoming acclimatized in China and was ceasing to be so evidently exotic.

As time went on Buddhist influence was seen not only in the winning of active adherents, but in its effects on native cults as well. Taoism copied the Buddhist priesthood and monastic life. In imitation of Buddhism it erected temples and created a pantheon, raising Chinese worthies to the divine rank and representing them by images. Its ideas of the future life conformed more and more closely to the Buddhist heaven and hell. Even Confucianism felt the influence, much as during the Han dynasty it had been modified by Taoism. Both then and in succeeding centuries the philosophy of Confucian thinkers was to show the effect of contact with Buddhism, now in a vigorous reaction from it and now in the adoption of some of its ideas. Confucian temples were increasingly erected and images or tablets of

Confucius and prominent Confucian scholars were placed in them, partly, it seems likely, in an attempt to compete with Taoist and Buddhist shrines.

The spread of Buddhism is important from the religious and philosophical standpoint, but it is also highly important because of the other cultural contributions that now reached China. It was a vehicle on which came many innovations from India. Buddhist art had a profound influence. The images in the temples, the pictures of saints, with their traditional Buddhist forms, pagodas, and temples, all testified to the contact with the foreigner. Like many other things that have come to them from without during the centuries, the Chinese made Buddhism their own and modified its art and its theology, but the foreign influence is still very apparent. It is interesting to observe that some Greek art, through its influence on Buddhist iconography in Central Asia, has penetrated China, although it was so altered that the connection has only recently been disclosed. All told, Chinese life was profoundly modified by Buddhism and other foreign contributions that came with it, more profoundly, probably, than it has been during

historic times by any foreign civilization until the present era.

Buddhism did not stop at the boundaries of China. It spread to Korea and in the sixth century even reached Japan. In Japan it became the first great civilizing influence that had touched the vigorous peoples of those islands. Chinese as well as Indian culture came with it, and the Land of the Rising Sun became a civilized state, looking up to its great continental neighbors as a model.

The period of disunion which had begun in A.D. 214 was not to last forever. A general who had served the monarch of one of the states into which the empire was divided, revolted, and succeeded in uniting all China under his sway. In 589 he founded a dynasty,[1] but this, somewhat like the Ch'in dynasty that preceded the Han, did not outlast four decades. In 620 it collapsed before the insurrection of another general who, with the aid of one of the groups of Northern nomads, made himself master of the imperial throne and established a new dynasty that was to last for nearly three centuries (618 to 907). This dynasty, the

[1] The Sui.

T'ang, is a name to be remembered. Under it China reached a high eminence of power and culture. It extended Chinese territory, made possible a great development in civilization, and the Chinese race became more numerous and prosperous than at any preceding time in its history. This dynasty coincided with a period of general decline and weakness in the Mediterranean world, and for a while China was probably the greatest state in the world.

The territorial conquests of the T'ang were extensive. The hardy peoples of Central Asia and Mongolia were reduced to submission. China's protection was sought by and extended to a declining royal house in Persia. Tibet had recently adopted Buddhism and had been consolidated into a state. It was brought by the T'ang into a close tributary alliance with China, and Chinese civilization penetrated it and influenced it largely. The T'ang power even made itself felt decisively in Northern India. The southern portion of modern Manchuria was conquered. Korea, after one unsuccessful attempt, was reduced to a group of tributary states. South China was incorporated into the empire. It had been invaded by the Ch'in and the Han, but the conquest was now

renewed and made permanent. The Chinese rule was even extended over much of the present French Indo-China (Tongking and Annam).

The great monarch under whom most of this territorial expansion took place was T'ai Tsung, or T'ang T'ai Tsung, as he is usually designated to distinguish him from emperors of the same name in other dynasties. T'ang T'ai Tsung is considered by many Chinese scholars to be the greatest monarch that the nation has ever had. He was unquestionably the most powerful man in the world of his day and deserves to be ranked among the mightiest potentates of all history. He was followed by a vigorous woman [1] who successively ruled three nominal emperors. She reminds one strongly of the great empress dowager of the Manchu dynasty.[2] Under her and with the aid of the generals trained in the preceding reign, the conquests of T'ai Tsung were maintained and even extended. The control of these two vigorous monarchs over China together covered nearly eighty years. Under them the dynasty was so firmly established that it maintained itself until 907 in spite of frequent rebellions and weak rulers.

[1] Wu Fu. [2] See below, p. 157.

Under the T'ang Chinese culture reached a new height of development. Taoism was favored by the rulers partly because of the fancied descent of the dynasty from the founder of the sect. It had by this time largely taken on the form so well known to-day, a mixture of its original philosophy, now an almost negligible element, of the demon exorcism and search for the elixir of life that had been so prominent a feature during the Ch'in and the Han dynasties, and of Buddhism. Buddhism had varying fortunes. The first emperor of the dynasty had frowned on it, and state supervision was usually enforced, but most of the emperors regarded it with tolerance and many greatly aided it. The Confucian philosophy was also honored with that impartial tolerance that with occasional exceptions has been the characteristic of the people and the monarchs of China. The stricter members of the Confucian school looked with disdain on Taoism and Buddhism, however, and one famous scholar[1] of T'ang times attacked Buddhist superstitions and veneration of relics with a trenchant sarcasm that makes interesting reading even to-day.

[1] Han Yü.

Learning was favored. The civil-service examinations of preceding dynasties were reorganized and developed. For the capstone of the system there was formed the Hanlin Academy, which was to endure to our own time. Admission to it has been regarded through the years as the highest reward of scholarship. The court gazette, possibly the oldest newspaper in the world, was begun as the official organ for the publication of decrees, appointments, and such other information as the central government wished to give out. Schools were organized and encouraged. Literature blossomed. Poets flourished who are still regarded as among China's greatest. Some of these were a bibulous lot, and the most famous[1] is said to have perished in a drunken effort to embrace the reflection of the moon in a lake. A vigorous prose was developed in a style that to-day remains a model. Painting reached a high state of perfection.[2] Some of the T'ang landscapes and figures that survive are notable for their beauty and refinement of feeling and furnished inspiration to the budding art of

[1] Li Po, or Li T'ai-po.

[2] The most famous painter of the time is probably Wu Tao Tzu.

Japan. Printing was developed, the first book made by this process dating from 868, more than half a millennium before Gutenberg.

Freed partly from the ravages of civil war the population increased beyond all previous numbers. Material prosperity came. Both internal and external commerce flourished. Trade was carried on with the West by the caravan routes across Central Asia, now reopened and made safe by the conquests of the T'ang armies. Merchants from India and from other countries of Southern Asia frequented the ports of South China. In this trade the Arabs predominated and were the commercial predecessors of the present Europeans.

Many other foreigners found their way to China. The Manicheans, followers of the Persian prophet Mani, came and propagated their faith. The Nestorian form of Christianity, one of the divisions of the Eastern Church, had spread extensively through Central and Southern Asia and continued to be popular there for some centuries. Its priests found their way to the capital city of the T'ang and attracted imperial notice and favor. The power and fame of the empire attracted to it representatives of less civilized peoples, and Chinese culture was

copied in many parts of Eastern Asia. The Japanese came in numbers to the capital and carried back with them to the island empire the written language, the art, the political organization, and the Buddhism of their great continental neighbor.

In time, however, the dynasty disintegrated. Rebellions became more numerous. A succession of weak monarchs sat on the throne. The palace eunuchs increased in power and cast their baleful influence over the administration, and the imperial title was usurped by a common adventurer. China, however, felt permanently the effects of the work of the earlier T'ang rulers and was never again to sink for long to the disunion and misery that preceded them.

Following the house of T'ang the empire was for over half a century (907–960) in the hands of a succession of military chieftains. The period is known as that of the "Five Dynasties," for five were founded in quick succession by as many generals. The boundaries of China had shrunk sadly under the weak hands of the last T'ang emperors, and now no one of these five ephemeral dynasties exercised control even over all of China proper. Tatar tribes found

North China an easy victim. One of the few redeeming features of the years of disorder was the invention of printing by means of carved wooden blocks (*ca.* 953). It antedated the invention of printing in Europe by more than half a millennium, and has been vastly influential in Chinese literary life.

Out of the chaos of kaleidoscopic dynasties there arose a strong man who by force of arms conquered his rivals, unified the country, and succeeded in establishing his house so securely that it lasted under the dynastic name of Sung for over three centuries (960 to 1280). The China of the Sung dynasty did not reach the territorial limits set by the T'ang. It had an almost constant struggle with the Tatar tribes of the North, one of which, the Kin Tatars, or "Golden Horde," finally established itself in North China, took from the Sung monarchs the possession of the northernmost provinces, and levied tribute on the remainder.

These three centuries, in spite of constant and frequently unsuccessful warfare, were marked by an unusually brilliant culture. Poetry, art of various kinds, and literature flourished. Schools were established, some of which survive to-day, educational foundations older

than any in Europe. Famous histories were written. The period was especially noted for its original philosophy and for its innovations and speculations in the art of government. The philosophy centers around Chu Hsi (1130–1200), the greatest scholar of his age. In early life he was influenced by Buddhism and Taoism, but in later years he reacted against them, and became an earnest student and interpreter of the writings of the Confucian school. His philosophy dominated the thought of that school for nearly seven centuries. His commentaries on the Classics remained standard down to our own day. He was by no means a materialist, but the effect of his teachings was such that the tendency toward religious agnosticism already latent in Confucianism was greatly strengthened during the succeeding centuries. Chu Hsi was the greatest exponent of a revived Confucianism. Buddhism lost in popularity and the works of the great Chinese sages grew in favor. Confucianism rose to greater heights of state patronage than ever before, and took on the form that it was to preserve until our own day.

Less lasting were the governmental reforms of Wang An-shih. This man was a brilliant

scholar and poet and a daring innovator in administration. To his mind the Chinese state, always paternalistic, should extend its functions to include a wide range of hitherto untouched activities. He proposed a system which closely resembled in parts some of the suggestions of Western Socialists of to-day. The commerce of the empire was to be nationalized. Taxes were to be paid in land products and manufactures, and the government was to buy all surplus products, transport them to places where they were needed, and sell them. It was an attempt to do away with the profits of the middleman. Moreover, the poorer cultivators were to have state advances of capital to help them with their crops, a measure that would relieve the farmer of the exactions of private money-lenders. Public works, which had heretofore been built by compulsory labor, were now to be constructed by the proceeds of an income tax, so that their cost would be shifted from the poor to the rich. To defend the empire against barbarians, a system of extensive enrollment in the militia was planned. It was designed to place the burden of defense on all. The civil-service examination system was reorganized and subjects

of more practical import for officials were introduced. Wang An-shih insisted that if a man were to be an official he must show power of independent thinking and must know something of government and economics. He brought out new commentaries on the Classics, using them to illustrate his views. He won the ear of the emperor and for a time had the opportunity of trying out his suggestions on the nation. The ignorance of the people, the dishonesty of the officials, and the opposition of the moneyed classes as well as of the scholars of the orthodox Confucian school, proved too much for him, however, and his system broke down. His career remains an interesting example of that strain of radicalism which seems inherent in Chinese nature. There had been famous reformers in earlier dynasties, and he reminds one strongly of the extremist tendencies of many of his countrymen of to-day. The violence of this radicalism may partly account for the unyielding conservatism by which in past generations it has been met and overcome.

The culture of the Sung dynasty was noteworthy for art as well as for philosophy and political theory. Painting reached its highest

development. The works of the Sung artists have never been surpassed in China for delicacy of touch and feeling and have been the inspiration of some of the best art in Japan. Landscape painting was especially developed in the attempt to portray the soul back of nature. It ranks with the best that the human hand has produced. Poetry flourished. The dynasty was an age of refinement.

The Sung dynasty, although brilliant in its culture, was fatally weak in its military defenses and finally was driven out by invaders from Central Asia, the Mongols. These Mongols were originally a group of tribes in what is now Northern Mongolia. Under a series of able leaders they became welded together into a powerful fighting machine. In the early thirteenth century, by superior strategy and discipline and under the able leadership of Jenghis Khan and his successors, they overran Mongolia, the northern provinces of China, Central Asia, Northern India, and penetrated into Europe. In Europe they made themselves masters of the Russians and left an impression that in manners and institutions survives today. They invaded Hungary and Poland. It is not strange that having conquered distant

lands they should cast longing eyes on the fertile valleys immediately to their south. They first directed their arms against the Kin Tatars in North China, and after a long struggle succeeded in overturning their state, taking their capital on the site of Peking in 1215 — the year of Magna Carta. The Sung emperor joined with the Mongols against the Kin, but after the downfall of the latter the allies fell into a dispute over a division of the spoils. The Mongols turned against the Chinese and after a struggle of several decades succeeded in capturing Nanking, their capital, and putting an end to the dynasty (1280).

Kublai Khan, the Mongol ruler, now became Emperor of China, and established his line as the Yüan dynasty (1280–1368). Conquests were carried farther. Korea was won. Burma and the present French Indo-China were successfully invaded. Even the Japanese islands were attacked, although unsuccessfully. The empire so established was one of the mightiest that the world has seen, reaching from the Black Sea on the west to the Yellow Sea on the east, and from Northern Mongolia on the north to the Himalayas and Annam on the south. Peace was maintained

along the overland trade routes of Central Asia and commerce by sea was encouraged between the ports of South China and the Near East. Merchants and missionaries from Western Europe reached China, or Cathay as they called it, and took back with them stories of the splendor of the court of the emperor and of the prosperity and wealth of his dominions. Marco Polo, a Venetian merchant, lived for some years at Kublai's court and in his employ traveled extensively over the empire. The narrative of his travels was widely read in Europe and helped to make China well known. The order of St. Francis was then in the first flush of its missionary enthusiasm and brothers of the order came to Peking. They were hospitably received and made at least some converts. Their work was not followed up, however, and none of their churches survive. Interesting narratives of their experiences are all that remain.

Kublai was a patron of the arts of peace as well as of war. The construction of the Grand Canal[1] is attributed to him. Order and justice were maintained and the nation grew in wealth and population. His successors were for the

[1] See above, p. 3.

most part feeble rulers. They failed to identify themselves with the Chinese. They held China as a subject country and did not wisely associate Chinese with themselves in the highest offices. Disputed successions were the rule and civil strife and disorders were common. Still a few changes occurred in the national life. The novel and the drama first became prominent, although it is doubtful whether they were foreign or indigenous in origin. Neither has reached the high degree of perfection to which they have attained in the West, partly, perhaps, because the scholar class of China has never given itself to their production.

After less than a century of power the Mongol dynasty disappeared in a welter of disorder. Out of it there emerged, as at the break-up of preceding dynasties, a general, best known to later generations by the title Hung Wu,[1] who succeeded in establishing a new ruling house. Hung Wu had for a time been a Buddhist monk, having taken up that life after the loss of his family and nearer relatives in a pestilence. He joined a rebel band as a subordinate, but by his ability rose to chief command. His band grew to an army and succeeded first in

[1] His personal name was Chu Yüan-chang.

driving the Mongols out of South China and then out of the North. The new dynasty, which rejoiced in the name "Ming," or "brilliant," lasted from 1368 to 1644. The founder made his chief residence at Nanking (the "Southern Capital" as contrasted with Peking, the "Northern Capital"). Here the mighty city walls and the tombs of his family still bear witness to his power. Under this native dynasty the boundaries of China were confined in the main to the Eighteen Provinces, or China proper, although Burma, Annam, and even Ceylon were forced to pay tribute. Of the successors of the founder little need be said. One of them moved the capital again to Peking, where it has since remained. Wars were carried on with the Mongols, for they did not tamely submit to the loss of power and were for this dynasty the successors of those Central Asiatic peoples who through every period of Chinese history have been pressing down toward the fertile valleys of the south and west. The Japanese harassed the coast of China and under their mighty captain Hideyoshi invaded and for a time overran Korea.

The culture of the dynasty was not marked by much great creative work. It was content to

reproduce the past and to expend its energy in conventional ways. The civil-service examinations were thoroughly reorganized, but were based on a stereotyped form that discouraged creative thought and that became a bulwark of conservatism. The scholarly activity of the period went not so much into new thought as into the compilation of collections of older works. The idea of such collections was not new, for some had been made in Sung times and even before; but they were now issued in very large numbers. Encyclopædias were compiled, still another type of literature that had been largely developed by Sung scholars. There was one philosopher, indeed, Wang Yang-ming, who thought vigorously and independently. He had a long and honorable official career, interrupted at one time by years of severe adversity. He had learned to look within himself for strength and knowledge and not to the outer world. He was the advocate of self-reliance, of conscious and intuitive judgment. He has been greatly honored in Japan, where he was very popular with the older military class. Modern Peking owes its beautiful and stately imperial palaces and temples largely to the Mings. Lacquer-work,

porcelain, and bronze-work reached a high stage of development and occasionally rose to the plane of true art. But though it was lacking in originality, the period was for the mass of people one of peace, material prosperity, and expansion. Population increased beyond any previous figures, and the Chinese race not only pressed more and more insistently upon the non-Chinese races in the Eighteen Provinces, but emigrated to the Philippines and the Malay Peninsula.

From the standpoint of to-day, however, the Ming dynasty is especially noteworthy as the period in which Europeans first began to come in numbers to China by sea. It was the period so familiar to all students of European history as the age of discoveries. The hardy mariners of Southwestern Europe were trying to discover a sea route to the fabled riches of the East, the land of spices. The hope of finding Cathay and the court of the Great Khan, made known by Marco Polo and the travelers of the Mongol period, helped to lure them on. In the last decade of the fifteenth century Columbus sailed westward in the hope of reaching India and Cathay. The Portuguese rounded the Cape of Good Hope and reached India in the

same decade (1498). Within twenty years the Portuguese Empire had been established in India and Portuguese traders were coming to China. The first arrived in South China soon after 1500. They followed in the route of the Arabs whose trade on the Indian coast they had broken up, and naturally came to those ports on the China coast with which the Arabs had traded for so long. It was years, however, before the China, reached thus by sea via the Cape of Good Hope and the Straits of Malacca, was identified with the Cathay reached overland by Marco Polo and the Franciscans. The early Portuguese traders were truculent fellows for the most part, half merchant, half pirate, and raised much disorder in the ports of South China. They finally established themselves on a strip of seacoast at Macao, not far from Canton, which they had rented from the Chinese and which they have held through all the succeeding years.

After the Portuguese came the Spaniards. These established themselves in the Philippines and were but little in China. The peoples of Northern Europe, not to be outdone by the Portuguese and the Spaniards, desired a share in the lucrative trade of the East. Dur-

ing the sixteenth century the Dutch made themselves independent of Spain and sent their mariners to the East Indies. Some reached China and settled first on the Pescadores Islands and then, when driven out by the Chinese, for a time on Formosa. Still later came the English.

Following the traders came Christian missionaries. This was the period of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. The Jesuits, the great exponents of the Counter-Reformation, were zealous missionaries, not only in Protestant countries, but in non-Christian lands. They sent representatives to the heart of North and South America and to the countries of the Far East. Peoples as widely removed from each other as the Japanese and the Indians of Paraguay and the Mississippi experienced their apostolic zeal. St. Francis Xavier, one of the companions of the founder of the Jesuits, came to India and Japan, and died on an island in sight of China in 1552. Following him came others, some of whom went to Peking and achieved a considerable reputation through their knowledge of astronomy and mathematics.

This coming of the Europeans is important,

but not because it led immediately to any great changes in China. They were looked upon by the Chinese as of no more consequence than many of the other peoples who from time to time had come to the Middle Kingdom. They are important rather because they were forerunners of that intercourse with Europe which was to go on continuously until the present in ever-accelerating volume, and which has in our own day produced such momentous changes.

Before the middle of the seventeenth century the Ming dynasty began to show unmistakable signs of decay. Monarchs of less vigorous character than the founder occupied the throne. The palace eunuchs grew in influence. Unrest showed itself among the people. The dynasty seemed doomed to an early collapse. Another Chinese dynasty would likely have taken its place within a few years had not the Manchus interfered. The Manchus were a group of tribes living in what is now South Manchuria and were one of those Asiatic peoples that had throughout Chinese history been pressing in from the frontiers. They were related to the Mongols and to the Kin Tatars, with both of whom we have become familiar in the preceding pages.

The Manchus had acquired something of Chinese culture and had cast longing eyes upon the great land to the south. Under an able leader, Nurhachu, one of the most remarkable warrior-statesmen Asia has produced, they were welded together into an efficient fighting machine and in the first half of the seventeenth century began an attack upon the Chinese northeastern frontiers. In the course of a few years they met with a number of striking military successes, due in part to the inefficiency of the Ming generalship. As they continued to press toward the south a rebellion in China gave them an unexpected opportunity and placed them in Peking. This rebellion had broken out in North China, and taking advantage of the weakness and misgovernment of the Mings had assumed alarming proportions. Its leader [1] proclaimed himself emperor and succeeded in capturing Peking. The Ming emperor in despair committed suicide. The Ming forces that had been operating against the Manchus now found themselves between two fires. Led by their general, Wu San-kuei, they submitted to their foes of the North, and the united armies of the Chinese and Man-

[1] Li Tzŭ-ch'êng.

chus marched on Peking. The Chinese rebel was defeated and his forces were broken up.

The Manchus did not restore the Mings to power. They placed one of their own number upon the imperial throne (1644), establishing what they called the "Ta Ch'ing," or "Great Pure" dynasty. The nation, however, did not submit without a struggle. Some of the Ming imperial line had fled to the south of the Yangtze, and here, defended by loyal generals, they attempted to stem the tide of invasion. The effort was futile. Divisions and palace intrigues weakened the Ming defense. The Manchus pressed southward. The tide of battle flowed back and forth. The carnage was fearful; the sack of Yang Chow on the Grand Canal by the Manchu forces, for example, forms one of the most ghastly chapters of history. Resistance was stubborn. The Mings slowly lost ground, until, after nearly two decades, the last of the line to claim the throne was driven into Southwest China and then into Burma. There he was delivered by a Burmese army into the hands of the victorious Manchus and the last remnants of Ming power came to an end. On the sea, from the vantage-point of Formosa, from which he had

driven the Dutch, a pirate chief [1] kept up a gallant opposition for a few years, but on his death resistance from even that quarter broke down.

The Manchus now proceeded to organize the government in such a way as to insure the permanence of their rule. The Chinese were held as subjects and were made to adopt the Manchu method of dressing the hair — the shaved forehead and the queue — as a badge of loyalty. With a wise statesmanship, however, they identified themselves with the Chinese as far as that seemed consistent with their rôle of conquerors. They left largely unchanged the system of administration that they found in operation. In the higher civil positions they associated Chinese with themselves. The civil service examinations were retained practically unchanged. Chinese and Manchus were admitted to them and to all but the highest offices of state on an equal footing. The legal code of the Mings was adopted with but slight modifications, a code that was not the exclusive work of the Mings, but had been the growth of ages. Confucius was honored, and was given added titles of respect. Buddhism and Taoism were

[1] Koxinga.

recognized, and Buddhism especially was fostered. Chinese literature was patronized and the Manchus themselves were encouraged to become proficient in it. Manchu garrisons were, however, established in various strategic places, and the attempt was made to keep up military discipline. In the course of a few decades these garrisons suffered the inevitable effects of a life of inactivity supported by government pensions. Their military discipline declined and they ceased to be effective as a fighting force. In 1911, when the revolution broke out that ended the dynasty, they offered no serious opposition to the Chinese insurgents.

The first century and a half of Manchu rule was marked by vigor and efficiency. The period was nearly covered by two reigns, those of K'ang Hsi (1662–1723) and Ch'ien Lung (1736–1796), one sixty-one and the other sixty years in length. These two monarchs were among the strongest that the nation has had. During their time China was one of the best-governed lands on the earth and was second to none in population and to but two in area. These two men gave an impetus to the dynasty that was to carry it over the reigns of weaker rulers down into the twentieth century. We

shall proceed to sketch the history of this century and a half more in detail, for it connects directly with the present.

The period was marked by a vigorous home policy. Rebellions were put down with a heavy hand. The most serious of these broke out during the earlier years of K'ang Hsi, headed by the Chinese general, Wu San-kuei, who had allied himself with the Manchus when they had first marched on Peking and who greatly facilitated if not indeed made possible their success. This king-maker had been rewarded with the governorship of extensive domains in the Southwest, an almost semi-independent satrapy. From that vantage-point he declined the emperor's invitation to come to Peking, sent him apparently with the desire to curtail his dangerous power, and had raised the standard of revolt. The rebellion was subdued only after the greatest exertions. To prevent future rebellions and the growth of feudatory, semi-independent states within the empire, the provincial governments were reorganized. No official was allowed to hold office in his native province and the higher authority in each province was divided among several offices which were carefully arranged to check and balance

one another. Other rebellions were put down with an equally vigorous hand. Remnants of non-Chinese peoples still exist within the borders of the Eighteen Provinces, principally in the South and Southwest. These have to a large extent preserved their own tribal form of government and their own languages. Their territories have been encroached upon by the Chinese only slowly. During this early Manchu period these native tribes were more firmly reduced to submission and were made to keep the peace. They were placed as far as possible under the direct rule of the central government, but complete amalgamation with the Chinese has never yet been effected.

Great attention was paid personally by the emperors to the details of administration. K'ang Hsi and Ch'ien Lung were noted for frequent progresses through their dominions, and for their attention to public works, especially to the great dikes that held in bounds the Yellow River and the other streams of the North. Both were builders. Temples were erected and restored and imperial tablets showing the interest of the rulers in various public enterprises are still to be found in many parts of the country. By the careful supervision pos-

sible in an Oriental monarchy only to rulers of unusual endurance and energy, the wheels of government were kept in motion, justice was done, and the country was made prosperous.

Both the great emperors were intelligent patrons of Chinese culture. Confucius had never been more generously honored than by these Manchus. The Sung dynasty philosophers — especially Chu Hsi — were revered and their commentaries on the Classics made the official interpretation of these ancient documents. Chinese scholarship was encouraged and thus bound by ties of loyalty to the foreign ruling house. Both K'ang Hsi and Ch'ien Lung were themselves authors of no mean ability and were masters of Chinese literature. Under imperial direction scholars compiled books on all the branches of learning known to the nation. Ancient works were sought out and were issued in imperial revised editions. Great encyclopædias were prepared, and a dictionary that still remains standard.[1] A few new schools of thought arose which after 1900 were to bear important fruit. It was, moreover, a time of great interest in all branches of culture. Art was encouraged, es-

[1] Known as "K'ang Hsi's Dictionary."

pecially work in porcelain, in brass, and in lacquer. The china of these years is still eagerly sought by collectors.

These vigorous Manchu emperors were interested in everything that made for the material prosperity of their subjects. Inter-provincial trade was encouraged by improved roads. Agriculture was stimulated by a fixed low tax on land instead of one subject to official caprice, and by great conservancy works of dikes and irrigation systems. Population grew rapidly. Increasing prosperity is in all nations one of the best recommendations for the ruling power, and especially in China is it looked upon as an indication of Heaven's favor. A wise statesmanship had insured for the Manchu power a much longer life than that of the Mongols.

The period was marked as well by a vigorous foreign policy. The boundaries of the empire were carried farther than ever before. Through all Chinese history, it will be recalled, the outlying districts of Central Asia had been a source of frequent invasions. There were two ways of dealing with these. One was to meet them at the borders of China proper. To this end the Great Wall had been built and maintained.

The other was to eliminate the danger at its source by conquering the invaders in their homes, incorporating them into the empire, and insisting that they keep the peace. It was chiefly the latter plan that the Manchus adopted. Manchuria, as the home of the dynasty, was already a part of their domain. To the west of Manchuria lies the great semi-arid region known as Mongolia. The tribes of Inner Mongolia, the section contiguous to China, had early submitted to Manchu domination. Partly through voluntary submission, partly by an extensive war of conquest, Chinese rule was expanded into the section to the north, Outer Mongolia.

The reduction of Mongolia brought China into conflict with Tibet. In the seventh century this region had been converted to a sect of Buddhism, and its priests had in the course of centuries become the temporal as well as the spiritual rulers of the land. In the fifteenth century this Buddhist sect was reformed by a vigorous character[1] who made the priesthood celibate and established its rule over the country more firmly than ever, in a form that has endured until the present. The head of this

[1] Tsongkhaba, born 1417.

Tibetan Buddhist Church is known as the Dalai Lama. He is held to be the incarnation of one of the Buddhist saints (or Bodhisattvas), and at the death of one Dalai Lama the spirit is believed to be immediately reincarnated in another, so that the succession is perpetual. Now the inhabitants of Mongolia were at this time adherents of this Lama sect of Buddhism, and although ruled directly by their own spiritual chief, the Dalai Lama was so closely connected with them that the subjugation of Tibet became a necessity if peace in Mongolia was to be assured. K'ang Hsi soon found in a disputed succession an opportunity for interfering in the internal affairs of Tibet, and in the interests of his candidate invaded the country, put him into power at Lhassa, and maintained him by a garrison. Tibet thus became tributary to China and has remained so ever since. Probably as much from the dictates of state policy as from religious conviction K'ang Hsi and his successors became patrons of Lamaistic Buddhism and showed it great favors.

Most of Mongolia and Tibet were now part of the Manchu Empire. It became necessary, however, to round out the frontier to its nat-

ural boundaries, the great divide that separates what is now the Chinese Empire from the Russian dominions in Western and Northern Asia. The principal territory still unoccupied was that along the ancient overland caravan routes to the West, the section known to Western geographers as Chinese Turkestan and some districts north of it, Ili and Dzungaria. Trouble arose in Mongolia over the presence of independent, restless tribes on its boundaries, and the disturbance became at once the excuse and the occasion for the reduction of these territories. By a series of campaigns, largely under Ch'ien Lung, they were conquered and annexed, and were organized into the so-called "New Territory" (Sin Kiang). Except on the north the Chinese boundaries now stretched without interruption to the continental divide.

Invasions into Tibet by the peoples of the Himalaya region led to the reduction of some of the hardy mountaineers that occupy the northern borders of India. So thoroughly were they awed that they sent tribute to the court of Peking until brought under the growing British authority in India.

In the southwest, where the mountain passes

are low and invite intercourse, troubles arose with Burma. To settle them Burma was invaded and reduced to submission. In witness of Chinese suzerainty it sent tribute to Peking every ten years, a practice which continued until 1886 when it was ended by the new masters of Burma, the British.

Annam was invaded, and that country, which had been part of the Ming domains, was compelled still further to recognize Chinese overlordship.

These vigorous Manchu emperors, then, had not only ruled China proper well and with justice, but they had extended Chinese territory to its natural boundaries and had made the border nations feel their prowess and promise to keep the peace. Under no preceding dynasty had the population been so large, prosperity so great, or had the well-defined boundaries of the empire extended over so wide an area.

The great Manchu emperors were as vigorous in their dealings with Europeans as with the peoples of Central Asia. Europeans, it will be remembered, had begun to come to China by sea during the Ming dynasty. They were now increasing in number. The English, in

face of the opposition of the Portuguese, began trade, and carried it on under the direction of that British East India Company which at this time held a monopoly on all English trade in the Far East. Other European nations opened commerce. The chief products exported were tea, fine cottons, silks, and china. The chief imports were opium and specie. In 1784 the Americans sent their first ship to China, and during the next few decades their commerce rose to fairly large proportions. To obtain furs to exchange for Chinese products, American vessels went to the northwest coast of America. One of these discovered the mouth of the Columbia River.[1] A little later an American merchant, John Jacob Astor, established at the mouth of that river a fort, Astoria, as a dépôt from which to ship furs to Canton. Thus arose part of the early American connections with the Oregon country that were later to lead to its incorporation into the Union.

The Manchus and the Northern Chinese were not a seafaring people, and looked with annoyance on these active Western traders, some of whom were little better than pirates.

[1] The Columbia, under Captain Grey.

They failed completely to recognize the importance and power of Western nations and thought of them as barbarians inferior in civilization to the Chinese and tributary to them politically. Since at times these caused disorder, and since their trade was said to result in a balance unfavorable to China, and to drain the land of its specie, they finally were limited in their intercourse to one port, Canton. Here commerce was carried on under the greatest restrictions. Foreigners were not allowed to reside within the city wall, and even outside the wall were not permitted to purchase, but merely to rent, ground on which to erect their residences or "factories." No foreign women were allowed on the premises. All trade was carried on through a limited body of merchants (the "co-hong"). No outsider was permitted to learn Chinese, and a kind of *lingua franca* grew up, called by Westerners "pidgin English." This was largely made up of English, but contained fragments of other languages, European and Asiatic, and was organized according to the Chinese idiom. It is still in extensive use. Arbitrary customs duties were levied according to no published schedule. No foreign consuls were recognized, although some were sent,

for all foreigners were treated as subjects of the emperor. If they became too restive, the Chinese brought them to terms by suspending all trade.

Amid such conditions friction between Chinese and Europeans was frequent and certain. To adjust the differences and to seek greater privileges, embassies were sent to the imperial court by various powers, especially the English and the Dutch. These were all regarded by the Chinese as bearers of tribute from subject nations, a sign of the obedience of European monarchs to the emperor, the "Son of Heaven," and but little was accomplished by them. The Chinese power was as yet too strong, communication with Europe as yet too difficult, and trade too unimportant, to warrant a serious armed effort to wrest better terms from China or to open her to foreign rule. No treaties were made.

On the north relations were opened up with Russia. This great power, half Asiatic, half European, had been gradually expanding across Northern Asia until in the seventeenth century it had reached the Pacific. It was one of the most daring pieces of pioneering that has ever been known, for thousands of miles of

wilderness separated these eastern outposts from the capital of the Czar. These adventurous pioneers came into contact with the Chinese. Embassies were sent to Peking and from Peking to Moscow. Trouble over boundaries arose and war broke out. To conclude peace and arrange differences, a treaty was signed in 1689,[1] the first between China and a European power. Official intercourse was continued intermittently and overland commerce maintained, a commerce in which Northern furs were exchanged for Southern teas. Supplementary treaties were subsequently made, and a Russian mission was allowed to reside at Peking. But it was not as equals that the Russians were received. They were rather regarded as another of those Central Asiatic barbarian tribes who had troubled the empire from time to time and with whom it was the business of Peking to maintain friendly relations.

The vigorous foreign policy of the great Manchu rulers was seen as well in their treatment of Christian missionaries. The Jesuits, it will be remembered, had entered China during the Ming dynasty, and had won some converts. During the early years of the Manchus

[1] The Treaty of Nerchinsk.

they were in favor with some of the higher officials, including even the emperor. They numbered among them some able scholars who continued the work of their predecessors of the Ming dynasty in reorganizing the imperial calendar. They carried on geographic surveys of the empire, and introduced to the court a fuller knowledge of Western learning. A fairly large number of converts was won. Other Catholic missionary orders followed the Jesuits, and came to differ decidedly from their policy of allowing Christian converts to continue certain Chinese customs connected with Confucianism and ancestors, and from their translation of the term for God. The dispute was referred both to the emperor and to Rome. The two differed in their decisions. The emperor was angered, and fearing that loyalty to Rome might lead to a divided allegiance and to possible rebellion among converts, he restricted missionary activity. Missions continued, however, although semi-secretly and subject to frequent persecution.

After Ch'ien Lung inferior men came to the throne. The Manchu race began to suffer from too many years of success, and its vigor declined. Outwardly the empire was as brilliant

as ever, but inwardly unrest began to show itself. Secret political organizations were constituted in opposition to the dynasty. Rebellions sprang up, some of them difficult to reduce, and disorder arose on the distant frontiers. The Manchu power was manifestly waning. During this period began a more extensive growth of European trade. European impact on the empire increased. The irresistible growth of the pressure of Western nations on China and the weakness and ignorance of the Chinese authorities led to a series of momentous events, some of which are still in progress. But before going on to sketch the opening of China to Western nations and the effect upon Chinese culture, it is well to pause for a time and to find out what that Chinese culture was.

CHAPTER IV

CHINESE CULTURE AT THE BEGINNING OF INTIMATE CONTACT WITH THE WEST

It would be impractical in a work of limited scope to attempt a full description of Chinese culture as it was before the advent of European influence. Such a description can be found in many larger works primarily devoted to the subject. It seems in place, however, to point out the salient characteristics of that civilization. Present-day events and problems cannot be understood nor the changes wrought by contact with the West appreciated without a knowledge of the older Chinese life. The new China is arising out of the old. There is no break, although the transition is very marked. The civilization and life of to-day are not entirely products of the present age, but are bound up inseparably with the past.

The primary emphasis in Chinese culture has been upon the materialistic. The Chinese have been primarily interested in this life, in making it happy and comfortable. They have been the successful merchants of the

older Far East and have carried on not only their own commerce, but much of the trade in the Philippines, in the Straits Settlements, the Malay States, and Siam. They are successful farmers, and with them farmers have been ranked high in the social scale, far above the soldier and even above the merchant, for the farmer produces food, the basis of life. Their political organization has had as its primary aim the prosperity of the people. They measure the success of any government by the material well-being of the nation. Continued hard times are sufficient to cause unrest and even revolution. Their ethics emphasize man's duty to man rather than man's duty to God. Even their religion has a materialistic bent. They pay their religious dues as a rule with the specific purpose of getting blessings in this life or in the life to come. Their worship is on the principle of giving that they may get. Their offerings to spirits and gods are principally for temporal success, for health, for children. When they think of the world to come, it is chiefly as an extension of this life. To the Chinese this life is not, as to the Indian, a passing shadow, but a reality. They have not often given themselves to transcendental speculation.

They have as well always emphasized society as contrasted with the individual. The state and the family are all-important. The will of the individual is subordinated to that of the group. Learning and education have had as their final aim the service and welfare of society, not the culture of the individual or the knowledge of the absolute. The Chinese have emphasized the ethical because they have seen that righteousness is essential to social prosperity. With all this emphasis on the practical there is still a deep strain of emotionalism which shows itself in a real appreciation of the beautiful in nature, in literature and in art, in a love of poetry and music, and not infrequently in mysticism. But the Chinese cannot be said to be primarily religious or mystical as are so many of the peoples of the Near East and of India. They are intent rather on this life. For that reason they fit in readily with the modern industrialism of the practical West, and adjust themselves easily to its ideals. They have the same tendency to emphasize commerce and industry, social organization and the state. Great as is the difference between the old China and the new Occident, the distinction is rather one of externals. In spirit

the Chinese are much more nearly akin to the modern West than they are to many sections of the East, to India, for instance, or even to Japan.

Another general feature of the older Chinese culture that should be borne in mind is the fact that it is indigenous. Some influences we have seen coming from abroad from the earliest times, but on the whole Chinese civilization is a native product, far more than is that of Western Europe. This was due primarily, as has already been said, to geographic isolation. To the same cause we have seen that we may trace the slowness of progress in civilization, and the feeling of self-satisfaction and of bigoted contempt for the culture of other peoples.

One last general comment that should be made is that the older Chinese civilization was not decadent. It progressed much more slowly than did culture in the West, and in its later years it did not have the tendency to branch out into newer creative lines that it had shown in its earlier years. One can, however, distinctly trace progress from dynasty to dynasty. Most of the nineteenth century was one of comparative stagnation, but that was

because of the weakness of the Manchus. Stagnation and even decline had been characteristic of the later years of most of the great dynasties of China. One does well to remember that within so short a period as a century and a half ago, when the Manchus were at their height, China was among the best-governed and most highly civilized nations on earth, and that its reputation in the West was such that it was held up by many as an ideal in industry and in the arts of living.

Knowing the practical nature of the Chinese, one is not surprised at the development of the economic side of their life. In agriculture they have attained a high state of proficiency. Soil fertility has been carefully maintained, partly by methods which are yet to be used in the West. The night soil, for instance, which is so rich in nitrates and which in our cities of the West is usually allowed to run to waste through our sewers, is by the thrifty Chinese returned to the land to restore the strength removed by food crops. Careful use is made of legumes, of rotation of crops, of green manuring, and of tillage. Intensive farming is carried on with a care and a success scarcely known in the West. Many varieties of grain have been developed.

Those of rice alone tax the memory of an expert. The more costly food products are neglected for the less expensive. Thus not much beef or mutton is eaten, for the raising of these is costly in grain and pasture; greater food values from a given piece of land are obtained by feeding the grain directly to human beings. Milk and butter are not eaten, possibly originally for much the same reason. Pigs and chickens are widely used for meat, since they are scavengers and can be fed on what otherwise would be wasted. Fish are extensively consumed and the thrifty farmer even raises them in his temporary irrigation ponds. Bean curd, made from the soy bean, is a popular cheap substitute for meat. The coolie, with his rice or his millet, his greens and bean curd, supplemented on feast-days by a little pork, fowl, or fish, has an inexpensive, well-balanced food ration. Irrigation is highly developed, and extensive dikes have been built to drain low-lying lands. Many works have been written on agriculture. Much of this knowledge was, of course, empirical. Little of it was scientifically organized. It was developed because of the pressure on human ingenuity brought by the struggle of a crowded population for existence. There have been a

prodigal expenditure of human labor, an absence of labor-saving machinery, and a reckless deforesting of the hills leading to impoverished hillsides and to flood plains covered with débris. In spite of defects, however, the system reflects credit on the intelligence and industry that could produce it.

Something was known of mining. The immense deposits of coal and petroleum were but little used, but some of the metals were mined, including especially iron, copper, and silver. Salt wells were drilled, and natural gas was utilized to evaporate the brine.

In manufactures China had not, of course, developed modern labor-saving machinery, the application of steam or electricity to machinery, or the factory system. In these processes she had not passed the industrial level of the Europe of the later Middle Ages. Manufactures were in households and small shops. Human labor was used lavishly. Industry tended to be localized. Certain sections were noted for crockery, others for furniture, others for silks, and still others for cottons. Within individual cities industries were grouped by streets, much as in mediæval Europe. They were organized, too, in guilds with an elaborate

apprentice system. There were ingenious mechanical devices, and one does well to remember that the invention in China of the mariner's compass and of printing antedate their use in the Occident. The system of production was probably as efficient as any to be found in the West before the Industrial Revolution.

The Chinese have developed an elaborate system for distributing and marketing the products of the fields, the mines, and industry. The streams are largely navigable, and many types of craft have been developed for river use, from the great junk of the ocean and the lower Yangtze to the small boat that threads the shallow tributary streams. Canals and canalized rivers have been used to supplement the streams. Water conveyance of heavy, nonperishable freight, including grains, it is well to remember, is less expensive than land conveyance, even by steam. The water systems were supplemented by roads, some of which were admirable when kept in repair by vigorous monarchs. Vehicles were clumsy and labor-consuming, however, a crude cart being used in the North and the wheelbarrow in the South. Famines often occurred in one prov-

ince because grain could not be carried in quantity from a neighboring province where plenty abounded. The transportation system of China, however, compared favorably with that of the Europe before the nineteenth century. It helped to bind the country together into an economic whole.

Commerce has been highly organized. Chinese merchants are among the most skillful in the world, and not only have they conducted the business of their own vast empire, but they have had a large share in the commerce of all the Farther East. The Chinese seems to be a trader almost by nature. The older commercial organization, however, was formed almost entirely on the guild and the partnership system. The modern stock company was unknown. Guilds existed for every kind of enterprise, and the student of the Western mediæval guild system can even yet see a similar one in operation in China. Merchants of one province residing in another have their guild. Each kind of trade and each industry is organized into one. The guild gave the protection to its members that the government did not give and regulated each trade and each branch of commerce with great

strictness. Apprenticeship, prices, and wages were very largely determined by them. Like their European counterparts each usually had its shrine and its patron divinity. In the individual shop the organization has been usually by partnership, not by the joint-stock company. That modern method of facilitating great combinations of capital under the supervision of a directorate was unknown, and except for the guild, business was usually divided into small units. A partial exception was a system of banking centering in one of the provinces of the North,[1] with branches in most of the principal cities of the empire. Even this, however, was not a joint-stock concern.

The currency system was clumsy. The familiar round copper "cash" with the square hole in the center was the unit of exchange for all smaller transactions of daily life. As it takes between twenty-five hundred and three thousand of these to equal in value a gold dollar, they could manifestly be used, even for smaller transactions, only because the price level was very low. Wages for unskilled labor were but a few cents a day and prices were scaled accordingly. For transactions involving

[1] Shansi.

larger amounts the unit was the ounce of silver, called the "tael." Silver was not coined, but was usually cast by private firms into small ingots. In every transaction these were tested for fineness and weighed. The ounce (or tael) was different in various districts, as were, indeed, most of the weights and measures. At times China has had paper money issued by the government, but her experience with it has not been entirely satisfactory. It has too frequently been based on an inadequate metal reserve, and depreciation has followed with all the attendant evils of speculation, uncertainty, and loss.

Credit was and is extensively used. Pawnshops are universal, and are a much more reputable means of borrowing and loaning than is apt to be the case with similar institutions in the West. A highly organized banking system is in existence. Voluntary loan associations of various kinds for various purposes and of varying amounts of capital are common. In these, several men will band together, each contributing an equal share, and each having the use of the entire capital for a given period.

On the whole, then, the Chinese economic system has been efficient. By it the nation was

bound together into an economic unit. Great cities arose, ever the sign of high economic development. It was, however, a very different system from that which has arisen in the West from the Industrial Revolution. Now that the latter has invaded China, the effect, as we shall see in later chapters, has been revolutionary and for the time being demoralizing.

The political organization of China was highly developed. No other surviving one can show a so nearly continuous history stretching over so many centuries. In ideal it was primarily for the people. It existed to secure and to further their welfare. Its objects were primarily the well-being of the entire nation. The ruler existed for the people, not the people for the ruler. The military was supposedly used merely for defensive and policing purposes. Although the army has always played an important part in Chinese history, and although dynasties have invariably owed their foundation to successful generals, the soldier has not been exalted as highly as in Japan and the Occident. He has been regarded as a destroyer of life and property and has been ranked among the lowest classes of society. The producer and

the creative thinker, the scholar, were ranked above him.

The practical turn of the Chinese mind, with its emphasis upon physical well-being, is clearly seen throughout the political constitution. At the head was the emperor. One of his titles was "Son of Heaven." The theory, however, was far removed from that of the divine right of kings of Western absolutists. The decree of Heaven was supposed to be given primarily with the good of the people in mind, and if the emperor failed to rule them justly or if he neglected their prosperity and gave himself to selfish luxury, the theory regarded with complacency rebellion and the foundation of a new dynasty. It justified that succession of royal houses which is so characteristic of Chinese history. The authority of the emperor was absolute. He was the fountain of law, of justice, and of administration, and his word was final. The institution was paternalistic, and the emperor took in theory, and, if an able ruler, in practice, an interest in every detail of national life.

The emperor ruled, however, by means of a bureaucracy. One man could not hope, of course, to attend to all the details of govern-

ment and his power was delegated to subordinates in a carefully worked-out, descending scale. At the top were the court officials; there was the council of state; there were central boards in charge of military affairs, the judiciary, public works, and various other branches of administrative, judicial, and legislative activity; there was a board of censors, charged to speak fearlessly its criticisms of the government; there were official historiographers whose duty it was to record impartially public events and the acts of the emperor.

Below these central bodies the system ramified through the empire. There were viceroys, usually at the head of two provinces. In the province the central power was shared by the governor, the treasurer, the salt commissioner, the commissioner of education, and the provincial judge. These acted as checks on one another and so made sedition difficult. Underneath the provincial authorities were the officials of another series of divisions and subdivisions, heads of circuits, of counties, of districts. All of these were appointed from the capital, and under the Manchus no official could hold office in his own province. Rebellion and the growth of local independence and

decentralization, always the danger of so large a state, were thus guarded against.

This immense official class was recruited by a series of civil service examinations, to which all but members of a few despised occupations were eligible, regardless of birth or station. In theory the emperor was to govern with the aid of the wisest and the ablest of the realm. Was not the government for the benefit of all, and should not the wisest and ablest be searched out to aid in it? These examinations, then, with their three successive grades and degrees, were for the purpose of selecting the best men in the empire. They were based primarily on the ancient Classics and had mostly to do with ethics, history, and statecraft. Too frequently they were stereotyped and encouraged literary style and memory at the expense of independent creative thinking. Too often corruption crept in, and literary degrees were sold to meet the necessities of the state and of dishonest officials. On the whole, however, they were fairly efficient and surprisingly democratic. They brought into competition for government positions and into official service most of the highly trained minds of the nation. Sons of the humblest might rise to the highest positions.

On even rude farmhouses in out-of-the-way districts one might see displayed characters indicating that some relative of the occupant had won a degree. Thanks to this system China was largely freed from a ruling caste that owed its power to hereditary right. No other part of the constitution so contributed to the continuance and the efficiency of the government.

Underneath the bureaucracy were the village elders and the heads of families, a humble but a no less important part of the government. The village was in many respects self-governing, and family control was universal and strong. Guilds exercised many of the powers of regulation over trade and industry which in most other countries have fallen to the government. The central government was a policing and tax-gathering agency. It gave coherence to the country and provided for the common defense, but in local, and especially in rural and village, administration, the nation was largely self-governing with a strong tendency to democracy.

There was a carefully organized code of laws, reissued and amended by each dynasty, but representing the growth of ages of experience

and legislation. Justice was too frequently bought and sold and many of the punishments seem to us inhuman. The theory of justice was there, however, and long-established precedent for reliance on and respect for law.

Measured by modern standards taxation was not heavy. It consisted principally of a land tax and the income from the manufacture and sale of salt, a government monopoly. It was collected partly in kind. Occasionally duties on internal commerce were levied. The expenses of the state of the ancient type were not large when compared with those of the modern one.

There were a number of general characteristics of the government that need to be noted. In the first place, there was no permanent ruling house dating back to the foundation of the nation, as in Japan. There the imperial house is popularly believed to have endured from ages eternal. It furnishes a tangible center and object for patriotic devotion and loyalty. Amid all the changes of government it remains unchanged. It adjusts itself readily to the modern constitutional form of government. Revolution means a change in ministries, not a

change in dynasties. In China, however, there is no traditional center for national loyalty. There have been many ruling houses. One disappears and another arises, usually out of a welter of civil war. This, in an age of transition like the present, makes the situation peculiarly difficult. Without such an hereditary, time-honored center of coherence, strong men are apt to seize in turn the central power as emperor or president, and civil war and disintegration are likely to follow.

There is, however, a real stability in the centralized bureaucracy. It is the slow product of all the long centuries of China's national life. It is something around which the new China can be formed, and it is not likely that it will soon be abandoned whether the government be called a republic or a monarchy. It forms a convenient framework for a modern centralized constitution. Then, too, the lack of a permanent dynasty is paralleled by a high development of democratic autonomy in the clan, the guild, and the village, which, if the individual can be brought to think in terms of the larger unit, are an excellent preparation for national democracy.

Another characteristic of the government

has been its paternal interest in every phase of the life of its members. It did not content itself with the duties of police and defense, but it encouraged trade, industry, agriculture, and learning. In ideals it is nearly akin to modern conceptions of governments with their extensive and varied functions. One does not wonder that several times in its history it has produced socialistic thinkers, or that many of its leaders should to-day incline toward socialism. And yet, while interested in all phases of national life, it also practiced the principle of *laissez-faire*. It left much to individual initiative and in local affairs the village was largely autonomous.

Still another characteristic of the government, not exclusively Chinese, by the way, has been the failure to realize in practice the high ideals held in theory. Corruption was rife, especially during the declining years of each dynasty. Offices were bought and sold. Officials used their positions avowedly to acquire fortunes by means that were so familiar to the populace as scarcely to call forth more than formal censure. The system was honeycombed with dishonesty and greed. Legal decisions went to the longest pocket-book. Here

and there high-minded officials stood out against the tide, but only an unusually able monarch could enforce a fair degree of integrity throughout the nation.

Another characteristic was a lack of nationalism such as one finds in Japan. There was racial consciousness and pride, but there was little if any of that patriotism that leads men to die for their country. Loyalty when it existed was to princes or generals and not to the nation. One part of the empire might be at war and another part be indifferent or even be aiding the enemy. This lack of national coherence was in strange contrast to the centralized bureaucracy. It was scarcely surprising, however, in so large a land in the absence of modern distance-annihilating agencies; it is strange rather that there was so much coherence. But the lack of unity was seen and is still seen in the deep-seated inter-provincial and inter-village jealousies, and in the subordination of national to local interests. It is also often apparent in the division between North and South, the dividing line being roughly the Yangtze River. It is a division that is in part linguistic, in part economic, in part traditional, and even in part racial. This

lack of unity was not so grave a defect in the old days when China was not in intimate competition with highly organized states. The system was in fact well adapted to existing conditions, for probably by no other plan could so large an area have been held permanently together without the aid of modern means of communication. It has been, however, an almost fatal weakness in the contest with modern highly organized states, such as Japan and the nations of Europe. As long as it exists only the mutual jealousies of the powers can save the nation from loss of independence and even dismemberment. It accounts partly for the partial dependence and loss of autonomy of the present time. Fortunately, in the old bureaucratic tradition there is precedent at hand on which to build the reconstructed nation, and nationalism is to-day growing.

In spite of weaknesses, however, the governmental organization has proved sufficient for the main needs of the people. For centuries, although with many and frequently long interruptions, it has held together an area as large, roughly speaking, as Western Europe or the United States east of the Mississippi. At four different intervals it has for a century or more

at a time controlled as imperial territory additional lands, Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, and the New Territory, that are together nearly twice the size of China proper. It has done this without the aid of telegraphs, railways, or the other means of communication that bind together the great states of to-day. When we remember that without these aids Western Europe divided into separate nations, and that only their timely discovery prevented the United States from doing likewise, when we remember that the Chinese Empire is larger in area and population than any empire of antiquity, not even excepting that of Rome, our respect is enhanced for its constitution and for the ability of the people that could produce it. And when we compare China with other states, we must say that on the whole its great realms have been governed well. Corruption and inefficiency there have been, but these have also existed elsewhere. Until the last few hundred years there existed no large state, probably, which was governed with less injustice and with more efficiency and economy.

The formal educational system of China, as we have hinted above, was in part an adjunct of the state. It was devised primarily to pro-

vide officials. The bureaucracy was the main learned profession and naturally attracted much of the best intellect of the nation. In fact as well as in theory the ablest and the best-trained men were drawn to give themselves to the task of government. The keenness of competition in the civil-service examinations can scarcely be realized by Westerners. The height of the ambition of every self-respecting family was to have sons who had achieved an entrance into the charmed circle of learned officialdom. And yet in education direct government supervision began only with the examination. Primary education and the preparation of candidates for the examinations were left entirely in private hands. After the student had passed the examinations there were a few state-aided colleges where, if he were fortunate, he might study. The government often encouraged or directly undertook through the Imperial Academy [1] extensive literary efforts, such as new editions or collections of famous works, encyclopædias, and dictionaries. But the preliminary steps to the examinations it did not supervise nor aid. The result was that formal education had as its aim the pass-

[1] Han Lin.

ing of examinations. No attempt was made to encourage the pupil to think for himself, or to develop him for his own sake. His memory was crammed with texts and their official commentaries, and he was trained in a narrow groove of literary expression and style. Only a very small proportion of the candidates ever reached the coveted goal and the rest became poorly paid clerks, or recruited the ranks of the schoolteachers. The best products of the system furnished fine examples of minds splendidly drilled on narrow but exacting classical lines. The system illustrated at once the best and the worst effects of a training for examinations carried to its logical conclusion.

The evils were many and obvious. The education of women was neglected. The great mass of the men were illiterate. Only about one in twenty could read, and for most of even these favored few literacy meant the use of the few characters needed in a special trade. Among the educated independent thinking was sacrificed for memory, style, and calligraphy. An unreasoning conservatism inevitably followed.

There were, however, some good results. A premium was placed on learning, and the

ideal maintained that the best talent should be given to the use of society as represented by the body politic. National cohesion was promoted by the resulting unity in language and literature. To the system China is indebted for much that is best in her culture. The test of social usefulness was applied to scholarship and it was a natural if not a readily taken step to the practical and technical education of the modern Occident.

The Chinese written language and literature on which this education was based were highly developed, as would naturally be the case when so much able attention had been concentrated on them. The written characters have a varied origin. The earliest were, as with all peoples, attempts to picture natural objects. Thus, the mouth was , the modern 口. To speak was a mouth with a tongue in it, , to-day 曰. The moon was , to-day written 月. A tree was (to-day written 木) representing the branches and roots and ground. The sun was ⊙, to-day written 日. A man was 人, a creature of two legs. A child, or a son, was , a crude picture of an infant, to-day written 子. A sheep was , a ram with its horns prominent, to-day written 羊.

A little later an attempt was made to picture ideas by combining characters. Thus east was 東, the sun, 日, rising behind a tree, 木, for when the earliest Chinese, an inland people, looked toward the dawn they saw a forest between it and them. The verb "to sit," 坐, was represented by two men (人人) seated on the ground (土), a common posture in China. The verb "to be born," "to bear," "to begin," is 生, originally 𠂒, a sprout (丫) proceeding out of the ground (土). Bright was 明, a combination of the sun (日) and the moon (月).

In the spoken Chinese several ideas are frequently represented by the same sound, the context or a combination with a synonym determining the meaning. In the beginnings of the written language, there would be a written character to represent one idea and none to represent another idea expressed in the vernacular by the same sound. It was quite a natural step, then, to write both words by the same character. Thus 方 originally represented a spoken word "fang" meaning "square." It was later used to represent the idea of a "locality" or "place" which had the same sound "fang" in the vernacular but was not represented by a written character. Still

later, to avoid confusion, when the character was used to mean locality there was added the character meaning earth, 土, and the character 坊 resulted. So 方 ("fang") still meant "square" and 土方 ("fang") meant a "place." Thus by combining a character indicating the sound with another indicating the idea, one obtained a new compound character, and the phonetic element was introduced into the written language. This method has been extensively employed until to-day the majority of written signs or characters belong to this class. The part of the character indicating the sound has been designated the phonetic and the part indicating the meaning the radical. Thus the character 弗 is pronounced *fu*, and by itself is an adverb of negation meaning "no," or "not." Combined as a phonetic with the radical 刂 meaning knife, it becomes 刜, a character used to write another word pronounced *fu* and meaning "to cut," or "to hew." The same phonetic combined with the character 口 meaning "mouth," becomes 咈 and is used to express the word pronounced *fu*, meaning "to oppose," "to refuse." The same phonetic written with the radical ⺾ meaning "grass" (an abbreviated form for 艸,

originally written , a picture of grass) becomes and represents a word *fu* which means "luxuriant." The same phonetic written with the radical meaning "heart" (also written , once written , a rude picture of the heart and its ventricles) becomes and represents a spoken word *fu*, meaning "sorry," "anxious," or "excited." Written with the radical for "hand" (originally a picture of the hand) the same phonetic forms the character representing the word *fu* that means "to shake off," or "to wave to and fro." One ought to add, however, that some of the combinations are by no means as simple as the above. Most dictionaries of the written language are now arranged either by radicals or phonetics. There are according to the standard list, two hundred and fourteen radicals, a list that most foreign students of the language learn early.

The written language composed of these characters is condensed in its expressions and highly developed. It appeals to the eye rather than to the ear, and few scholars can understand it when read aloud unless they are familiar with the passage or can see it. It was originally developed when writing was a

cumbersome process and done with clumsy instruments. It was hence produced in as condensed a form as possible and probably never, unless at its earliest beginnings, exactly reproduced the spoken language. After instruments of writing improved and the characters were simplified, the same condensed form was continued. The centuries of effort by scholars of taste and intellect have resulted in a written language notable for its richness of expression and its niceties of meaning. In the hands of a master it becomes a rare vehicle for the expression of thought. New combinations of characters are readily produced to express new ideas. The language is remarkably adjustable to such changes in thought as are taking place to-day and to the new ideas and new objects that are coming in from the West.

The written language thus developed has had and to-day still has many advantageous features. In addition to its richness and its flexibility, it is a tie which binds the different parts of the empire together. The vernacular develops dialects so different that they are mutually almost unintelligible, but the written language is the same throughout the empire;

scholars who cannot understand each other's speech can still read the same books and communicate by writing. The local pronunciations of the characters differ, but the written language appeals to the eye rather than to the ear, and hence is independent of the variations in dialect that are certain to develop in a land as large as China when communication is as difficult as it has been. It is an element of unity which has had no small part in holding the nation together. The written language was taken over by the Japanese and is used by them to-day with modifications, although their spoken language is very different indeed from that of China. As a result Japanese students study Chinese much as American college students of the last generation studied Latin, and Chinese can learn to read Japanese with but little effort. Many new terms have been taken over bodily in recent years from Japan where they were coined by combining Chinese characters to express new ideas from the West.

The written language has its weaknesses, however. The labor of learning the characters is far greater than that of learning even the illogical spelling of the English written language. It consumes much time which with a

phonetic alphabet could be used to advantage elsewhere. It promotes illiteracy and adds difficulty to the task of primary education. The form of the written language, removed as it is from the vernacular, is still another burden for the student. Even the Chinese must learn it almost as he would another closely related language, so different is it from the vernacular in its rules of composition, its style, and even its vocabulary. It adds to the difficulty of education and of communicating ideas to the mass of the people. Extensive education in the knowledge derived from the written page has thus been the privilege of a comparative few, and a difficult task even for them. The mere labor of memory and of the development of form and style has helped to divert the emphasis from the thought to the means of expressing that thought, and has been an obstacle to independent thinking.

The spoken language resembles closely in its structure the written language. It is monosyllabic in nature. There is but little inflection and what little there is is done largely by the addition of particles. It is very poor in separate sounds. No more than nine hundred are in use in any one part of the empire, and in some

sections the number is half that. This means confusion. Thus the word represented in Roman letters as "Hsi" (pronounced like the English "she") represents several scores of different things or ideas. Among others it may mean "west," or "few," or "to draw in the breath," or "old," or the interrogative "why," or "to write," "to dry," "a mat," or "the neighing of a horse." To prevent confusion a number of devices are in use. The meaning may be indicated by the context, as is the case in English with "bear" (the verb), "bear" (the noun), and "bare" (the adjective). The meaning is also made clear by combining words in pairs. Sometimes this is done by repetition, sometimes by the use of two words of nearly synonymous meaning. Another device is a system of tones. Each syllable may be pronounced in a number of tones, — in the North four, in the South as many as nine or more; the tone is inseparable from the word. Thus the syllable "fu," when pronounced in one tone means "not"; in another, "rich"; in another, "corrupt"; and in still another, "to store up." [1]

[1] The systems now in use by Westerners for representing Chinese by Roman letters are numerous and are mostly con-

The spoken language has developed a number of different dialects. These are often mutually unintelligible, but they have the same root stock, as, for instance, have English and German. Through the North of China and most of the Yangtze Valley the dialects are sufficiently alike to be mutually intelligible, and differ but little more than do the dialects of English. This Northern group of dialects is usually called by foreigners the mandarin, or official language, because one of its forms is the language of Peking and of the court. Along the coast from Shanghai southward, and in the Southern provinces, however, the dialects differ greatly both from the mandarin and from each other. A native of Canton, for example, cannot understand a native of Shanghai or Peking. He can much more readily learn the dialects of these places than can a European,

fusing and unscientific. Because it is the one in widest use the Wade system is followed as a rule in this book. The vowels are given their European, not their English value. The consonants *ch*, *t*, *k*, *ts*, and *p*, when followed by the inverted apostrophe, have their English value. When not followed by it, *ch* has approximately the value of the English *j*, *t* of *d*, *k* of hard *g*, *ts* of *ds*, and *p* of *b*. Thus Taoism is more like the English "Dowism." A few names, such as Confucius and Mencius, and prominent geographical names, such as Canton, Hankow, and Peking, do not follow the system accurately, and *hw* is used for Wade's *hu*, as being less confusing.

however, since the structure is essentially the same. This diversity is an obstacle to national union and helps to keep the different sections of the empire apart.

The spoken language of China can be, and at the present time is, frequently represented by the characters, but the great mass of Chinese literature is in the written language. This literature is very voluminous and especially rich in ethics, philosophy, history, and poetry, although religion, science, mathematics, drama, and the novel are all represented. The great mass of the literature has been produced by the scholarly official class, and the outlook of that class, as we have seen, was essentially that of the cultured statesman. The emphasis has consequently been on ethics, history, and philosophy, on poetry, and on essays noted as much for their style as for their subject-matter. The so-called "practical" branches of mathematics, astronomy, medicine, agriculture, science, and pseudo-science are also represented. Many of the works are voluminous. One set of official histories alone, for instance, occupies in an ordinary edition some seventy octavo volumes. Dramas and novels exist, but are usually not in the best

literary style and do not compare favorably with similar works in the West. Religion is largely represented by Buddhist and Taoist books, but only part of these appeal in their style to the Chinese scholar of taste. The most prominent works are the so-called "Classics," which have been previously described.[1] The classical literature of the Chinese is notable for the loftiness of its moral tone and for its beauty of style. In these characteristics it is not greatly inferior to some of the best that the West has produced.

The invention of printing in China antedates its invention in the West, and books have for centuries been cheaply produced and widely distributed. Only the very poorest could plead poverty as an excuse for being without them.

Literature as well as learning has been held in the highest esteem. The written characters were sacred and were not to be put to ignoble uses. The paper on which they were printed was carefully collected from places where it might be trampled, and was burned. Incinerators for this purpose were placed along the streets by charitably disposed persons.

Chinese art and literature fit in naturally

[1] See above, p. 25.

with each other, for the most highly developed form of art has been painting, and the great painters have frequently been poets as well. Then, too, the writing instrument is the brush pen and calligraphy in itself is a fine art. Skillful penmen have national reputations. The best paintings have in them the emotional touch of the poet and the penman's emphasis of line. The artist has endeavored to put into his landscape or his portrait the spirit back of the originals rather than to reproduce them exactly, and to do it largely by lines rather than by an exact reproduction. Perspective and an adherence to nature seem to the Westerner to be lacking, but the best examples cannot but appeal to him as the work of masters.

Sculpture has not had the attention that has been paid it in Europe and has not risen to the heights reached by painting. Architecture has done better and at its best equals the best of Europe. No visitor can soon forget the grandeur and dignity of Peking nor the grace, simplicity, and power of some of the pagodas. Metal-work, lacquer, and porcelain have at times risen from the level of the handicraft to that of art.

Chinese art has shown many foreign influ-

ences, some of them Greek, some of them Indian, and other and earlier ones possibly from the islands of the Pacific. Its highest development was under the T'ang and the Sung. Except possibly in porcelain and metal nothing has been produced for some centuries that is worthy to be compared with the achievements of these dynasties.

In her religious life China has as a rule been tolerant. Various faiths exist side by side and live in comparative peace with one another. Many times there have been persecutions and often the government has frowned on certain sects, once in a long while Confucianism, but more often Buddhism, Taoism, or Christianity. But there have never been the religious wars that have marked the Near East and the West, and the average Chinese is at once an animist, a Confucianist, a Buddhist, and a Taoist without any sense of inconsistency. His ethics are Confucian or Buddhist; he calls in Buddhist or Taoist priests at critical times of illness or burial; and he honors the *manes* of his ancestors, propitiates evil spirits, and seeks blessings from beneficent ones. Only Mohammedanism and Christianity deny to their followers the privilege of eclecticism.

Underlying all organized faiths is animism, a belief in spirits or invisible essences. This seems to have been the primitive religion of China. It is for the great mass of the ignorant dominant to-day. To the average Chinese the air and the earth and natural objects are inhabited by spirits, some of them beneficent, more of them evil. Spirits are the cause of disease and misfortune and must be avoided or propitiated. Shrines are erected throughout the countryside and in the cities. By any roadside one may see one, usually with a tree growing over it. In one of the provincial capitals an ancient gun that did good service in the T'ai P'ing Rebellion was thought to be the abode of a mighty spirit, and written prayers were posted on it and incense offered. In many cities at the point where one street ends in another, a stone is placed declaring itself in large characters to be from the sacred mountain, T'ai Shan (although it is but infrequently genuine). It is a warning to spirits to go back the way they came. The merchant can be seen at the opening or closing of the day burning incense sticks at his shop door. The worship of ancestors is almost universal. To the average Chinese their spirits have power to harm or

to bless the living. They are represented to him by tablets, in his home and in the ancestral hall. Before these offerings are made. The spirits are honored at the graves by food, and by paper houses and paper money for use in the world beyond. To some of the educated the honor paid to ancestors may be but little if at all different in motive from that given at the grave in Western lands: one uses food, the other flowers. To the great mass of the nation, however, the honor becomes worship and is expected to obtain blessings and to avert calamity.

Closely allied to animism is the so-called "feng shui," or doctrine of "wind and water." Its basis is a belief in lucky and unlucky spots. The earth and the air are supposed to be filled with good and evil influences, and these must be taken into consideration before the site of any building is chosen, or any grave is located, or a city begun. A profession numbering many thousands has arisen to determine such spots. This doctrine of wind and water has made difficulty for railways, because railway cuts, besides desecrating graves, disturb the configuration of the land. Telegraph poles were at times objected to. The erection of pagodas

outside of the cities has been partly to insure good influences.

Somewhat similar is the belief in lucky and unlucky days and omens. No betrothal is properly constituted before the horoscopes of the contracting parties are determined. There are lucky and unlucky days for beginning journeys and business undertakings.

The three great formal religions of China are Taoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. It will be remembered that Taoism began during the Chou dynasty as a philosophical, quietistic faith. Its obscure statements of belief could never be comprehended by the masses, and by its philosophy it was naturally limited in scope to the few elevated souls who found themselves spiritually akin to its founder. During the later years of the Chou, however, and during the Ch'in and the Han, it became primarily a search for the elixir of life as a means to physical immortality. Other superstitions crept in as time went on, and in recent centuries the chief function of the Taoist priest has been the exorcism of the demons that have so prominent a place in the Chinese imagination as the cause of disease, death, and misfortune. Taoism has copied extensively from

Buddhism. Its temples were originally built largely under the stimulus of competition. Its priesthood and its ceremonies have come to resemble that of the foreign faith, and it has in imitation of its rival created a pantheon. It talks of a western heaven in imitation of the Buddhist paradise. In its popular form it seems at present to lack any real appeal to the higher spiritual side of man's nature, and caters almost entirely to the crass superstition of the mass of the people.

Buddhism has been in a somewhat better ethical and spiritual condition. It has held up before the nation the ideal of a moral life with heaven as a reward and hell as a punishment. Some of the pictures of hell in its temples vie in their horror with the conceptions of mediæval Europe. It has introduced terms and ideas into the Chinese language that are of use in expressing some of the highest religious conceptions known to man. Many sects have grown up within it around religious leaders of moral and mystical insight, and it has been the main channel through which earnest souls have sought satisfaction for their spiritual longings.

Chinese Buddhism differs very widely from primitive Buddhism, and seems to have ap-

propriated many elements from other faiths as well as to have undergone extensive modifications from within. Primitive Indian Buddhism early developed different forms as it spread northward and southward. The northern form[1] existed and appears to have had its origin mainly in Central Asia, and since early Buddhist missionaries to China came largely from this direction, it predominates in China. But the southern form,[2] the type that to-day predominates in Ceylon, Burma, and Siam, has also had some influence, and in both types the Chinese themselves have modified extensively the faith as brought them from abroad. In some respects Chinese Buddhism resembles, in ceremonies, doctrine, and organization, the Eastern Christian churches, although no one has yet determined whether the elements they hold in common were borrowed by Buddhism from Christianity, or by Christianity from Buddhism, or were derived from a common source, or were of completely independent origin. The similarity is so striking that early Catholic missionaries referred it piously to the work of the Devil. There are monasteries, with

[1] Called "Mahayana," or the "Greater Vehicle."
[2] Called "Hinayana," or the "Lesser Vehicle."

nuns and monks. The ritual bears a superficial resemblance to that of some Christian bodies. There is a doctrine of salvation by vicarious suffering, and there are other teachings that are strangely like the Christian. Some scholars have referred the similarities in part to contact with Nestorian Christianity, a division of the Eastern Church that is known to have been widespread in Central Asia during the European Middle Ages. Pilgrimages to sacred mountains, which are partly Buddhist in their origin, are in great vogue and remind one again of mediæval Europe.

In spite of its elements of life, Chinese Buddhism has been largely formal and superstitious. The mass of the priesthood has been ignorant and even vicious. It has ceased, on the whole, to be able to read comprehendingly the sacred books or to understand the liturgy of the service. To all but a few the higher doctrines of the faith have been meaningless and the religious life has been a matter of blind routine and a means of livelihood. Lay adherents have principally been women and children.

In Chinese the term corresponding to "Confucianism" is "the teaching of the learned." There has been much dispute as to whether it

is a religion. Although discounted by many Chinese thinkers there are certainly religious elements in it. The worship of ancestors is an integral part of it, and the imperial sacrifices at the imposing Temple of Heaven in Peking also belong with it. Confucius himself, as the greatest teacher of the sect, gradually passed through a process of deification until the Manchu dynasty in its last years completed the apotheosis by declaring him to be "the Equal of Heaven and Earth." Official temples have been erected to him in the chief cities, and official sacrifices offered at stated times. He and his disciples are represented in these temples by tablets and form a kind of pantheon.

Confucianism, however, has placed its chief emphasis upon the moral rather than the religious. It has represented the ethical, philosophical, and religious reaction of the learned upon the facts of life and of the universe. It has, consequently, lacked much of the gross superstition of the masses and at times has been skeptical on religious matters. Since the training of the scholar had official position primarily in view, Confucianism has looked on ethics from the standpoint of the state and of

society. It has, as is the usual way with official cults, been a conservative force and a bulwark of the existing order. It has presented to the nation an unusually lofty ethical standard. The five cardinal virtues of Confucius were kindness, rectitude, decorum, wisdom, and sincerity, and in his rule, "What you do not like yourself, do not do to others," one recognizes a parallel to the golden rule of Jesus. It is doubtful whether a higher moral standard than that of the Confucian school is to be found outside the Christian Bible. The system, while it was worked out primarily by the learned, was meant for the entire nation and has profoundly influenced it. The so-called "Sacred Edict," for instance, which as finally developed was an attempt by the Manchu emperors to present in popular form a comprehensive system of ethics, was in reality largely a summary of the Confucian teachings as interpreted by the Sung philosophers. "The teaching of the learned" — like Japanese Bushido, "the way of the warrior," and European "chivalry," the ethical code of the knight — has become the moral ideal of the great mass of the nation.

Mohammedanism has existed in China for some centuries, and to-day has several million

adherents. They are in part descendants of foreign immigrants who have intermarried so extensively with the Chinese, that usually the racial difference between them and the pure natives is not noticeable. They are to be found mostly in the northwest and southwest sections of the empire, although they exist in smaller numbers in practically every province. Islam has not been in China a proselyting faith, and its members seem to have had only infrequent communication with the rest of the Moslem world.

Of Christianity mention has been made above and its further progress will be chronicled later.

In the social organization the emphasis has been laid on the family rather than on the individual. The family means not only the father and mother and the children, but the larger circle of blood relationship. Large sections of the family frequently live together, and in some districts whole villages are made up of one clan group. The immediate ancestors are represented by tablets in the home and the remote ancestors by tablets in the ancestral hall of the family clan. The sons marry early, usually before they are able to support house-

holds of their own. They bring their wives to the paternal home and stay there even after the children come, so that one will often find several generations living together under the same roof tree.

Great emphasis has been placed on family solidarity. Of the "five relationships" familiar to every schoolboy, within which are supposed to be summed up the duties of man to his fellows, three have to do with the family. These are the relationship between husband and wife, between younger brother and older brother, and between father and son.[1] The basis of much of the national ethics has been duty to parents rather than duty to God. If a man indulges in dissipation, he sins, not because he has defiled the temple of God, but because he has injured the body transmitted to him by his ancestors. He is to serve his parents during their life, and after their death to sacrifice to their spirits. Ancestral worship thus becomes a part of his mental background and of his daily life. It is a grave lapse of duty to die without leaving sons to perpetuate the name of the ancestors and to honor their spirits.

[1] The other two are the relationships between prince and minister and friend and friend.

The family has acted as a unit far more than in the West. It usually centers around the ancestral hall, which is often endowed. It frequently provides for the education of its children, especially of the more promising. It looks after its indigent members and its aged, and often after the family graves. The state recognized family solidarity by holding the theory of joint responsibility. The penalty for murder was inflicted not only on the individual culprit, but on his relatives as well, with a severity nicely adjusted to the degree of relationship. Even distant cousins might be punished if the offense of the culprit was particularly heinous. The morals of the entire family must be imperfect, it was argued, if one of its members was guilty of crime. Given the family system, this was not an altogether unjust deduction.

This family solidarity has many points of strength. It is a preventive of a too hurried departure from the past. It furnishes a motive for and makes possible the preservation of excellent moral standards and restraints and is an aid to government. China's high ethical system and her persistent adherence to it during the centuries, in theory and often in practice, have to no small degree been the result of

her emphasis on the family. The duty of leaving descendants was a fortunate provision for the endurance of the race in an age when pestilence, war, and famine kept up the death-rate. The loyalty to the family has certain potential points of national strength. If the unity of the smaller group could be expanded in its scope until it became national, patriotism and national solidarity would be greatly strengthened. This development has been long delayed, but it may now be at hand.

On the other hand, this family system has had certain grave defects. It has hindered initiative. It has been extremely hard for the individual to break away from the dead hand of the past. All the pressure of the traditional moral code and of the family group has tended to subordinate the will of one to the will of all, to discourage departure from the ways of the fathers. That is perhaps one reason why China has found it so difficult to discover leaders in recent years. There have been but few men in the past century who have stood out sufficiently from the mass to command the respect and adherence of the nation. Even some of the few who have emerged have been lacking in the moral courage required for persistent

independent action. Reforms are started amid enthusiasm, and great programmes of local or national reorganization are mapped out. But even more frequently than in the West, these are apt to be dropped before permanent results have been achieved.

This dearth of political leadership and constancy may be due in part to the size of the nation. In the Greek city-state, where the population was relatively small, it was comparatively easy for a leader to emerge and dominate the group. It is much more difficult to become the leader of a loosely organized population of three hundred millions. The mere mass of numbers has an inertia that requires more than ordinary persistence and energy to move and guide. National leadership is a more difficult matter than in the smaller, more highly organized Japan or in the states of Europe.

Since individual initiative has been so difficult and the tendency has been to honor the past, it follows that conservatism has been encouraged and progress discouraged. When individuals or the nation as a whole finally break away from the past, as has been the case in recent years, extremes of radicalism are apt to follow. Unaccustomed to progress, the nat-

ural tendency when the break comes is to go to extremes. Too rapid change results and chaos follows.

Still another evil of the Chinese family system has been the premium on numbers. This has been salutary in time of war, pestilence, or famine, for it has helped the race to survive and recuperate quickly. Whenever these checks on population are limited by peace, however, the race multiplies too rapidly and extreme poverty and all its ills follow.

The position of women in the old China was midway between that of the modern Occident and of the older Orient. She has been more honored than in India or in Mohammedan lands. At times she has been educated, and there have been a few notable instances in which empresses or empress dowagers have governed. In every age many homes have been dominated by vigorous mothers or grandmothers. The husband and wife are ideally to hold each other in mutual regard and both are to be honored by their children. But in many respects the position of woman has not been the equal of that of her sister in the West. Concubinage has been allowed. Divorce has been freely permitted, usually at the instance

of the husband and on a number of grounds, some of them trivial. Women, while more frequently educated than in most Asiatic countries, have not been as frequently educated as men. The widespread custom of foot-binding, enforced by the sanction of long practice, has been a physical hindrance. The girl has not been as much valued as the boy and with the advent of poverty has been the first to be sold into slavery.

The Chinese nation has been on the whole a democracy. Family name and influence have counted for much, it is true, but that is likewise the case in democratic America. The descendants of Confucius have formed a specially honored clan. The only formal nobility under the Manchus, however, was almost entirely confined to the Manchus themselves. The educated official class, sometimes called by foreigners the "literati," formed a kind of ruling caste, but membership was on the basis of merit, not of birth, and all but followers of a few despised occupations might rise to any position in the empire that was not reserved to the Manchus. There was no extensive hereditary nobility as in Europe and Japan. This democracy has been a source of strength

and of weakness. It has permitted the best men constantly to come to the front, regardless of birth, but it has also deprived the nation of the stability given to many countries by a ruling caste whose hereditary business it is to lead.

This in brief was the civilization of the old China, the China that is being completely transformed by contact with the peoples of the West. In spite of the changes of the past decades, it is still predominant, even in the coast cities where the transformation has been most marked. Some of its features are even yet to be found practically unchanged in the remote corners of the empire. Whatever the future of the country and however thorough-going the transformation, this older civilization will be the foundation of the culture of the future.

CHAPTER V

CHINA FROM ITS FULLER CONTACT WITH THE WEST TO THE WAR WITH JAPAN 1834–1894

We now turn from the older history and civilization of China to her intercourse with the aggressive Occident. We have seen how the nation developed without intimate contact with the West, or indeed without the moulding influence of any civilization but that of India. We have seen the beginnings of intercourse with Western Europe, first overland during the times of the Mongols, and then after the fifteenth century by sea. We have also seen that the nation as a whole was but little influenced by this contact. In 1834 foreign intercourse was practically confined to one port, Canton, and was carried on under rigid restrictions. Only a few scattered Catholic fathers ministered to their flocks and these largely in secret and against official prohibitions.

During the last few decades of the eighteenth century and the early decades of the

nineteenth century, however, changes were taking place in Europe that were to lead Western nations to knock at the gates of China and eventually to batter them down. These changes are usually known as the Industrial Revolution, and are so familiar to all students of recent history as scarcely to need recapitulation. A series of inventions had made possible the application of power to machinery. The steam engine came into use. The peoples of Western Europe ceased to be primarily agricultural and gave themselves more and more to manufacturing by the new methods. Factories and factory towns grew up. Manufactured goods increased more rapidly than the local demand and foreign markets were sought. A great impetus was given to foreign commerce, an impetus that was strengthened by the coming of the steamboat and the steam railway. The nations of Western Europe and America sought to open new markets and to develop old ones. They reached out for new sources of raw material. Later, as capital accumulated they looked for new places to invest it. Their purchasing power multiplied and they bought more eagerly the products of other lands. A great increase in population followed and led to

still further growth in manufactures, in the demand for raw materials, for foodstuffs and luxuries, and in international trade. With each decade the effects of the Industrial Revolution have been more apparent. There has been a growing world-unity. Europeans have gone everywhere, and wherever they have gone they have taken their civilization and the industrial and commercial methods and ideals that are the products of the Industrial Revolution. The nations have been bound together by rapid transportation and improved methods of communication, by the steamship, the railway, and the telegraph. Europeans have poured into the Americas. Within a century they and their children have added some tens of millions to the population of the United States. The movement to Canada and parts of South America has been equally striking. Africa has been explored and divided among the powers. The South Sea islands have been acquired. The ancient nations of Western and Eastern Asia have been invaded commercially and their markets and natural resources have been developed. The non-European peoples of the world are conforming more and more to European industrial and commercial methods and

are being profoundly influenced by European civilization. No similar transformation has ever before taken place on so large a scale.

Along with other countries, China has felt the effects of this expansion of the industrialized West. Mighty changes have resulted. It is the history of these changes and their effects that we are to study in the remaining chapters. China had closed her doors to outside influence only to have them opened against her will. For the first time her people and her ancient culture were brought into intimate contact with strong peoples possessing an alien civilization equal and possibly superior to her own. For a time she resisted, but Occidental culture has come in upon her as a flood and the result has been partial disintegration and mighty transformation. The end of the process no one can yet clearly foresee.

The earliest agent of the new age was England. She dominated the foreign commerce of China during the nineteenth century and for most of the time was the outstanding influence in her foreign affairs. It is only in the last few decades that England's commercial predominance has been seriously disputed. The reasons for her leadership are not far to seek. She was

the first nation to feel the Industrial Revolution. She began the new processes in manufacturing. Other Western nations followed her more or less tardily and for some decades could not seriously compete with her. Even before the new age England had been the chief European power in India and the Far East. It was not until other countries, Germany, Japan, and Russia, began to share the new industrial methods that her leadership was seriously threatened.

The signs of pressure on China caused by the new life in the West first became apparent during the last decade of the eighteenth and the first two decades of the nineteenth century. Two embassies were sent by England to the Chinese court to request more favorable trading privileges. These embassies[1] were treated, however, as though they had been sent to bear tribute from subject peoples. No concessions were granted and nothing lasting was accomplished.

British trade with China grew up under the monopoly of the East India Company. Before the middle of the nineteenth century the increasing British commerce could no longer

[1] The Macartney and the Amherst missions.

brook the restrictions involved. Independent merchants fought them in Parliament and in 1834 they were abolished. The British government now sent out a special representative who was instructed to obtain further trading concessions from China. He was to open negotiations directly with the Chinese government, and not with the group of merchants through which the government had heretofore dealt with foreigners. The English insisted, in other words, that the Chinese open their country to foreign nations on the basis of equality. This demand led to friction, for the Chinese continued to regard the English as barbarians. Under the circumstances there could be but one outcome, war. Unfortunately for the good name of Great Britain, the question came to an issue over the opium question. For some years one of the principal British exports to China had been opium, chiefly opium raised in India. The traffic had been frowned upon by the Chinese government, partly because it led to the export of silver and partly because of the demoralizing moral and physical effects of the drug. The Chinese repeatedly declared the traffic illegal, and occasionally made half-hearted attempts to stamp it out. The venality

of the local authorities, however, had thwarted attempts at restriction and had even permitted an increase. Finally, in 1839 the imperial court resolved on a determined effort and sent to Canton a special commissioner [1] to put an end to the traffic. This commissioner, a vigorous fellow, was very much opposed to foreign trade in general and especially to that in opium. He forced the surrender of all the drug then held in stock by the foreign merchants and destroyed it. This and some other acts, in which the British were treated with arrogance and with what was from their standpoint rank injustice, led to increased friction and finally to open hostilities (1839–42). From the British standpoint the war was primarily to secure just treatment of their subjects by the Chinese and to open China to trade on terms more nearly fair to foreigners. To the Chinese and to most of the world, however, it seemed to be designed primarily to force opium upon the Chinese. Hostilities were confined almost exclusively to naval attacks on the cities of the southern coast. The British were uniformly successful and finally, after several abortive attempts at negotiations, concluded a peace,

[1] Named Lin.

known as the Treaty of Nanking. The terms that were important from the standpoint of later years were as follows: —

(1) Canton, and four other ports south of the Yangtze River, including Shanghai, were to be opened to foreign trade. Thus was inaugurated the system of treaty ports that has endured to the present day. It is through these ports and the many others that have since been opened that commerce has been carried on.

(2) The island of Hongkong was ceded to Great Britain. The island was at that time practically unoccupied, and gave the British a strategic position near Canton free from Chinese restrictions from which they could carry on commerce with China. It has since grown into one of the great commercial centers of the world.

(3) Fair tariff rates were to be imposed at the treaty ports to take the place of the arbitrary official exactions of the past. These rates were shortly established by a supplementary agreement. They were low, mostly on a basis of five per cent, *ad valorem*. China thus partially surrendered the right to fix her own customs duties.

(4) An indemnity was exacted, establishing

the precedent that China must pay in cash for her unsuccessful wars with Western powers. It is a custom that has since helped to saddle her with a huge debt.

(5) Official correspondence between the two nations was to be conducted on equal terms, a provision that paved the way for recognition of consuls and later of ministers.

The Western world watched the war with great interest. Following the treaty with Great Britain others were sought by and made with the United States and with France. The American treaty was drawn up at considerable length by a special mission under Caleb Cushing, and for some years served as a model for other treaties with China. There was one important amplification of the treaty with England, that of exterritoriality. American citizens were to be tried for offenses committed in China, not by Chinese law and Chinese courts, but by American law and American officials. Experience had shown that Chinese conceptions of justice differed so much from those of the West that Americans would never submit to them. It was the clearest early statement of that principle of exterritoriality that to-day removes foreigners from the juris-

diction of the Chinese government and that has created in China *imperia in imperio*. It is the basis for the foreign "settlements" in some of the main treaty ports, by which the important commercial centers of China have fallen largely under alien jurisdiction.

By these treaties the old days of restricted trade at Canton were brought to an end. No longer was commerce to be carried on at only one port and through an official monopoly. No longer were consuls to be without legal standing and foreigners to be turned over to Chinese courts for farcical trials. No longer were tariff duties to be levied without published schedules, subject to the whims of officials.

The effect of the treaties in the Occident was a greatly accentuated interest in China. Commerce with the West was expected to grow rapidly, and missionaries, especially representatives of Protestant churches in England and America, came in increased numbers. Chinese conservatism and bigotry, however, were as yet scarcely touched. The mass of the nation knew nothing whatever of the war with England and the subsequent treaties. Those who did thought of Westerners as merely another group of those barbarians who had from time

to time harassed the empire. No one suspected that it was the dawning of a new day. Continued friction was inevitable. The treaties were but the first steps toward intercourse, and in carrying out their terms there were repeated difficulties. There were riots in Canton, where the people were bitterly opposed to a change in the old order, and the opening of the city to foreign residence was deferred. There was trouble in the other open ports, although these very naturally were less disposed to quibble over treaties that had brought them a share in the profitable foreign trade. Commerce increased, stimulated by the greater freedom and by the pulsing new industrial life in the West. Clipper ships cut down the time of the voyage to Europe and America and steamboats began to appear in Chinese waters. Friction continued, and it was evident that foreign nations would insist upon additional concessions and upon a further opening of China.

In 1856 war broke out again with Great Britain. The immediate occasion was disregard by the Chinese for the British flag on a small vessel engaged in the opium traffic.[1] The

[1] This was the lorcha Arrow, and the war is at times called the "Arrow War."

underlying cause was still the increased commercial pressure, brought by industrial growth in the West. There was as well the inadequacy of existing commercial concessions and of arrangements for official intercourse, the disregard by the Chinese of the existing treaty provisions, and the kidnapping of Chinese coolies for contract work in other countries. The opium traffic helped, for no mention was made of it in the first treaty with Great Britain and it still continued. The war dragged on from 1856 to 1860. After some months the French joined with the English. At first hostilities were confined to the South, but the English came to see that if satisfactory relations were to exist, negotiations must be entered into directly with the capital and not with commissioners in the provinces. The war was accordingly carried to the North and the forts that commanded the entrance to Tientsin, the port of entry to Peking, were captured. At Tientsin treaties were concluded, not only with the French and English, but with the American and Russian ministers, who had followed in the wake of the allied fleet. The main provisions of these treaties were as follows: —

(1) Ministers of foreign powers were to

reside at Peking. With direct communication with the court it was thought that there would be less friction.

(2) Ten more ports were to be opened to foreign commerce and foreign ships were allowed to trade in the Yangtze River.

(3) Foreigners were to be allowed to travel in the interior of the country.

(4) Christianity was to be tolerated throughout the empire. Toleration in the treaty ports had been virtually granted by the earlier treaties, but this was now extended to all sections of the country and liberty of conversion was acknowledged.

(5) The tariff duties as fixed under earlier treaties were to be revised. China thus continued to sacrifice her tariff autonomy.

When the representatives of the powers returned to Tientsin a year later (1859) to exchange ratifications, they found that the mouth of the river (Peiho) that led to Tientsin had been strongly fortified. The foreign ministers were urged to go to Peking by a less direct route, the one usually taken by representatives of subject states on their way to the capital. The British and French declined and their fleets attempted to force direct passage to

Tientsin only to be severely repulsed. In spite of these events the American minister went to Peking, but he declined an audience under the Chinese terms and exchanged ratifications at a coast town. The British and French returned to the attack, and finally found it advisable to force their way to Peking. Here, in retaliation for the mistreatment of some prisoners at the hands of the Chinese, the allied army burned the imperial summer palace. The emperor had fled northward, but through his brother[1] he negotiated new treaties by which, in addition to the provisions enumerated in the ones at Tientsin, a piece of the mainland opposite Hongkong was ceded to Great Britain. Tientsin was opened as a treaty port. Chinese subjects were allowed the privilege of unrestricted emigration. Catholic missionaries were permitted to own property in the interior, and an additional indemnity was granted. Thus the foreigner forced the Chinese to take another long step toward opening their land to trade and toward taking their place with the nations of the world.

During the negotiations at Peking, the Russian minister offered his friendly offices as

[1] Prince Kung.

mediator. After the treaties were signed, Russia suggested a return for her services. She was seeking to extend her Asiatic territory south from the Amur River along the Pacific, in search of an ice-free seaport and a share in the opening trade of the Far East. She asked and was given the region to the east of the Ussuri River, a long strip of territory reaching southward toward Korea. Near the southern end of this district she built a seaport town, Vladivostok, that was later to be the terminus of her trans-Siberian railway. Thus by posing as a friend of China she prepared to share in her dismemberment.

On the whole, however, the policy of European powers at this time was not one of territorial aggression. Colonial expansion was temporarily unpopular. What they wanted was security for commerce. They were quite eager to see a strong government in China that would be liberal and stable, and that would make possible the peaceful development of trade. It was not until the last two decades of the nineteenth century that they were again to be seized with earth-hunger.

The victory of the allies over the Chinese was made easier by a serious rebellion that

during those years was raging in South China and that for a time threatened to tear in pieces the empire and even to end the Manchu dynasty. The leader [1] was a Southerner who had come in contact with Christian teaching. He believed that he had a special mission to exterminate the worship of idols and to introduce the worship of the One God, and attained such marked success that he attracted official attention. The government attempted to suppress the movement, but succeeded merely in aggravating it, and it became a political rebellion (*ca.* 1848) which had as its object the driving-out of the Manchus and the establishment of a new dynasty that was to be known by the name of T'ai P'ing. This title, meaning in Chinese "Great Peace," was a frightful misnomer. The rebellion rapidly spread through South China and disorganized several provinces. Wherever it went it brought destruction. Temples were destroyed, — for it still professed a religious purpose, — cities and towns were pillaged, and adherents of the Manchus were ruthlessly slaughtered. The rebel forces captured Nanking and made it their capital. They made one dash to the north in

[1] Hung Hsiu-ch'üan.

an attempt to capture Peking, but this proved unsuccessful and thereafter they confined their activities to the South and to the Yangtze Valley. The T'ai P'ings almost completely lost whatever of high religious motive they may originally have had, and became little better than a well-organized band of plunderers. They threatened for a time the Manchu dynasty, however, and were finally put down in 1864 and 1865 only by the most vigorous exertions.[1] The imperial forces were assisted ably by some foreigners, one of whom, Ward, organized a force of Chinese with foreign officers, the nucleus of a corps that later became famous as the "Ever Victorious Army." After Ward's death it was commanded by Major Charles George Gordon, that Englishman whose career was to end so spectacularly and heroically in the Sudan. Under him it helped to hasten the downfall of the T'ai P'ing power.

The rebellion gave rise to two definite institutions that have survived until to-day. The first of these is the system of internal customs duties, or "likin," that was first instituted to help defray the cost of suppressing the rebel-

[1] Tsêng Kuo-fan, who finally succeeded in suppressing them, was probably the greatest statesman of his generation.

lion. These duties are levied at customs barriers that are placed every few miles along the trade routes of the empire and that remind one strongly of the local customs barriers of mediæval Europe. They are still maintained, although a wasteful source of revenue, for they are a convenient form of peculation. Only a fraction of the funds collected escapes the hands of greedy officials and reaches the coffers of the government. The second institution is the collection of foreign customs duties by foreigners. These duties were fixed by tariff agreement with foreign powers. During the disorders of the rebellion Shanghai fell into the hands of a political secret order. The native customs establishment was demoralized, and a board, made up of foreigners appointed by the consuls with the approval of the local Chinese officials, took over the collection of the duties. The system was later extended to the treaty ports of South China and finally to those of all China. To-day the collection of all maritime customs duties is made through foreigners, under the direction of a foreign inspector-general who is responsible to one of the government boards at Peking. China thus lost another part of her sovereignty. The system,

however, in many important respects has been of great service to China. Sir Robert Hart, who more than any other one man was responsible for its organization and development, had at heart the best interests of the nation. As the years went by he gathered around him, and placed in each treaty port, men of real ability and broad education who proved friendly, sagacious advisers to the Chinese in the years of transition and who were centers of reform. The customs service began and developed a national postal system and charted and lighted the rivers and seacoasts. As an example of honest, efficient, progressive administration it has been of invaluable aid to the Chinese.

The years between the T'ai P'ing Rebellion (1850–65), and the Chino-Japanese War (1894–95) can best be treated as a unit, and can in general be characterized as a period of gradual weakening of the Manchus and of gradual increase of foreign influences.

The Manchu power was slowly but surely declining. For most of the four decades the emperors were minors. The real authority was in the hands of the crafty and able empress dowager, Tz'u Hsi. This remarkable woman

was one of the most vigorous rulers of the Manchu dynasty. Intensely fond of power, with but one brief interval she was the virtual master of China from the accession of her son [1] in 1861 to her death in 1908. The nominal emperors were puppets in her hands. Her own son came to the throne as a minor and on attaining his majority proved to be a dissolute weakling. He died in 1875 and his vigorous mother obtained the succession for a mere child, her nephew, known by the title Kuang Hsü. On attaining his majority he was allowed only a semblance of real authority and was dominated by the more aggressive personality of his aunt. But for the strong hand of this woman and the aid of able Chinese statesmen,[2] the dynasty might have collapsed some years before it did.

There were other rebellions than that of the T'ai P'ings, although there were none that equaled it in extent. Both in Southwest and Northwest China revolts broke out that were

[1] T'ung Chih.

[2] Among these were Tsêng Kuo-fan, already mentioned; Tso Tsung-t'ang, who put down the rebellion in the Northwest; Li Hung-chang, the controlling voice in foreign affairs for years; Chang Chih-tung, a great reforming viceroy; Yüan Shih-k'ai, later the president of the republic.

difficult to suppress. Palace eunuchs increased in number and influence. The line of the conquerors from the North was evidently losing its vigor. When once the last strong personality it had produced should have gone, it would almost certainly lose its hold on the nation.

More important, however, was the contact with Western powers. Improved means of communication, the growing industry, commerce, and enterprise of the West, increased the number of points of contact. This was seen in a variety of ways. First of all, there was a steady although slow growth in commerce. The total foreign trade, for instance, increased from about $220,000,000 in 1875 to about $270,000,000 in 1890. The imports consisted chiefly of cotton goods and opium — principally the former, for the cotton mills of England could produce cloth much more cheaply than could the hand-looms of China. In return China exported tea and silk, and for many years was the chief source of the world's supply of the former commodity. Trade was principally in the hands of the British, and was carried on mostly through large merchant houses, some of which had come down from pre-treaty days. A peculiar organization de-

veloped. Few foreign merchants learned Chinese, but conducted their business through native middlemen and by means of the "pidgin English" that had begun its growth in pre-treaty days. The commercial houses could be located only in the treaty ports. The number of the latter was increased from time to time, and very frequently there were marked off in them foreign concessions. Following out the exterritorial idea, these were governed by foreigners and owed only a partial allegiance to Chinese sovereignty. All foreigners were tried before their own consuls or national officials. There is, for instance, a United States Court in Shanghai with jurisdiction over Americans. Natives accused by foreigners were tried before mixed courts in which Chinese judges were assisted by foreign advisers or "assessors." Policing these concessions came also under foreign supervision. Originally each of several nations was given a concession in a treaty port, and each concession was under the supervision of a consul. Thus at Shanghai, the French, British, and Americans each had a district which for most practical purposes was under the control of the nation to which it had been granted. The American and British conces-

sions were later united into what is called the "International Settlement" and are to-day in charge of a foreign "Municipal Council." Thus there grew up throughout China in the strategic commercial cities of the empire small *imperia in imperio*. Almost unconsciously, partly through weakness and partly through arrogance, China was permitting her sovereignty and her territorial integrity to be compromised. Each of these foreign settlements became a foothold for Western civilization, a center from which Western influences could spread and prepare the way for the transformation of China. Most of these treaty ports were in the South and along the lower Yangtze. Largely because of this, South China came to be more radical and progressive, and opposition to the foreigner died out more quickly than in the North. The province[1] whose capital, Canton, had the first foreign settlements has provided a disproportionate number of leaders for the new China.

The increasing contact with the West in the three decades before 1895 was seen, not only in commerce and in the growth of foreign settlements in the port cities, but in the augmenta-

[1] Kwangtung.

tion of Christian missionary efforts. Christian missions, as we have seen, had begun long before the first treaties in spite of official opposition. Catholic Christians, the fruits of the missionary activity that dated from the sixteenth century, were scattered widely through the empire. In the early nineteenth century English and American Protestants had sent a number of representatives to China. Some of these located at Canton, where they labored heroically against tremendous odds, and some worked among the Chinese emigrants in Siam, Malacca, Java, and Penang. With the signing of the first group of treaties, the opening of the five treaty ports, and the occupation of Hongkong, missionary efforts were redoubled. Both Protestant and Catholic missionaries increased in numbers. The second group of treaties, finally ratified in 1860, gave fuller privileges to missionaries and granted to the Catholics, as we have seen, the right of holding property in the interior, outside the port cities to which the residence of other foreigners was restricted. The Catholics, with the advantage of an older work, were far more important numerically than the Protestants. They had as well the aid of the French government, which

for political purposes posed as their protector and gave to them a certain official influence that made it easier to attract converts. In the thirty years from 1840 to 1870, the number of Catholic missionaries increased from 158 to 252 and the number of converts from about 320,000 to 390,000. These numbers are estimated to have been 657 and 576,000 respectively in 1890, twenty years later. The Protestant body also grew, and, in proportion to its size, more rapidly. For example, the number of its missionaries increased from 473 in 1876 to 1296 in 1889, and the number of church members from 9 in 1847 to 400 in 1857, 3132 in 1865, 13,515 in 1877, 37,287 in 1890, and 55,093 in 1893.

This Christian missionary movement was, of course, important from the religious and moral standpoint, for it brought the Chinese into contact with Western religious ideals. It was also extremely important as an influential agent of other branches of Western culture. Missionaries were more widely scattered than merchants, for they lived in the interior as well as in the port cities. They were in China primarily to give the best of Western civilization to the Chinese, and because of this conscious

purpose were more influential agents of the West than were the merchants. They established schools in which Western as well as Chinese learning was taught. The first Chinese to graduate from a Western university[1] got his preliminary training in one of these schools. For many years the best and for a time the only schools in China in which Western subjects were taught were under missionary direction. Missionaries established printing presses and so brought foreign ideas to many Chinese who were outside their schools. Western medical science was brought to China by Christian hospitals and physicians. Among the missionaries were many men of statesmanlike vision, who clearly saw the situation in which China found herself and realized that sooner or later she must adjust herself to Occidental life. They tried accordingly to fit her for the transition. They were representative of the Occident at its best, and brought the Chinese into contact with a different side of the foreigner from that which was conspicuous in too many merchants and diplomats. The readjustments of the past few decades have been extremely difficult for China, but they would have been much

[1] Yung Wing, a graduate of Yale.

more so had it not been for the work of the missionary body.

The contact of China with the West during these years was furthered by slowly improving diplomatic relations. Following the treaties of 1858 and 1860 foreign ministers took up their residence in Peking. They were not very cordially received, and it was years before they were admitted to audience with the emperor. Even then the audience was held in the hall which was set aside for the reception of embassies from tribute-paying states. A bureau of foreign affairs[1] was organized, however, which was official recognition of the fact that regular intercourse was unavoidable.

Among the early ministers in Peking was a remarkable American, Anson Burlingame. Affable, chivalrous, and enthusiastic, he was impressed with the future prospects of such a people as the Chinese and wished to further their intercourse with Western powers. He sympathized with the Chinese officials in their bewilderment and their ignorance, and after seven years of service as American envoy, proposed to them to send an official mission abroad to seek for more favorable terms than

[1] The Tsung-li Ya-men.

had been granted in the earlier treaties. In 1867 this embassy started, with three envoys, two Chinese and Mr. Burlingame, who, upon resigning as United States minister, was himself persuaded to accept the position of ambassador of China. It was the first embassy abroad and was watched rather cynically by European courts. It visited the United States, then England and the Continent. Unfortunately Mr. Burlingame died before his rather anomalous task was concluded, and without him the mission came to an untimely end. It was, however, a long step in advance in the mutual acquaintance of China and the West. In 1876, six years after Burlingame's death, a Chinese legation was established in London, the first of several that were later instituted in various foreign capitals. China was slowly beginning to accept the fact of foreign intercourse.

Diplomatic relations were by no means always cordial or entirely smooth. China found herself in serious trouble from time to time with each of the three strong European powers whose territories touched hers.

By 1862 the British expansion from India into Burma had reached a stage where it be-

came desirable to control the ancient trade route that connected with Southwest China. In the process of peaceful exploration during the years that followed, a British officer lost his life on the Chinese side of the frontier. This led to strained diplomatic relations, but in the end China made ample recompense and opened additional ports to trade. Several other points of dispute were settled in the agreement that ended the episode. By a convention, concluded in 1886 after the British conquest and annexation of Burma, China formally acknowledged the complete authority of Great Britain over that country.

There was also trouble with Russia. One of the rebellions that marked for China the middle of the nineteenth century had involved the far-western part of the empire bordering on the Russian dominions. For years practically all the vast region known as the "New Territory" had been lost to Chinese rule. To protect their possessions from disorder the Russians had crossed the border and had occupied territory that centered around the frontier post of Kuldja. A masterly campaign had restored Chinese authority over the oases and the

deserts of the great plateau. The general[1] in charge had led an army of twenty thousand men or more across the wilds, had supported them partly by setting them at work to till the soil, and by sheer force of discipline and strategy had subdued an enemy numerically vastly superior to his own force. It was a campaign that deserves to place the commander among the ranks of great conquerors. It is noteworthy, too, in an officialdom notorious for its corruption, that the commander was absolutely untainted by the prevailing dishonesty, although entrusted with almost unchecked power and large funds. After the Chinese had regained control of the region the Russians showed such reluctance to return Kuldja that friction ensued and nearly ended in war. Finally (1881), an agreement was made whereby most of the territory was restored to China in return for an indemnity.

For many years France had been building up for herself a sphere of influence in Annam. In 1862 she extended her territory by acquiring Cochin China, just to the south of Annam. A few years later she attempted to acquire Tong-

[1] Tso Tsung-t'ang, a fellow provincial and protégé of Tsêng Kuo-fan, who had put down the T'ai P'ing Rebellion.

king, a province of Annam which touched the southern border of China. It was an iniquitous attack on a defenseless neighbor. Annam was tributary to China and appealed to her for protection. China came to her aid. France in a high-handed way set Chinese suzerainty at nought, and friction followed which culminated (1884) in war. China was worsted, although the defeat was not entirely an inglorious one. By the treaty of peace (1885) France's protectorate over Annam and Tongking was recognized by China and steps were taken to mark definitely the boundary between the territories of the two powers.

These three incidents presaged the trouble that China might later expect from the earth-hunger of the West when once it was fully aroused and when once her impotence was clearly discerned.

One other point of contact of Chinese with foreigners was through Chinese emigration. Chinese laborers are patient, efficient, and able to live and work in many different climates. Emigration of these laborers, or coolies, was encouraged by transportation companies and labor contractors. Numbers found their way or were taken to Cuba, Porto Rico, Peru, and

other Latin-American countries, to the sugar plantations of Hawaii, to Australia, and to the Pacific Coast of the United States. In this last district they were at first greatly valued, for in these then newly settled regions there was a dearth of cheap labor. Before many decades, however, they aroused opposition. White laborers objected to them on the ground of the long hours and the low wages they were willing to accept. In their alarm, many Americans believed their west coast was about to be deluged with cheap, unassimilable Asiatic labor whose competition would lower greatly the standard of living of the native workingman. Anti-Chinese riots occurred, and finally, in 1882, with the acquiescence of China, an exclusion act was passed by which the immigration of Chinese laborers was forbidden for ten years. This act was followed by others and the exclusion is now without a time limit.

All this contact with foreigners was not without results in China itself. In the first place, there were occasional anti-foreign demonstrations, signs of restlessness under the increasing influx of foreigners. There were notable riots in Tientsin and later in the Yangtze Valley. Far more important, however, were

the conscious attempts at readjustment to the new age. A Chinese[1] finished his course at Yale in 1854, the first of his race to graduate from a Western institution of higher learning. He had been impressed with what he had seen abroad and perceived that China must sooner or later take her place among the nations of the world. He conceived the idea of inducing the government to send students to American schools, who on their return to China would help to guide her through the inevitable transformation. He was finally successful in obtaining the appointment of an educational commission. A number of boys were sent to the United States (1872–75), but before they could complete their training a conservative reaction caused their recall (1881). From among them, however, were later to come some of the leaders of the reform movement.

In addition to this educational mission a few tentative changes were made in the old examination system in the attempt to make it conform more nearly to new conditions. Two government schools were established to prepare young men for the foreign office and the diplomatic service by giving them training

[1] Yung Wing.

in both Western and Chinese languages and learning.

The telegraph was introduced. Arsenals were built, and the attempt was made to remodel the naval and land forces of the empire to meet Western requirements. Some of the more strategic ports were fortified in accordance with approved European methods. A few miles of railway were in existence, although the first line built had been purchased by the government in 1876 and torn up.

These changes, however, were largely on the surface. The great mass of the Chinese, both rulers and ruled, were as yet untouched and went on their way as though there were no outside world with mighty nations and great civilizations. Foreigners were despised as barbarians. China was practically unchanged. Foreign influences had scarcely affected her.

It was only a question of time, however, until these influences would make themselves felt and the nation would awake to find itself in a new age, an age to which it would need to adjust itself whether it wished or not. By the early nineties indications of the approaching change were increasingly apparent. The introduction of steam in trans-oceanic traffic had

added to the size and speed of sea-going vessels. The completion of the Suez Canal had shortened the distance from Europe to the Far East by some thousands of miles. The cable and the telegraph were aiding in the practical annihilation of time and space. China's island neighbor, Japan, had opened her doors to the foreigner and had whole-heartedly given herself to the task of reorganization. Manufacturing and commerce were increasing in the West at an unprecedented rate, and with them wealth and population. Europeans were pressing into all corners of the earth for markets, raw materials, and outlets for their surplus population. They had explored Africa and had divided it among themselves. They had poured into Australia and New Zealand. They had crossed the prairies and the mountains of the North American continent to the Pacific Slope and were dominating Hawaii. Russia was feeling the impulse of the new life and was enlarging her domains in Asia. British power in India had been extended and consolidated. France was reaching out from the southeast. It was only a question of time until China's barriers would crumble and leave her struggling for life in the fierce competition of the new age.

CHAPTER VI

THE TRANSFORMATION OF CHINA
1894–1928

THE underlying cause of the transformation of China was the growing pressure upon her of Western peoples and culture. The immediate cause of its beginning was the war with Japan in 1894–95. The Japanese had long been regarded by the Chinese as inferior and even tributary. Their civilization was much younger than that of China, and had been taken, in fact, almost entirely from it. During the time when all Eastern Asia was enjoying a vigorous life under the T'ang dynasty, Chinese culture had entered Japan and had been eagerly adopted. In the succeeding centuries communication had been kept up in spite of occasional interruptions. The written language of Japan, her philosophy, much of her religion and her moral code, her art, her constitution, and even her dress and her manners were either of Chinese origin or had been profoundly affected by Chinese models. The Japanese, with fine independence and vigor, had, how-

ever, freely modified the foreign culture to meet their own needs. They had not been slavish imitators, but had rather been quickened by the contact into developing a civilization that bore distinct marks of the Japanese genius. Chinese civilization has much the same relation to Japan that the culture of the ancient world has to modern Europe. Shortly after the European age of discoveries, or from about 1600 on, the Japanese had closed their doors to foreign commerce even more completely than had China. With only one nation, the Dutch, was trade allowed, and this through only one port and in strictly limited amounts. Emigration was forbidden and Christianity was proscribed. In 1854, however, Japan had been compelled by Commodore Perry to admit the foreigner. Much more quickly than China, Japan realized that a new age was upon her and that she must conform to it. The process was greatly facilitated by the fact that she was a much smaller state than China, that her government was more highly centralized, and that the foreigner came when because of internal developments she was ripe for some kind of change. By 1894 Japan had nearly completed the readjustment. She had reor-

ganized her government into a constitutional monarchy. She had begun the transformation of her industry, commerce, and education after Western models. She had reformed her army and her navy and was ready to enter on that period of remarkable development which in the last quarter-century has made her one of the leading powers of the world.

This new, progressive Japan seemed certain sooner or later to come into contact with the larger, more unwieldy, more conservative China. The two must almost inevitably contend for the hegemony of the Far East. They were near to a clash in 1874 when China had refused to punish certain uncivilized Formosan tribes for their mistreatment of some wrecked Riukiu sailors, and Japan, taking the law into her own hands, had sent a punitive expedition to the island. They came nearly to blows a little later when Japan extended her new provincial organization to the Riukiu Islands, a group lying between Formosa and Japan. China claimed them as dependencies and for a time hostilities seemed imminent. The islands were finally peacefully left in Japan's hands.

War came at last over Korea. Korea's geo-

graphical position made her the connecting link between the two peoples. She had been the main highway through which Chinese culture had come to the old Japan. She had been invaded at least twice by the Japanese, once in the latter part of the sixteenth century [1] in an attempt to use her as a gateway to the conquest of China. From the time of this invasion she had occupied a position of rather shadowy vassalage to Japan. She was also claimed by the Chinese as a tributary state. This latter relationship she recognized more readily than the former, especially since she was nearly Chinese in her culture, and China seemed the more powerful. When Japan opened her doors to the foreigner, Korea remained so tightly closed that she acquired the sobriquet of the "Hermit Kingdom." She scornfully broke off all connection with Japan, whom she now regarded as a betrayer of Oriental culture. In 1876 the Japanese returned and with the consent of China forced Korea to make a treaty and open a port to trade. Treaties with European powers followed and Western influences entered. As a result two groups came into being, one intensely conservative, the

[1] Under Hideyoshi.

other in favor of reform. The first looked to China for aid, the second to Japan. Both China and Japan interfered from time to time, and in 1885 the two agreed that neither would send troops to Korea without notifying the other. Disorder was rife in the little kingdom and the government was hopelessly corrupt and inefficient. Japan suggested reforms only to find them blocked by Chinese intrigues. China, naturally, was not eager to further in Korea changes which she was not willing to adopt for herself. This was especially embarrassing, since by furthering reforms she would be playing into her rival's hands. Japan felt that the Korean Peninsula from the military standpoint was so strategically situated that in self-defense she must have a deciding voice in its affairs. She could not permit it to be controlled by a strong military power, and she feared not only China, but Russia. It was, moreover, a natural field for her commercial expansion. By 1894 friction had so increased that when a rebellion arose in Korea and both Japan and China, in pursuance of a previous formal convention, sent troops to restore order, open war broke out.[1] China had under-

[1] The Chinese resident at Seoul was Yüan Shih-k'ai, a

estimated her island antagonists, for she had regarded them as semi-barbarous dwarfs and had thought that a sharp party struggle then in progress had hopelessly divided them. To her surprise the Japanese forgot their internal differences, united against her, and inflicted on her a sharp defeat. It is unnecessary to go into the details of the war. The Chinese army was overcome time and again, the Chinese navy, although made up of modern ships, was partly destroyed and the survivors captured, and a number of strategic points were seized, including Wei-hai-wei in the Shantung Peninsula, and Port Arthur. Both of these places had been strongly fortified with Western armaments under some of the progressive Chinese. Port Arthur commanded the Liaotung Peninsula and the entrances to the fertile expanses of Manchuria. Its possessor could threaten North China and Korea. The treaty (of Shimonoseki) that closed the war gave somewhat more favorable terms to China than her performance on the field would have justified her in expecting, but they were humiliating

lieutenant of Li Hung-chang, who was the leading figure in the foreign affairs of China during the last part of the century.

enough.[1] The complete independence of Korea was acknowledged, definitely ending Chinese suzerainty. Japan was given Formosa and the Pescadores, a group of islands between Formosa and the mainland. She was also given the Liaotung Peninsula, including Port Arthur, and a huge war indemnity. Several additional ports in China were opened to foreign trade. As between China and Japan the question of the leadership of the Far East seemed to be decisively settled.

The European powers had watched with interest the progress of the war and some of them viewed with alarm the terms of the treaty of peace. Russia had been seeking to build up for herself an empire on the Pacific and was extending her influence into Manchuria and North China. She was already at work on a Siberian railway to connect European Russia with the Pacific. It was part of a magnificent plan of Asiatic expansion that included all her eastern frontiers from the trans-Caspian regions and the borders of

[1] China's agent in the peace negotiations was Li Hung-chang. While in Japan he was attacked by a fanatic, and it is said that the Japanese statesmen were so chagrined by the disgrace of such grave national discourtesy that they modified their demands.

Persia to the shores of the Yellow Sea. Her steady, long eastward advance had led her to believe in it as a kind of manifest destiny, and an ice-free port, for centuries an object of her diplomacy, seemed almost within her grasp. The cession of the Liaotung Peninsula threatened a decided check to her plans. She did not as yet greatly fear Japan, but looked with annoyance upon her ambitions. Germany was alarmed by what she thought to be the Yellow Peril. In the eyes of her emperor Japan's victory was but the beginning of the military reorganization of Eastern Asia. Unless it were kept in control the yellow race would sometime oust the European from the Far East and possibly invade Europe itself. Accordingly Germany, Russia, and Russia's ally, France, protested against the annexation of the Liaotung Peninsula. Japan was not in a position to resist, and agreed with what grace she could muster to re-cede it in return for an additional indemnity.

The war with Japan was followed by consequences momentous for China. In the first place, it led to territorial aggression by European powers. As we have seen, Western nations were by the latter part of the nineteenth cen-

tury entering on a period of commercial and territorial expansion and competition as a result of the Industrial Revolution. No longer was England the only power which enjoyed the fruits of the new methods. No longer were colonies unpopular, as they had been earlier in the century. Imperialism had become a slogan. The powers of Europe were feverishly dividing among themselves the undeveloped sections and the weaker peoples of the world. They were striving to obtain from the weaker nations commercial preferences and concessions for the investment of capital in railways, mines, factories, and plantations. It was not only because their trade was developing rapidly and because their investment-seeking capital was accumulating, but because they feared for the future and believed that unless they obtained special grants from the weaker, poorly organized peoples, some other power would later do so. The Chino-Japanese War revealed unmistakably the weakness of China. The ancient empire was seen to be impotent to defend itself even against its smaller Asiatic neighbor. And yet, with its vast population and its immense natural resources, it was certain to become a rich field for commerce and

for the investment of capital. In the desire to insure for itself a share in her future each power now began to take steps to build up spheres of influence and to divide China. In compensation for her services in obtaining the retrocession of the Liaotung Peninsula Russia asked and received permission to carry her Siberian railway directly across Northern Manchuria instead of following the longer and more difficult route through her own territory. Count Witte was in the midst of his plans for railway and industrial expansion, which included all Russia and pushed forward her commercial boundaries along a frontier extending from the northern confines of Persia to the North Pacific. It was an attempt to dominate the carrying trade of the continent of Asia by judiciously placed trunk-lines. France asked and obtained certain mining and railway privileges in South China and a rectification favorable to herself of the boundary between the French Possessions and China. Great Britain, disturbed by the French demands, obtained boundary concessions on the Burmese frontier. In 1897 Germany took advantage of the murder of two German missionaries in Shantung to demand a ninety-nine-year lease, as the

cession was euphemistically called, of Kiaochow Bay. Kiaochow commands the province of Shantung, fertile of soil and rich in minerals, and can be made to drain even a larger hinterland. On this bay Germany began building a model city, Tsingtao, and to develop its commercial and military possibilities built railways, made harbor improvements, and erected fortifications. She opened mines in the great coal-fields of Shantung and projected a system of railways to tap much of North China. Following the German example, and ostensibly to secure the balance of power and the maintenance of peace in China, Russia demanded and received the "lease" of Port Arthur, the very port of which Russia and the other powers had deprived Japan. She was also permitted to connect Port Arthur by rail with the Siberian trunk-line. This turned over to her the virtual control of the vast territory of Manchuria, a sparsely settled and extremely fertile district, and was a long step toward an ice-free port. As compensation for the German and Russian leases, Great Britain asked and was given a lease of the fortified port of Wei-hai-wei on the northern coast of Shantung, and an extension of territory on the mainland opposite Hong-

kong. Not to be outdone, France obtained the lease of a port [1] in South China. Even Italy made demands,[2] which, however, were refused.

Not content with leases the powers began marking out for themselves "spheres of influence." A sphere of influence consists of claims for preference in the section covered. Privileges in commerce, in furnishing capital for railways, and in the development of mines are to be granted. No territory within the sphere is to be alienated to another power. England strove to reserve the great Yangtze Valley for herself and persuaded the Chinese government to promise that no portion of it should go to another; Russia agreed to seek for no concessions there in return for a similar promise from Great Britain in regard to territory north of the Great Wall.[3] France marked out a more or less shadowy sphere in the provinces of South China, and Germany, adjacent to her leased territory in Shantung. In case China were to be partitioned, the control of these spheres would lead to something more definite. Eng-

[1] Kwang-chow-wan.

[2] For Sanmen in Chehkiang Province.

[3] One exception was made in a railway concession from Shan-hai-kwan to Newchwang which had been previously granted to a British corporation.

land was confirmed in her predominance in the control of the Chinese customs service by the stipulation that as long as her trade in China was larger than that of any other power, the head of the customs service should be a British subject.

The Chinese government had with much reluctance decided to build railways. It lacked capital and would need to borrow. Here was another opportunity for the powers. Railways are strategic both from the political and from the commercial standpoint. A struggle for railway concessions followed and many were granted, carrying with them the privilege of supplying the capital and of controlling the construction and the operation. A Franco-Belgian firm was backed by the French and Russian ministers in a successful demand for the contract for the trunk-line from Peking to Hankow, which, with the roads in North China, Manchuria, and Siberia, would give the heart of the country rail connections with Europe. This was done in competition with a British firm and really marked the invasion by Russia of the British preserve in the Yangtze Valley. Russia was making a widespread attempt to wrest from England the control of the

commerce of Asia. Since she could not hope as yet to displace her on the sea, she was attempting to fight her by great railway systems. From her trans-Caspian roads she was reaching south toward Persia and India. By her Siberian and Manchurian lines, now to be supplemented by one from Peking to Hankow, which when carried on to Canton would be the main trade route of China proper, she hoped to dominate the greatest of the Asiatic empires. As a counter-attempt, English capitalists projected a railway from Shanghai to Nanking, to be joined to the British-controlled Chinese line from Tientsin into Manchuria by a road from Nanking [1] to Tientsin. This last road Great Britain was forced to divide with German interests, now strongly intrenched in Shantung. American capitalists obtained a contract for the line from Hankow to Canton, but later sold it to the Chinese government before any construction work had been done.

Aside from the Canton-Hankow railway contract the United States had had no part in this scramble in China. She had been too occupied with the development of the virgin

[1] More strictly speaking, from Pukow, just across the Yangtze from Nanking.

resources of her own great land to be struggling for them elsewhere. She did have some commerce in China, however, and just at this time had come into possession of what was virtually Asiatic territory, the Philippines. Under Secretary Hay she now (1899) suggested to the powers that they observe in their enclaves the "open door," or respect for existing treaty rights and tariffs and equal harbor and railway charges. This principle was accepted by the great powers, cordially so by Great Britain, since her traditional economic predominance in China was threatened by her rivals, and somewhat more guardedly by the others. It was more strongly stated in 1900 in an agreement between Great Britain and Germany, an agreement which was later accepted by all the powers but Russia.

The disastrous defeat at the hands of Japan and the subsequent leases and concessions to European powers had a profound effect upon the Chinese mind. Foreign countries could no longer be ignored. For the first time a large proportion of the thinking men of the nation and even of the common folk began to realize that Western countries must be reckoned with. One group, the reactionaries, attempted to

meet the situation by riots in a blind effort to rid themselves of the foreigner and all his works. Another, the progressives, realized that China was entering a new age, whether she would or not, and that she must adjust herself to it. They felt that Japan had defeated them because she had heartily adopted such Western methods as she needed. They believed that European powers had been able to prey upon China, not because of any greater native ability, but because of their learning, their methods, and their organization. To meet Japan and Western nations successfully, then, and to avoid becoming a puppet in their hands, it was necessary to adopt Western methods. This progressive group was still in the minority, but it was an increasing minority that bade fair soon to become a majority.[1] The events of the past few years had given impetus to its growth and to its activity. As might be expected its leaders were from Canton where there had been a longer opportunity to become acquainted with the foreigner. In 1898, after the Japanese War and the humili-

[1] One of the best known and most influential members of this group was K'ang Yu-wei, of Kwangtung. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, who was later to become famous as one of the greatest writers of the progressive school, was also among them.

ating concessions to Europeans, reform societies sprang up throughout the empire. Translations of foreign works were eagerly read, foreign schools were filled to overflowing, and numbers of students went to Japan to seek for the new learning in the formerly despised island empire. The progressives succeeded in winning the ear of the young emperor,[1] who by this time had attained his majority and was old enough to assert himself against the conservative and vigorous empress dowager. He gave himself heartily to the movement and in the spring of 1898 issued a number of decrees which were designed to begin such a transformation in China as had taken place in Japan. The old civil service examinations were to be reorganized and Western subjects were to be placed on the examination list. Colleges and schools with curricula combining the old and the new learning were to be established throughout the empire. A national bureau was to be formed for the translation and dissemination of foreign works. The government was to be given a complete overhauling; useless offices were to be abolished and new boards were to be established. The privilege of memorializing the

[1] Kuang Hsü.

throne directly was no longer to be confined to the higher officials, but was to be given all members of the civil service. The military system was to be completely reorganized.

The progressives, however, were still in the minority. The great mass of Chinese officialdom was intensely conservative and found an able leader in the empress dowager. The contemplated innovations were viewed with consternation. The salvation of the country was held to lie in returning to the ideals approved by the ancients, and in ousting the foreigner rather than in adopting his methods. In the autumn of 1898 the empress dowager suddenly asserted herself, seized the reins of government, and forced the emperor into virtual retirement. The reform edicts were canceled, and wherever possible liberalist movements were suppressed. The leading progressives were executed or fled to foreign lands.

The official reaction was reinforced by popular attacks on foreigners, which culminated in 1900 in the Boxer uprising. This outbreak was a last blind, desperate attempt of the Chinese to rid themselves of the unpopular alien. It was based on the conviction that the ills which had befallen the nation were due to his pres-

ence. If he could be ousted and the door closed against him and his new ways, all would again be well. The uprising was begun and led by a society in North China called "The Righteous Harmony Fists," or "Boxers." It was in North China that the coming of the foreigner was more recent, that the official anti-foreign reaction was strongest, and that the recent territorial aggressions of the powers had been largely concentrated. Late in 1899 the Boxers began anti-foreign riots which spread through North China during the next few months. Missionaries and their converts, living as they did in scattered groups outside the treaty ports, were the most exposed and suffered most severely. The empress dowager, after some hesitation, apparently allowed herself to be persuaded that the Boxers were possessed of supernatural power and that they were invulnerable to foreign bullets. She gave them her sanction and an edict was issued ordering officials to kill the foreigner wherever he was found. The viceroys and governors [1] of the

[1] Principal among these were the aged Li Hung-chang, Yüan Shih-k'ai, Liu K'un-i, and the scholar reformer Chang Chih-tung, whose pamphlet advocating progress, and translated under the title "China's Only Hope," was well known in its day.

East and South disregarded the edict, but in some of the more northerly provinces it was carried out. Scores of missionaries and hundreds of Chinese Christians were killed, often with fiendish cruelty. The chancellor of the Japanese legation was killed by Chinese soldiers, and the German minister was foully murdered. The foreigners in Peking delayed leaving the city until it was too late to escape, and shut themselves up in the legation quarters, where they were besieged for over two months.

In the mean time the powers had not been inactive. Troops were hurried to China, and there started for Peking a joint relief expedition in which British, Japanese, Russians, Americans, and Germans joined. The allied forces reached Peking after some hard fighting and one check near Tientsin, and took the city and looted it. The imperial court fled westward.[1] With the fall of the capital the uprising subsided.

The powers were now face to face with the problem of what should be done with China. There was a strong opinion in some quarters that she should be partitioned, but other counsels prevailed. In the end no territory was

[1] To Hsianfu, an ancient capital of China.

taken from her, but conditions of peace were imposed that were designed to mete out punishment for the outbreak, to obtain indemnity for the foreign lives and property destroyed, and to insure against a similar outbreak in the future. Among the specific terms were the following: —

The death penalty was to be inflicted upon some of the officials who had been most notorious in their cruelty toward foreigners.

Civil-service examinations were to be suspended for five years in all places where the outrages had occurred. This deprived the people of these districts of the privilege of competing for the highly coveted degrees which were the door to official service.

Officials who in the future failed to prevent anti-foreign outrages within their jurisdiction were to be dismissed and punished.

The foreign office was no longer to be a subordinate department, but the leading ministry of state. This would insure attention to foreign affairs as the leading business of the government. It was, moreover, expressly stipulated that representatives of other countries were to be granted audiences with the emperor as with the monarchs of other civilized nations.

Some coast defenses in North China were to be razed and arms and war material were not to be imported for two years.

A heavy indemnity (450,000,000 taels, or roughly 300,000,000 dollars gold) was levied on China to pay for foreign losses during the uprising. The customs duties and some other revenues were pledged to its payment and the former were raised slightly to help meet the burden. The American portion of the indemnity proved to be more than sufficient to meet the military expenses and the claims of citizens of the United States and the surplus was later voluntarily returned to China. It was set aside by the Chinese government for the payment of scholarships for Chinese students in America. Still later the remaining balance was remitted and assigned to cultural purposes.

Permanent guards of foreign troops were to be placed in the capital to protect the legations, and the powers were permitted in addition to guard the railway line from Peking to the coast to prevent a recurrence of the siege. The legations have since been fortified and now resemble armed camps in the heart of an enemy's territory.

The Chinese government was to erect a

monument in Peking to the memory of the German minister and was to send to Germany a mission of apology.

Serious complications in Manchuria followed the Boxer year. To Russia the disorders had seemed a most convenient opportunity for strengthening her hold in that region. If China were to be partitioned, as appeared for a time to be possible, she would hope to come in for the lion's share. She had hurried troops into Manchuria on the outbreak of the troubles, ostensibly to protect her railways, citizens, and other special interests. When the uprising had ended and order had been restored, she showed no inclination to withdraw, but rather tried to strengthen her hold. In January, 1901, a preliminary understanding with the local Tartar General recognized her partial control of the civil and military administration. About the same time negotiations were begun with China for an agreement which would have made Manchuria a Russian protectorate in everything but name and would have given Russia preferential rights in all the vast Chinese dominions which bordered on her possessions. The convention failed of ratification

only on the strongest objections from influential Chinese and representations by Japan and Great Britain. Russia still kept her troops in Manchuria, however, and persisted in her policy of obtaining special privileges, commercial and political. Great Britain, Japan, and the United States protested, and in 1902 she agreed with the Chinese to withdraw her troops within eighteen months. This convention she began going through the form of carrying out, but only far enough to concentrate her forces along her railways. She retained her control of the maritime customs of Newchwang, the principal port, and of the civil administration of that city. In 1903 she made further demands which included the virtual reservation of the commerce of Manchuria to her subjects. These demands were withdrawn, but Japan and the United States attempted by treaty so to insure the open door that they could not be renewed. Still Russia persisted. Through railway service was established between Moscow and Port Arthur and a Russian viceroyalty of the Far East was created which amounted to claiming Manchuria as a province of the Czar's empire. Russia still delayed withdrawing her troops, and openly disregarded

Japanese interests and carried on intrigues in Korea.

Japan was especially interested in Korea and Manchuria. She had a rapidly growing population which was already overcrowded. Arable land in Japan is limited and her hope of continued prosperity is in emigration and in engaging her surplus population in manufacturing. If she does the first, she must try for reasons of national strength to keep the emigrants under her control. If she does the other, she must keep open her natural market, the adjoining continent. Russia by her intrigues in Manchuria and Korea was cutting off Japan's natural field for emigration and commercial expansion. The Russian ownership of these districts would have meant for Japan economic distress and would have planted an aggressive military power at her doors. She foresaw a probable conflict and exerted every effort to prepare herself in case her efforts to avert it were unsuccessful. She increased her army and navy, and in 1902 made an agreement with Great Britain which assured her of the aid of that power in the Far East in case another power were to come to the aid of Russia. Great Britain was fearful of the Russian advance, not

only on China, but on the boundaries of India, and was quite willing to set against it the doughty Japanese. She did not foresee the leading part that the little islanders were later to play in the commerce and politics of the Far East. The Japanese repeatedly protested to Russia against her policies in Manchuria and Korea, but to no avail. They tried agreements with Russia (in 1896 and 1898) to respect their interests in Korea, only to have them treated as "scraps of paper." One party, led by the famous Ito, would even have welcomed an alliance with Russia. The Russian authorities regarded Japan with contempt as a possible military antagonist and at times treated her with scant ceremony. The island empire finally struck and struck suddenly. As a result of the war the Russian fleets were annihilated and in spite of a stubborn resistance the Russian armies were driven back. Port Arthur fell and the railways in Southern Manchuria were captured. It is hard to say what the outcome would have been had the struggle been prolonged. Japan was not far from the end of her resources, and revolution at home and the difficulty of bringing adequate supplies of troops and provisions across the vast reaches

of Siberia by a single-track railroad were serious handicaps to Russia. Both sides were ready to welcome President Roosevelt's intervention. Negotiations at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, followed, and a treaty was made, which among other things recognized Japan's paramount interests in Korea and transferred to her all the Russian privileges and property in Southern Manchuria. Port Arthur and the Russian railways of the section were handed over to her. The two powers agreed to evacuate Manchuria and Chinese sovereignty was still recognized. China formally sanctioned the transfers and assignments and the open door was theoretically still maintained. Japan could not be expected, however, to withdraw completely from a territory purchased at so great a cost of blood and treasure or to exert herself to see that equal commercial opportunity was accorded all nations. She had now, moreover, become a factor to be reckoned with in Far-Eastern affairs and had achieved recognition as a first-class power. After a futile attempt to administer Korea as a protectorate, she formally annexed it (1910), and as a result became increasingly interested in the future of China.

The effect upon China of the Boxer year and of the subsequent developments, including the Russo-Japanese War, was revolutionary. At last and in no unmistakable terms events had shown her that she must reform or lose her national existence. Even the most blindly conservative could not fail to read the lesson. The foreigner could not be expelled. He was there and there to stay. The Boxer uprising had resulted, not in ousting him, but in placing China more than ever under his control. The Russo-Japanese War was humiliating to China, for she saw two nations fighting over her soil while she stood helpless. It was also encouraging, for she perceived that it was possible for an Asiatic power by adopting the foreigner's methods to defeat him at his own game. The much-feared Russians had been worsted by Oriental islanders.

As a result of these lessons the walls of Chinese conservatism broke down in rapid succession and the country entered feverishly on a campaign of reform. China at last was awake to the new age and attempted to fit herself to enter it by changes which startled the world. The empress dowager saw that unless the Manchus could place themselves at the head

of the movement they would be swept aside. She received foreigners at court and endeavored to establish more cordial official relations with them. The building of railways was encouraged and no special hindrance was placed in the way of granting concessions to foreign capital. The new education was aided. The old-style examinations were abolished and schools were opened throughout the empire in which were taught both Western and Chinese subjects. By the end of 1910 there were 35,198 government schools with an enrollment of 875,760. Government effort was supplemented by private initiative, and many private institutions were founded. Students flocked to Europe, to America, and especially to Japan. It was cheaper to go to Japan than to the Occident, and a similarity in customs and language made it easier to get the new learning there than at its source. The number studying in Tokyo ran up into the thousands. A public press sprang up and newspapers were printed in a form of the written language that approached the vernacular and was easily read by the man of average education. Translations of foreign books were made and were eagerly read. English was studied in all higher

schools as a means of acquiring Western learning without the aid of the translator. A post-office had been started under the direction of the maritime customs service and now grew apace. Telegraph lines were built by the government to connect all the principal cities. By the end of 1908, twenty-five hundred miles of railway were open in China proper and seventeen hundred more were under construction. Hankow at the heart of the empire and on the great Yangtze River was connected with Europe by rail. From Shanghai, Peking, Canton, and Tsing-tao lines reached out into the surrounding country. Work was begun on the road from Canton to Hankow, to tie the South up with the rest of the empire and with Europe, and on a line from the central Yangtze Valley into the great western province of Szechuan. The French completed a railway from the coast to the capital of the southwestern province of Yünnan. Modern cotton mills and match factories were started and new coal, iron, and antimony mines were opened. Chinese organized companies after Western methods to handle these and other enterprises. Attempts were made to stamp out foot-binding and to eradicate opium-smoking. The latter

reform for several years proved to be remarkably successful. The importation of the drug, its production, and its use were soon reduced to a minimum and in many places entirely stopped. When one considers the grip of the habit on its victims, their numbers, — at least twenty or thirty millions, — and the profits paid to producers, merchants, and the government, the achievement is most noteworthy. Foreign commerce grew. It increased from 360,000,000 taels (about $270,000,000) in 1898 to 583,000,000 taels (about $418,000,000) in 1904. Foreign cotton goods were more and more used, foreign machinery came in, and kerosene appeared as an illuminant in even the remote districts. An attempt was made to introduce uniform coinage and to end the monetary chaos of the empire.

There was a remarkable growth in national feeling. The Chinese had racial coherence, but they lacked national consciousness. Now the disgrace of China's helpless condition began to be keenly felt. The reorganization of the army and navy, already begun by intelligent leaders,[1] was loudly demanded and partially accomplished. Funds for it were raised partly by

[1] Principal among these was Yüan Shih-k'ai.

private societies. A beginning was made at a reformation of law courts and codes in the attempt to remove the excuse for exterritoriality. A more direct control of the maritime customs service was sought and the effort made to check the complete authority over it exerted by its organizer, Sir Robert Hart. The effort was partially successful and Hart retired to England. A demand arose for a constitutional government of a Western type. A commission was sent abroad to study Western forms of government and to suggest a constitution for China.

In 1906 a plan for governmental re-organization was announced. The central ministries of state were made over and a scheme adopted for the gradual introduction of representative bodies. Provincial assemblies were to be opened in 1909, a national assembly in 1910, and by 1915 a national parliament was to be organized and the transformation to a constitutional monarchy to be completed. The provincial assemblies were opened at the time set. They were chosen by a carefully restricted electorate and had consultative powers only. On the whole they conducted themselves with dignity and gave high promise for the future of

representative institutions. The national assembly met as scheduled in 1910.

The new national spirit had shown itself in a boycott on American goods in 1905 as an expression of disapproval of the treatment accorded Chinese in the United States.

In this transformation of China, Christian missionaries played a prominent part. They were more widely scattered and were in more intimate contact with the people than any other group of foreigners. They were for the most part men and women of ability and were interested, not only in the religious, but in the social, physical, political, and economic regeneration of China. They sought to bring the best of the West to China. They founded schools and colleges throughout the empire. Inadequate as many of these were, they were more efficient than the hastily organized government schools, and a large proportion of the leaders of the new China have come from them. Hospitals were widely established in which the scientific methods of the Occident were substituted for the clumsy and often superstitious practices of the Orient. A few medical schools were founded — a first step toward training a modern Chinese medical profession. Preven-

tive medicine and public sanitation were talked of as means of reaching disease at its source. Famine was attacked, not only by the organization of relief, but by plans for removing at least some of its causes by reclamation projects, forestry, and improved methods of agriculture. Wholesome Western literature was translated and distributed. Churches were organized throughout the empire, centers of light and hope and of revolutionary, regenerating influences. By 1911 the number of Protestant church members had passed the 200,000 mark, four times the number of twenty years before. The Catholic Church counted nearly a million and a half as Catholic Christians, a substantial increase, although not so great proportionately as that of their Protestant brethren.

The reform movement in China finally swept aside the Manchus. These lost in 1908 their last great leader, the empress dowager. She and the unfortunate emperor died within a few days of each other and an infant [1] was elevated to the throne under a regency that proved unequal to the situation. A republican

[1] Known by his reigning title Hsüan T'ung, "promulgating universally."

movement had for some time been agitated, largely by Cantonese in China and abroad, under the leadership of the foreign-trained Sun Yat-sen. It was the extreme wing of the reform party and saw in democracy the ideal for the new China. For years Sun had been traveling among the Chinese abroad, preaching a republic and building up a constituency. In the spring of 1911 unrest became acute. The central government attempted to place the railways of the empire, many of them owned in the provinces, under imperial control, and to complete them by funds raised by foreign loans. This aroused bitter opposition in the provinces. The extremists took advantage of the unrest and in October, 1911, led a rebellion which broke out at Wuchang opposite the great commercial city of Hankow, the key to the central Yangtze Valley. The revolt speedily assumed alarming proportions. The Manchus in a panic called to their aid Yüan Shih-k'ai. Yüan had been prominent under the empress dowager, first as Chinese resident in Korea before the fateful war with Japan and later in the *coup d'état* of 1898 when he was accused of betraying the young emperor. As governor of Shantung during 1900 he showed

his good judgment by opposing the Boxer madness. He was unpopular with the regency and had been dismissed from court after the death of the empress dowager. He was primarily a soldier, a leader of the new army, thoroughly convinced of the necessity of reorganizing China by adopting Western ideas; but being a Northerner he represented a more conservative type of reformer. He was given full control of the imperialist fortunes. After a few weeks of localized fighting, Yüan announced to the Manchus that the revolutionary movement had become so strong that it seemed to him best that the dynasty should abdicate. This it did, entrusting the future disposition of the country to his hands. In the mean time the provinces south of the Yangtze had organized themselves into a republic with Nanking as their capital and had elected Sun Yat-sen as provisional president. Early in 1912 Sun agreed to resign in the interests of unity and Yüan Shih-k'ai was elected the provisional president of the Republic of United China.

This change to a republic, so startling to the West, was in reality logical. The Manchus had become weak and as foreign conquerors could not be tolerated by the awakened patriotism of

the new China. There was no recognized native dynasty to which the Chinese could turn, and there was no man who would be universally acceptable as the founder of a new one. In the old days the country would have been thrown into prolonged civil strife from which some successful general might eventually have emerged as the founder of a new dynasty. But foreign powers would have intervened had that been attempted in 1912, for it would have put in jeopardy their citizens and their commerce. A republic was, seemingly, the only form of government that would prevent extensive civil strife for the moment and maintain China's independence. It was, moreover, not entirely foreign to China's previous training. Her government had had many features, particularly in the village organization and in the civil service, which readily lent themselves to a republican organization. The chief immediate changes were the substitution of an elected president for an hereditary emperor, and the introduction of democratic ideals of increased popular control in all branches of the government, ideals which were not in a strict sense a necessary accompaniment of a republic.

The founders of the republic, radical South-

erners, had in mind a very democratic form of constitution. The franchise was to be granted with as few restrictions as possible and was even in some sections to be opened to women as well as to men. Party government was to be instituted, and the national assembly and a responsible cabinet, rather than the president, were to be the dominating factors in the state. Yüan Shih-k'ai, however, representing the Northern and more conservative element, believed in a strong executive and a centralized government. The North and the South, as we have seen, had always been somewhat different in spoken language, and even in blood, and at times they have been divided politically. The South had been longer in contact with the foreigner and was now more ready to adopt his ways. There ensued a struggle between the radical group which was in control in the South, and the more conservative group, led by Yüan, with its stronghold in the North. Friction was almost constant and became acute over alleged political murders by the president, and his removal of southerners from office. The issue was joined chiefly over the question of a foreign loan. The new government was in dire need of funds and could not

immediately obtain them in sufficient amounts from taxation. A combination of foreign capitalists, representing Great Britain, France, Germany, the United States, Russia, and Japan, offered to make a loan. It was to be a large one and was to be secured by a lien on Chinese revenues, principally the income from the salt monopoly. It involved increased political as well as financial control and evidently compromised still further Chinese independence. So prominent was the political side that President Wilson refused to give official backing to the American capitalists, and these withdrew, leaving the loan to be made by the representatives of the five powers. The Southern radical party[1] was opposed to the loan, and obstructed its ratification by the national assembly. Finally, in the spring of 1913, Yüan signed it on his own authority, without the sanction of the assembly. At once a rebellion broke out in the South, in an attempt to depose the president who, it was alleged, had sold his country to the foreigner. The uprising was quickly put down and Yüan professed to find that the radical party had been back of it. It had certainly obstructed administration by

[1] Kuomintang.

long delays in the national assembly, where but little had been accomplished toward organizing a permanent government. The provinces, too, were tending to become more and more independent of Peking. The times seemed to demand prompt action and the guidance of a single strong hand. In October, 1913, Yüan forced through the national assembly his election as president for a term of five years. That done, he dissolved the radical party and expelled its members from the national assembly on the ground of their connection with the rebellion of the summer. The expulsion of the radical party left the assembly with only a minority of its members and after a few weeks the president obtained the dissolution of what was left. He took the step only after consulting the governors of the provinces and an Administrative Conference, composed of over seventy experienced men chosen by himself. He dismissed as well the provincial assemblies, the representative bodies that had come into existence during the last years of the empire, and prepared to strengthen the hold of the capital on the provinces by a centralized military government. This made Yüan virtually a dictator, depending on the army

for support. He still professed, however, to be loyal to the republic, and took steps to gather a convention which should provide the nation with a revised provisional constitution. This convention was elected on the basis of a limited franchise and was made up of the conservatives and the moderates. It promulgated in 1914 a revision of the provisional constitution which lengthened the president's term to ten years and virtually gave him the power of choosing his own successor or of continuing himself in office. It provided for a parliament and a council of state appointed by the president, but the president was given an absolute veto over the former and in other ways was to be the dominant figure. Given the right president it probably provided the form of government best suited to serve as the natural transition from the monarchy of the Manchus to a democratic republic. Arrangements were begun for a council which should draft a permanent document, supposedly much on the same lines as this revision of the provisional constitution. The permanent constitution was to be ratified finally by a national convention.

In the summer of 1915 there arose in some quarters a demand, encouraged by many of the

military chiefs, that Yüan become emperor. For a time he seemed to resist, but he finally went through the form of submitting the question to a group of some two thousand electors who were supposed to represent the nation. These were so carefully chosen from among Yüan's adherents that they declared almost unanimously for the change, and in December, 1915, the decision to make it was announced. The establishment of the empire, however, was destined not to be accomplished. The Entente opposed it. Even before December Japan, Great Britain, Russia, Italy, and France had counselled delay, and Japan later reiterated the advice. Such opposition augured ill. A rebellion broke out in the South and West, led partly by the republicans and partly by military leaders who saw a chance of furthering their personal ambitions. In March, 1916, Yüan yielded and announced the restoration of the republic. This, however, was a confession of weakness, and although followed by other concessions which greatly limited his power and granted much that the radicals had asked, it did not allay the unrest. Most of the provinces south of the Yangtze revolted and demanded nothing short of the resignation

and exile of Yüan. The country seemed to be splitting up into fragments. Not only provinces but cities declared their independence. The income of the government fell behind and a serious financial panic threatened. Anarchy seemed at hand. Some of the leaders of the revolting provinces met at Nanking to decide on action independent of Peking. A new turn to events was given by the sudden death of Yüan in June, 1916, probably because the strain of his office and of the rebellion had aggravated a long-standing weakness. Li Yüan-hung, the vice-president, automatically came to the presidential chair. Li first came into prominence in 1911 as the revolutionary general at Wuchang. He had had a modern training, primarily on military lines, and used English with some degree of ease. He had had an admirable record for integrity, simplicity, directness of thought and speech, and wise, prompt action. Although by no means an extremist he had been known to be more favorable to the radical Southern wing than was Yüan, and during the latter part of his predecessor's administration had been kept in Peking under careful surveillance. His accession to power seemed to mean the union of both radicals and conserva-

tives in the administration. The members of the National assembly, which had been dissolved by Yüan, again came together at Peking and took up their work where it had been interrupted by the *coup d'état* of the autumn of 1913.

While these internal developments were taking place, new and startling events supervened in China's foreign relations. The revolution had been the signal for uprisings in the outlying dependencies of the empire and the loosening of the control of the central government over them. Both Tibet and Mongolia became for a time virtually independent. The European powers whose territories bordered on these districts were not slow to take advantage of the situation. Russia, whose influence in the region had been weakened since her war with Japan, made overtures to the "independent" government in Outer Mongolia, that portion of Mongolia bordering on Siberia, which would have made of it a Russian protectorate. Great Britain extended her claims in Tibet. Already in the preceding decade she had sent an expedition to Lhassa under Younghusband and had entered into an agreement with China which, while respecting Chinese suzerainty, excluded other powers, and so made Tibet a buffer state

against a possible Russian advance on India. China entered into negotiations with both powers. In 1913 and 1915 she agreed to acknowledge Russian commercial privileges in Outer Mongolia and the autonomy of the region in return for the recognition of her suzerainty. In the case of Tibet she refused to ratify a convention with Great Britain whereby the dependency was to be divided into two districts, an inner and an outer one. China was to retain her suzerainty over both but was to cease to interfere in the affairs of Outer Tibet. A final agreement has not been reached. Japan in the mean time looked with longing eyes on Eastern Inner Mongolia, the district bordering on Southern Manchuria. It was evident that only a strong hand in Peking could save these great domains for China.

The great European War of 1914 started new and immensely significant developments. Japan and England were bound together by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This, originally made in 1902, had been renewed and extended in 1905, and had again been renewed with slight modifications in 1911. Japan, too, had been gradually drawn into the group of the Entente Powers. The new friendliness of Eng-

land, France, and Russia, which was one of the features of the first decade of the twentieth century and which had shown itself so strongly at Algeciras and in Persia, and finally in the union against the Central Powers in 1914, had embraced Japan. France and Japan had entered into an agreement in 1907 regarding Far-Eastern affairs, which paved the way for a reconciliation with Russia, France's ally. When in 1909 the United States, in the interests of the open door, suggested the neutralization of the Manchurian railways, Russia and Japan had both taken alarm at the threat to their special interests, and in July, 1910, entered into an agreement to preserve the *status quo*. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance did not bind Japan to go to war unless Great Britain were attacked in the Far East, and the Japanese were probably under no obligation even then to do more than to help protect British shipping and colonies against the enemy. Japan, however, took an active part in the war, and not only assisted in driving German warships from the Far-Eastern waters, but captured German possessions in the Pacific, and sent immense quantities of munitions to Russia via the Siberian Railway. Her most

important acts, however, were in China. From Japan's standpoint it appears to be a matter of life and death that she be assured an open door to her great neighbor. There is the natural field for her commercial expansion, and without this expansion her future as a great power is dark. China possesses great quantities of coal and iron and a huge population which can be organized into a mighty industrial force. She is potentially a fabulously rich market. What wonder that the Japanese should desire to lead her and to establish that leadership so firmly that it cannot be disputed by Western powers! Already her merchants had penetrated to all parts of the country. Already heavily subsidized steamers traversed the waters of China and competed successfully with the long-established English lines. Japanese manufactures, cottons, matches, tobaccos, and medicines, were already flooding Chinese markets. She had seventeen per cent of China's foreign trade. The great war offered the opportunity for which she had been looking. While the nations of Europe were busy at home, she could gain so great a hold on her neighbor that they would be forced to recognize it after the war. As an ally of Great Brit-

ain she could drive out Germany, and as the price of her aid she could demand a freer hand in China. This she did. Tsing-tao was besieged by a joint British and Japanese force under the leadership of the latter, and after a few weeks of gallant defense surrendered. Japan occupied not only the German leased territory, but the German railways and mines in Shantung. In a short time she began making a series of demands on China, demands which amounted to her undisputed leadership in the foreign and even the internal affairs of the unwieldy republic. These were in five groups: —

(1) In regard to the province of Shantung, China was to give her consent to any transfer of German rights and privileges to Japan that the latter might obtain. China was to promise not to alienate to any third power any territory in Shantung or along its coast either by sale or by lease. She was to grant Japan the privilege, subject to German consent, of financing the building of certain railways in Shantung. She was to open additional treaty ports. These demands would not only make Japan the successor of Germany in this wealthy and strategic province, but they would give her more than Germany had ever had.

(2) In regard to South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia (the part of Mongolia contiguous with South Manchuria): the lease of Port Arthur, Dalny, and the Japanese railways in Manchuria was to be extended to ninety-nine years. Japanese were to have anywhere in that district the privilege of buying or leasing land for trade, manufacturing, and agriculture, a privilege which was not given to foreigners elsewhere in China. Japanese were also to be allowed to reside and to travel anywhere in the region. With these privileges there would naturally follow an extension of the jurisdiction of Japanese courts. Other concessions in regard to mines, railways, government loans, and the employment of advisers were demanded. These, if granted, would be a large additional step toward handing over South Manchuria to Japan and extending the Japanese sphere of influence into Eastern Inner Mongolia.

(3) The largest iron-works in China [1] were already mortgaged to Japanese capital. At the right moment these were to be made the joint concern of China and Japan, and China was not to sell her interest in the company without

[1] At Hanyang, opposite Hankow.

Japan's consent, nor to allow mines near those of the company to be worked without the company's consent. This would give Japan control of the best iron-works in China, with great deposits of coal and iron. This last is needed badly by Japan, for the island empire has practically no iron ore.

(4) China was to agree that she would lease or sell no island, bay, or harbor along her coast to any third power.[1]

(5) The fifth group included a number of very radical demands. China was to employ Japanese advisers in political, financial, and military affairs, virtually insuring them the direction of her central government. Japanese were to have the privilege of owning land for the building of hospitals, churches, and schools, and of propagating religious ideas. The police departments of important places in China were to be jointly administered by Japanese and Chinese. China was to purchase from the Japanese a fixed proportion of her arms, fifty per cent or more. Certain railway concessions were to be granted them in the Yangtze Valley. In the province of Fuhkien, opposite the Japa-

[1] This as later modified applied only to Shantung and in part to Fuhkien.

nese-owned Formosa, if foreign capital were needed to work mines, build railways, and construct harbor-works, Japan was to be consulted before it should be borrowed.

A wave of indignation swept over China when these demands became known, and some opposition was aroused in Europe, especially in England. British merchants did not view with equanimity the increasing Japanese competition in China or the sacrifice of their interests entailed by the Japanese alliance. The Chinese government was at first disposed to resist, but it could not expect military aid from Europe or America, and unaided it could not hope to resist Japan successfully. Japan modified her demands somewhat, but finally (May, 1915) presented an ultimatum insisting on most of the points in the first four groups as revised. These China granted. The fifth group was left over for further discussion. The effect was to make Japan the dominant power in China, at least until the European War should be over. However, instead of leading to an alliance between the Japanese and Chinese, in which the latter should give themselves willingly to the leadership of the island kingdom and the two present a united front to the

world, it aroused among all Chinese a helpless but bitter hatred of Japan. This hatred was intensified by various acts which were interpreted as being unwarranted aggression on a defenseless neighbor, among them disregard of Chinese rights in Shantung, unofficial aid to revolts, and demands for excessive indemnity for losses during the rebellion of 1913.

In August, 1916, a dispute between a Japanese merchant and a Chinese soldier in Chengchiatun, near the border between Manchuria and Mongolia, led to a clash between the troops of the two countries that were there and to loss of life on both sides. There at once arose an outcry in the two nations and although the Japanese forces had had no right to be in the town, Tokyo submitted some rather severe demands. Peking stoutly resisted most of these, for they threatened a further loss of sovereignty in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. Tokyo relented, perhaps because of the danger of further alienating the Chinese, and the trouble was settled in January, 1917, by the Chinese agreeing to apologize, to punish the officers who were responsible for the trouble, to pay a small solatium to the Japanese merchant who was first involved, and

to issue proclamations for the protection of Japanese soldiers and civilians in districts where these were to be found.

The leniency of Japan in the Chengchiatun incident did not indicate any change in her purpose to take advantage of the war to make secure her position in China. On this she was as determined as ever. In July, 1916, she entered into an agreement with Russia for the protection of the interests of the two countries in China. In February and March, 1917, she obtained the secret promise of Great Britain and France that they would support her claims at the peace settlement to the German holdings in Shantung and she had the assurance that the Russian and Italian governments would offer no objection. All of the motives that led the Entente Powers to give these pledges to Japan have not been made public, but the existence of the agreements was later to bear fruit at Paris.

While these events were transpiring in her foreign relations, China was endeavoring to set her house in order. The reassembled National Assembly, or Parliament, was at work on a permanent constitution for the republic, the country seemed to have confidence in its honest president, Li Yüan-hung, and it looked as

though reorganization was to be achieved and the continued progress of the country assured. Had it not been for the European War, indeed, or could China have been let alone by the Powers, it is entirely possible that these hopes would have been realized. Early in 1917, however, new events led China into the great struggle as a nominally active participant, and brought upon her weakening and prolonged civil strife. In February, 1917, the United States, at last driven out of her neutrality by the renewal of unrestricted submarine warfare by Germany, severed diplomatic relations with Berlin and sent notes to the neutrals of the world inviting them to do likewise. One of these notes came to Peking and started a chain of momentous events. China had so far kept out of the struggle. If anything, she had been pro-German. The fact that Japan was associated with the Entente Powers was in itself enough to alienate Chinese sympathies from them and their cause. Added to this the French had in 1916 forcibly added to their concession in Tientsin several hundred acres of land which they had long coveted, and had thus brought on themselves a boycott and a great outcry from the Chinese. The Germans

had, moreover, been active with their propaganda and the northern military chiefs were not unfavorably disposed to them. On the other hand China had already been giving passive aid to the Allies by offering no opposition to the recruiting of coolies in Shantung for labor behind the lines in France. The United States was popular with the younger, more democratic and progressive groups in the republic, and the masses of the nation, so far as they had any opinion, were friendly toward her. Americans in Peking brought active pressure to bear on the authorities, and on March 14, 1917, China broke off diplomatic relations with Germany.

When, in April, 1917, the United States formally entered the war against the Central Powers, the question arose whether China should follow her in this further and more serious step. It is probable that the majority of the thinking men of the nation were in favor of doing so. The process of declaring war, however, led to a struggle between the different parties and branches of the government which was to prove disastrous. Parliament was controlled by the Southern liberals, the party that had started the revolution of 1911. These

wished a form of government in which the president would, as in France, have but little authority, and in which the real executive functions would be exercised by a premier and a cabinet responsible to Parliament. The Cabinet, however, was dominated by a group of military men, largely northerners, led by the premier, Tuan Chi-jui. These perpetuated the tradition of Yüan Shih-k'ai, and were in favor of a strong executive and of a cabinet independent of the control of Parliament. Premier Tuan had, indeed, favored breaking off relations with Germany without referring the question to Parliament. Now that war was contemplated, he called a conference of the military governors and their representatives and with these decided on hostilities with Germany. The cabinet accordingly drafted and presented to Parliament a bill to that effect. The members of Parliament were in favor of war and were disposed to pass the suggested measure. They feared, however, that Japanese influences were at work to make Peking subservient to Tokyo through a war loan, and hesitated. A mob gathered on May 10 and attempted to coerce Parliament to quick action. The latter held Tuan to be

responsible for the mob and refused to act until he should resign and a new cabinet, not dominated by the military chiefs, should be created. On May 23 President Li dismissed Tuan Chi-jui. Tuan went to Tientsin where a group of military chiefs was gathering. These now demanded the dissolution of Parliament on the threat of revolution, and led the Northern provinces in a declaration of independence from Peking. The president weakly yielded to the Tientsin leaders, and, contrary to the constitution, dismissed the legislative bodies (June 13). The members of Parliament fled southward and encouraged the southeastern provinces to resist the military party of the North.

In the meantime, Chang Hsun, a military chief who had gathered a force behind him and for some time had been astride the railway from Tientsin to Pukow (Nanking) had been summoned by President Li to come north and mediate between the military junto and Peking. He reached the capital early in June and, taking advantage of the prevailing disorder, on July 1 declared the Manchu boy emperor restored to the throne. Li Yüan-hung sought refuge in the Japanese legation. From that

shelter he asked the vice-president, Fêng Kuo-chang, to assume the duties of president, and once more appointed Tuan Chi-jui premier. Tuan and his military supporters were not at all minded to see the Manchus again in power and moved promptly against Chang Hsun. On July 12 that redoubtable leader's bands were forcibly ousted from Peking, he himself fled to the Legation Quarter, the bewildered boy emperor resumed his retirement, and the republic was restored. President Li Yüan-hung resolutely refused to resume his office, and the vice-president, Fêng Kuo-chang, automatically succeeded him. In spite of the fact that the republic had been confirmed, the southern party refused to recognize as legal the government which held Peking and from the vantage point of Canton began organizing armed opposition to a power which it deemed both unconstitutional and undemocratic. The Peking authorities seemed but little perturbed by the schism and, taking up again the question which had thrown the country into chaos, on August 14 declared war on Germany and Austria.

By the summer of 1917 it became highly desirable that Japan and the United States

should have some definite understanding about China. Japan feared an active American program in China, for it had been the example of the United States which had had much to do with China's entrance into the war. Washington had protested in 1915 against the twenty-one demands, and had in June, 1917, tried to steady the situation in her Asiatic sister republic by advising her to maintain her internal unity, even if that were at the cost of staying out of the war. In November, 1917, there was arranged, accordingly, an understanding called from the names of its negotiators the Lansing-Ishii agreement. By this the United States recognized that because of "territorial propinquity . . . Japan has special interests in China, particularly in those parts to which her possessions are contiguous," but both powers denied having "any purpose to infringe in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China" and agreed to adhere to the "'open door' or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China." To many Chinese it seemed that by this agreement the United States had basely abandoned them, and Peking came out with a statement that it would not "be bound by any agreement entered into

by other nations." The phrase "special interests" was, indeed, indefinite, and might well lead to future misunderstandings.

The years that followed China's entry into the World War were to be filled for her with perplexity and humiliation. Her participation brought her some advantages. She canceled the unpaid portion of the Boxer indemnity which was due the Central Powers, the Entente permitted a temporary suspension of the payments due them on that indemnity and opened negotiations for an increase in her tariff duties to an effective five per cent, and she was assured a voice at the peace conference. She contributed, moreover, to the Allied cause by permitting the recruiting of 175,000 of her citizens for labor battalions in France, Mesopotamia, and Africa and by undertaking, after the Russian collapse in 1917, to help preserve order in Siberia. However, civil strife continued within her borders, and in spite of protracted negotiations the North and the South failed to compose their differences. The struggle, originally one in which the South professed to be standing for the principles of democracy and responsible government, degenerated into factional warfare between ambitious and predatory

military chiefs. Over whole sections of the country the central government had little power, and brigandage and corruption were rife. To be sure, in 1918 the Peking authorities gathered a new parliament and elected a president, Hsu Shih Chang, to serve for the five-year term ending in 1923, but the Southern leaders and numbers of districts did not recognize his authority. The country seemed, indeed, to be disintegrating. There were not wanting a few rays of hope, however. By the spring of 1920 the Southern parliament had all but broken up and its leaders were drifting back to Peking in the hope of effecting some settlement. The South had, moreover, been represented on the Chinese delegation at Paris, and there were those who insisted that although technically divided, the country was in spirit more really united than ever.

In the chaos of internal strife the danger of Japanese aggression loomed ever greater. With the collapse of Russia in 1917, Japan's power in Southern Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia was left without a counterweight, and, indeed, by her joint intervention in Eastern Siberia with America in 1918 and by the latter's withdrawal in 1920, she seemed about to supplant

Russia on China's northern frontier. Formally, by military and naval agreements in May, 1918, Tokyo and Peking arranged for joint action against the menace of disorder from the north, and Japan agreed to remove her troops from China as soon as the war should end. Since China was so much the weaker of the two partners, this enterprise could not fail to be perilous for her. The situation was made darker for China by the negotiation of extensive loans with the capitalists of the island empire. These loans amounted to several score millions of yen, and as security the Chinese government pledged railways, mines, forests, telegraphs and various taxes, thus placing the country still further under the control of its neighbor. The larger part of the proceeds of the loans seems to have been squandered or to have gone into the pockets of venal officials. The charge was made that the Peking authorities had sold their country for their own private profit. Certainly the group at the capital was in part pro-Japanese. There were, moreover, agreements entered into between the two countries for the joint control of the former German railways in Shantung and for the building by the proceeds of Japanese loans of additional lines in

that province and in Manchuria. Japan was clearly dominant in North China unless she should be unseated by the peace conference.

At the Paris Conference in 1919 China was doomed to suffer further humiliation and disappointment. Her delegation had asked that the concessions made to Japan in 1915 be canceled, on the ground that they had been obtained under duress, and that the former German holdings in Shantung be returned to her. There were not wanting those in China and abroad who believed that the requests were reasonable and would probably be granted. Blocking the path toward such a settlement, however, were the secret treaties between Japan and her European associates which guaranteed her the Shantung properties, and the Chino-Japanese treaty of 1915 by which Peking had agreed to abide by any disposition of these which Tokyo might make with Berlin. There were, moreover, other difficulties in the way, among them the danger that such a settlement might jeopardize British and French holdings in China and that Japan might withdraw from the peace conference. In spite, therefore, of the efforts of some of the advisers of President Wilson and of the Chinese dele-

gation, the German mines, railways, and leased territories in Shantung were given to Japan. The Japanese gave at the time some sort of verbal assurance that these would eventually be returned to China, and they had earlier formally promised the restitution of Kiaochow with certain reservations. These statements, however, did not satisfy the Chinese and a wave of anti-Japanese feeling ran over the country. It showed itself in part in a student uprising which demanded the dismissal of some Peking officials who were accused of having sold out to Japan, and in a widespread and very effective boycott of Japanese goods which began in the spring of 1919 and continued unabated for some months. America, too, came in for a share of unpopularity, for she was held to have betrayed the country which she had induced to enter the war. China still had a little hope that the League of Nations might aid her against Japan, and although she refused to sign the treaty with Germany she obtained membership in the international body by becoming a signatory to the Austrian treaty. Japan did, indeed, early in 1920 offer to open negotiations with China for an understanding about Shantung but public opinion

would not permit Peking to comply, for to do so was felt to be tantamount to a recognition of the Paris settlement.

In 1920 one step was taken by Westerners which seemed to offer some hope for a constructive, friendly policy toward China. Largely through the efforts of Americans a financial consortium was formed in which bankers from all the major powers but Germany and Austria were to join. The purpose was to assume the international control of all further loans to China and so to prevent the various countries from acquiring special privileges and threatening the partition and independence of China. Such a group, if rightly managed, could help China back to solvency and financial independence. For a time Japan refused to join the consortium unless Eastern Inner Mongolia and Manchuria were excluded from its operation, for she feared for her holdings in these regions. To this exception, however, the United States would not accede, and in May, 1920, Japan withdrew her objections and entered unconditionally. The consortium has so far not fulfilled the high hopes that were entertained for it. For a time it maintained a representative in Peking, but it has

as yet been of no substantial financial assistance to the country. However, the principle that it established of coöperative lending to China rather than rivalry ending in special spheres of influence may yet be of value to the country.

Other and extensive adjustments in foreign relations followed on the heels of the World War. In the first place, China negotiated a separate peace with Germany by which the latter waived her exterritorial privileges and did not regain either her concessions at Hankow or her share in the Boxer indemnity. Exterritoriality did not apply, moreover, to the citizens of the new states which arose in Europe as a result of the war.

In the next place, the Russian revolution altered the relations of China with her great neighbor. The government that for many years had been an aggressor collapsed and the soviets found it difficult to assert their sway over the regions formerly controlled by it. For a time China did not avail herself of the opportunity to regain territories or privileges wrested from her by the old régime. She did not recognize the soviet government and continued to permit the diplomatic representa-

tives of the Czar to exercise their functions under the treaties. Eventually, however, she began to assert herself. In November, 1919, a presidential mandate cancelled the autonomy of Outer Mongolia that had been granted after the Revolution through pressure from St. Petersburg. In the summer and autumn of 1920 the payment of installments on the Russian share of the Boxer indemnity was discontinued and recognition of Russian officials was withdrawn. Although the old treaties were still in theory valid, by agreements and declarations in 1924 exterritorial privileges of Russians were largely suspended and the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Russian road in Manchuria, was placed partly under Chinese control. There was some sympathy in China for the soviets, but for the moment Bolshevism did not have any very wide influence.

As a further aftermath of the war, the Paris Conference and the Treaty of Versailles increased rather than lessened the strain in the Far East and made necessary an additional settlement. The Chinese were indignant at the Shantung award, American public opinion was extremely critical of Japan, Japanese were critical of America, and a new race in

naval armaments seemed impending. War in the Pacific was a strong possibility and some understanding on naval and Far-Eastern questions was obviously necessary. The United States government therefore called a conference at which nine powers, the British Empire, France, Japan, China, Belgium, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, and the United States, were represented. The gathering met at Washington in the winter of 1921–22. China very naturally played a large part in the deliberations, and most of the treaties, resolutions, and declarations which ensued either dealt with her directly or were of distinct concern to her. These, in so far as they affected her, can be briefly summarized as follows:

1. One treaty limited the naval armaments of the United States, the British Empire, Japan, France, and Italy, and forbade the building of new fortifications or naval bases or the strengthening of old ones in most of the Pacific island possessions of the first three powers. The effect was to placate Japan and at the same time to give her an assured control of the sea approaches to her own shores and to China. Neither Great Britain nor the

United States could hope, so long as the treaty should be in force, successfully to attack Japan or to force their way past her to China. In other words, any coercion of China from the sea could be undertaken only with the consent of Japan and Japan could be restrained in China only by her plighted word, the public opinion of China and the rest of the world, and fear for her own commerce. This had really been the situation for several years past, but it was now assured by treaty.

2. The additional so-called "Four Power Treaty" between the United States, Great Britain, Japan, and France reënforced for ten years the *status quo* in the Pacific by pledging these powers to respect each other's insular possessions and dominions in the Pacific and to confer if any controversy arose which threatened these and which could not be settled by diplomacy.

3. The nine powers agreed, moreover, to respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity of China, to give her opportunity to develop and maintain a stable government, to use their influence to establish and maintain the Open Door — "the principle of equal opportunity

for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China" — to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China to seek special privileges which would abridge the rights of citizens of friendly states, and to give no support to efforts by their nationals to create spheres of influence. The other powers having treaties with China and having governments recognized by the nine powers were to be invited to sign the treaty.

4. Provision was made for increasing the tariff and for revising it every seven years.

5. A plan was adopted for establishing in China a board of reference to which questions connected with the observance of the Open Door could be referred.

6. The Chinese delegation would have liked to see exterritoriality abolished or at least curtailed, but the powers would go no further than to declare that they were "prepared to relinquish extraterritorial rights when satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangements for their administration, and other considerations warrant" them in so doing and to agree to appoint a commission to investigate conditions and to make recommendations.

7. Foreign postal agencies in China were to be abandoned by January 1, 1923.

8. The powers declared their intention to withdraw the armed forces that had been in the country since 1900 whenever China should assure the protection of the lives and property of foreigners, and promised that when China should so request, they would make an official inquiry to see whether conditions would warrant such a step.

9. Certain resolutions were passed regarding foreign radio stations in China.

10. The Chinese expressed their intention to develop and unify their railway system under their own government "with such foreign financial and technical assistance as may be needed." Certain resolutions were also passed regarding the Chinese Eastern Railway.

11. The Conference expressed an earnest hope that China would soon reduce her military forces and expenditures.

12. The powers agreed on machinery for notifying each other of all treaties, conventions, and agreements with or concerning China.

13. Finally the Conference gave the opportunity for Japan and China to come to an

agreement concerning the much-mooted Shantung question. Japan adopted a conciliatory policy and agreed to return Kiaochow and the railways and mines in Shantung under certain conditions, the most important of which was probably the purchase by China of the former German lines by treasury notes which had as their security the roads and their revenues. Pending the redemption of these notes Japanese were to be appointed as traffic manager and joint chief accountant of the railway.

The months following the Washington Conference saw the carrying out of several of the agreements made there. The Japanese transferred the Shantung properties as they had promised, the foreign post-offices were closed, and the tariff commission met. With the ratification of the Four Power Treaty the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was automatically terminated. Other actions, not specified formally at Washington, naturally followed. The Lansing-Ishii agreement had caused some misunderstanding, the occasion that had brought it into existence had passed, and the Washington agreements had removed any last reasons for its continuation. It was, accordingly, ended by an arrangement made between the

two governments on March 30, 1923. The Japanese, too, withdrew from Continental Siberia, thus removing a menace to China from the north, and, what was of still more importance to China, they brought home the troops which had for some time been stationed at Hankow.

Although the Washington Conference greatly lessened the strain between Japan and China, and although the Japanese government pursued a more moderate policy than it had during and immediately after the war, relations between the two countries left much to be desired. Tension was increased in the spring of 1923 by China's request (March 10th) that the famous Sino-Japanese agreements of 1915 be abrogated, and by Japan's refusal (March 14th). The Peking government chose that particular time for its request because the original term of the lease of Port Arthur and Dalny to which Japan became heir in 1905 was about to expire, and unless China were to protest the agreements of 1915, these would extend the term of the lease into the first decade of the twenty-first century. Japan's refusal was the occasion for a recrudescence of the boycott against her trade and

for violence in one of the provincial capitals. The boycott did not, however, assume the proportions of that of 1919 and Japan was unwilling to become again actively aggressive. Whether she will ever be able to win the friendship of China remains an unanswered question. The Chinese have at present a deep-seated distrust of their island neighbors and show no inclination to discard it.

The Washington Conference and the months immediately following it marked, then, on the whole, an improvement in China's foreign relations. The powers seemed prepared to act more generously toward China and to give her an opportunity to set her house in order. There was even a disposition on the part of Great Britain and the United States to lighten her financial load by remitting the balance of the Boxer indemnity, and in the early months of 1923 this seemed about to be accomplished. Even though all the Washington agreements concerning China had not yet been ratified, a better day appeared to have dawned.

While the powers were becoming willing to give China greater freedom, her government was rapidly disintegrating. A minority of the parliament of 1913 — the only one that all

China had ever really recognized and the one that had fled from Peking in 1917 — gathered at Canton and in April, 1921, elected Sun Yat-sen "President of the Chinese Republic." Sun claimed, therefore, to be the only legitimate head of the Chinese state, and with Canton as a base started northward an expedition which he hoped would drive out his rivals from Peking and make him the actual head of a united country. He fell out with his chief supporter, Ch'en Ch'iung-ming, however, was defeated by the latter in the summer of 1922, and for some months was an exile from Canton. When, in 1923, he did return he had such difficulty in maintaining himself even in Canton that he had but little leisure to plan for the conquest of the North. While Sun, in spite of his vast pretensions, was having such difficulty in keeping even a precarious footing in the South, the Peking government was only slightly better off. A pro-Japanese faction under Tuan Chi-jui, and known as the Anfu group, had been in control since China's entry into the World War. It lost popular support in the summer of 1920 and was ousted by a combination of three military leaders, Chang Tso-lin, Ts'ao Kun, and the latter's chief lieutenant, Wu P'ei-fu.

These men now dominated Peking. The President, Hsu Shih-chang, had but little real power and his government was virtually bankrupt. Chang Tso-lin, an ex-bandit, ruled Manchuria, Ts'ao Kun and Wu P'ei-fu dominated the central Yangtze Valley and some of the northern provinces, and the Peking government existed only on their sufferance. In the spring and summer of 1922 friction developed between Wu P'ei-fu and Chang Tso-lin. In a resort to arms the latter was defeated and driven back to Manchuria and Wu P'ei-fu was left in control of Peking. Wu P'ei-fu seems to have had a real desire to see established a government that would unite the country, and to this end he ousted Hsu Shih-chang from the presidential chair, put in his place the well-meaning Li Yüan-hung, and summoned the members of the parliament of 1913 to reassemble at Peking. It was an attempt to put the government back where it was in the early spring of 1917. Wu P'ei-fu was of the conviction that unity in China could come only as an evolution from the people themselves, perhaps as an outgrowth from the guilds and the chambers of commerce, and believed that the chief function of a military leader like

himself was merely to clear the way for the normal progress of that development. When he had restored as nearly as possible the last central government that could at all be said to draw its support from the will of the entire natoin, he withdrew to give it a free hand.

Unfortunately the problem could not be solved by any such simple method. Revenues were deficient; cabinets were with difficulty gotten together and did not last any length of time when once they were formed; the parliament of 1913 had ceased really to represent the country, if it ever had done so, and its members were notoriously venal. Many of the provinces were falling into anarchy, petty civil wars were in progress in several sections, especially in Szechuan and in the South, and bandits made life and property unsafe over a large proportion of the country. The situation was brought spectacularly to the attention of the world when, on May 6, 1923, some bandits derailed an express train at Lincheng in Shantung and held the passengers captive. There had been worse outrages in the months immediately preceding, and the Lincheng affair attracted attention chiefly because more than a score of Europeans and Americans were among

the captives. After some weeks of negotiations the foreigners and later the Chinese were released, but the incident continued to stir diplomatic circles and demands were made on the government for reparation and greater security for travelers. The government was falling into still further difficulties, for on June 14, 1923, President Li Yüan-hung, discouraged by the general situation, pressed for arrears in pay by the Peking police and the troops stationed in that city, and plotted against by a powerful faction, resigned his office and fled to his home in the foreign concessions in Tientsin. Although he later attempted to withdraw his resignation, he could not regain his authority in Peking, and since there was no vice-president and only an *ad interim* cabinet could be gotten together, the government was greatly handicapped. Finally, in October, 1923, a quorum of the parliament of 1913 by an overwhelming majority elected to the presidency Ts'ao Kun. Ts'ao Kun was a friend of Yüan Shih-k'ai and belongs to the same general school of military leaders. Not all the country was willing to recognize him, and it was popularly believed that his election was obtained by extensive bribery. Although he was

elected by the only existing body which could be said legally to represent the entire country, and although, almost simultaneously with his inauguration, there was promulgated the permanent constitution on which parliament had been at work at intervals for the past decade or more, it was obvious that he would have to maintain himself in office and win recognition for his authority chiefly by intrigue and military power.

Ts'ao Kun's tenure of office was of short duration. In 1924 Chang Tso-lin felt himself strong enough to renew the attack on Wu P'ei-fu and in September espoused the cause of the enemy of one of Wu's supporters. He was successful and Wu was forced to withdraw to the Yangtze Valley. Chang's victory was made possible by the defection of one of Wu's subordinates, Fêng Yü-hsiang, who, in command at Peking, turned against Wu, ousted Ts'ao Kun, Wu's technical superior, and associated himself with Chang. Fêng Yü-hsiang was one of the most picturesque figures of a kaleidoscopic age. He professed the Christian faith in its Protestant form, probably sincerely, and encouraged Christian propaganda and education among his troops. His army became noted

for its discipline and for the absence of some of the vices usually attendant upon camp life. Chang and Fêng declared their desire to end civil strife and attempted to bring together some of the main factions. In November, 1924, Tuan Chi-jui was installed in Peking as chief executive (not president). Sun Yat-sen was invited north, but, arriving, died in Peking in March, 1925.

Fêng Yü-hsiang and Chang Tso-lin were too autocratic and ambitious long to be at peace. They were brought to the verge of war when Sun Chuan-fang, master of Chêkiang, invaded Kiangsu and drove Chang's forces northward. The break, however, did not come until a little later when, by the defection of one of his subordinates, Chang was forced to retreat to Manchuria and leave Fêng the undisputed master of Peking. Fêng's triumph was short-lived, for Chang, ruthlessly suppressing insubordination, returned to the attack, and, assisted by Wu P'ei-fu — the two finding common ground in their hatred for Fêng — early in 1926 drove the Christian general out of Peking and into Mongolia. In the turmoil Tuan Chi-jui once more withdrew from official life and the only semblance of a national government remaining in

Peking was ephemeral cabinets and rapidly changing premiers.

In the summer of 1926 a new and unexpected development occurred: a revived Kuomintang began a triumphant march from Canton northward. Sun Yat-sen had proved incompetent to administer a national government, but his death both freed his party from the incubus of his presence and supplied it with a program and a hero. Assisted by Russian Communist advisers, the Kuomintang leaders canonized Sun Yat-sen and in his last will and testament to the Chinese people — later declared to be forgery — and in a series of lectures delivered by him, the *San Min Chu I* ("The Three People's Principles"), discovered a platform. "The Three People's Principles" were, roughly, democratic government, a better standard of living for the masses, and the recovery of all special privileges granted to foreigners, including the abolition of "the unequal treaties." Russians also assisted in training officers and in organizing unusually skillful propaganda.

The army of the reorganized Kuomintang, led by the young Chiang K'ai-shek, and preceded and accompanied by heralds of the new gospel who promised the early coming of a

golden age of peace and prosperity and organized unions of laborers and peasants, rapidly made their victorious way northward and by early winter had practically eliminated Wu P'ei-fu and were in possession of Hankow, Wuchang, and Hanyang. By April, 1927, Sun Chuan-fang, but recently master of Chêkiang and Kiangsu, had been driven north of the Yangtze, and Kuomintang troops were in command in the native city of Shanghai and were kept out of the foreign settlements there only by foreign marines. Many foreign and Chinese observers confidently predicted that summer would see the Nationalist (Kuomintang) armies in Peking and the country unified.

These roseate dreams were denied fulfillment. The Communists overreached themselves. As victories followed each other in quick succession the radical left wing of the party became ascendant and antagonized conservative Chinese and most of the foreign community. Laborers' and peasants' unions made exorbitant demands and, attacking people of property as "imperialists" and "capitalists," confiscated property and killed the owners. Then, too, Kuomintang adherents, led largely by Communists and inspired by

Russians, strove to regain what they deemed Chinese rights. Foreigners, especially the British, were accused of being "imperialists" and while in theory it was not the foreigners themselves, but their privileges which were attacked, in practice the property and in some instances the persons of aliens suffered severely. The occupation of foreign settlements, the abrogation of exterritoriality, and the restoration of tariff autonomy were demanded. An anti-Christian movement joined the nationalistic appeal in denouncing missionaries and in insisting upon strict government control of mission schools and the elimination of required — and in some instances even voluntary — religious services and instruction. Churches, schools, and hospitals suffered, particularly those of the British and the Americans. British and American consuls advised their countrymen to leave the interior and an exodus of merchants and missionaries ensued. By March, 1927, the British concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang were in the hands of the Chinese and violent anti-Christian outbursts had occurred in Nationalist territory, notably at Foochow.

This anti-foreign, anti-Christian phase of the Nationalist movement was a natural out-

come of agitation which had been in progress for some time. At Paris and again at Washington the Chinese representatives had sought, with scant success, a modification of the special privileges which foreigners enjoyed. In 1922 an anti-Christian movement — theoretically an attack on all religion as unscientific and irreligious — had arisen with the support of many of the student class, and, after a temporary subsidence, had broken out again in 1924, partly in an attempt to obtain government supervision and the minimizing of the religious features of mission schools, and partly in a more direct attack on Christianity and the churches. In 1925, moreover, an anti-British boycott was instituted, the immediate cause of which was the shooting, on May 30th, by British police in the International Settlement in Shanghai, of some of a mob of Chinese students who had been aroused by the arrest of several of their fellows for noisily supporting the strikers in Japanese-owned factories. Anti-British feeling was accentuated by a further clash, in June, 1925, between Chinese and the foreign settlement, Shameen, in Canton. The boycott was so effective that British trade and the British colony of Hongkong suffered

severely. The anti-British movement was aided by Russian radicals, who saw in Great Britain a major enemy.

Foreign powers made some concessions to Chinese nationalism, but not enough to allay the unrest. In October, 1926, a conference of the treaty powers and China convened in Peking to discuss the tariff question. An informal agreement was reached — but was never ratified by the respective governments — to restore full tariff autonomy on January 1, 1929, and the Chinese promised, although expressly not as a prerequisite to the other, the abolition of likin. Because of the disintegration of government in Peking the conference broke up before completing its work. In 1926 the international commission on exterritoriality promised at the Washington Conference was appointed and after a careful survey made a report describing the administration of justice and suggesting steps looking toward the ultimate abolition of exterritoriality. In 1924 the United States remitted the remaining unpaid portion of her share of the Boxer indemnity. Other powers, notably Great Britain, Russia, and Japan, took preliminary steps toward the same end. All, however,

tended to restrict the use of the funds so released to constructive cultural purposes in China partly supervised by their own nationals. Japan continued her conciliatory policy.

Still, Great Britain, the United States, France, Japan, and some of the minor treaty powers retained most of the privileges to which the Chinese Nationalists objected. Great Britain, to be sure, entered into an agreement for the administration by the Chinese of her concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang. The Mixed Courts in the foreign settlements in Shanghai were returned to the Chinese, and Great Britain and the United States each (December, 1926, and January, 1927, respectively) issued statements which in effect promised to revise their treaties as soon as China should have established a stable government. However, in September, 1926, British naval forces bombarded, as a punitive measure, the city of Wanhsien on the Yangtze above Hankow, and several of the powers, especially Great Britain, despatched marines to China to safeguard their interests. Not only the Kuomintang but Chang Tso-lin's government in Peking was restive, and in October, 1926, on grounds whose

legality was questionable, the latter abrogated the Sino-Belgian treaty, and in January, 1927, it threatened to begin collecting the surtaxes suggested at Washington and to assert full tariff autonomy on January 1, 1929.

The anti-foreign agitation reached a major crisis when on March 24, 1927, Nationalist troops entering Nanking after the flight of Sun Chuan-fang's forces, savagely attacked foreigners, killed and wounded several of them and looted their property, and were estopped from further depredations only by the fire of foreign gunboats. This incident so aroused the ire of foreigners that for a time extensive intervention seemed imminent.

The Communists had gone too far and had alienated a majority of the thoughtful and propertied classes, dissension broke out within the Kuomintang, the rapid northward sweep of the drive slowed down and then halted, and the Nationalist movement seemed on the verge of collapse. The moderates in the Kuomintang, led by Chiang K'ai-shek, set up a government at Nanking, and the radicals attempted to maintain one at Hankow, but in August Chiang threw the Nanking government into confusion by withdrawing from it and the

Hankow group was rapidly approaching its end.

Anarchy now became worse than at any time in centuries. Former Nationalist generals fought each other, banditry increased, and here and there desperate farmers organized to kill both bandits and soldiers. The Fengtien (Chang Tso-lin's) forces maintained a fair degree of order in the Northeast, but in the autumn of 1927 Yen Hsi-shan, governor of Shansi since the Revolution of 1911, and Fêng Yü-hsiang, now strongly intrenched in Honan, and both professing Nationalist sympathies, attacked them, and, while repulsed, brought fresh disorder to the North.

Moderate leaders of the Kuomintang made vigorous efforts to retrieve their cause. Chiang K'ai-shek reëntered active politics in November, 1927, and a party conference led to slightly less disunion and weakness at Nanking. Through nearly all of what was called Nationalist territory an anti-Communist reaction was now in full swing. The radical Hankow government had collapsed, most of the Russian advisers had fled the country, Chinese suspected of Communist sympathies were executed wholesale, and in December, 1927, the

Nanking government ordered Russian Soviet consuls and commercial agents to leave its domains. Occasionally violent outbreaks bearing the Communist name brought misery to a city or county, but conservatism was in the saddle. The Nanking government was conciliatory to foreigners, discouraged anti-foreign agitation, and in notes to the United States Government assumed responsibility for the incident of the preceding March and promised reparation. But for the wide-spread anarchy foreigners would once more have been comparatively safe and numbers returned to the interior. Neither Nanking nor Peking, however, forgot its antipathy to the "unequal treaties": the Sino-Spanish and Sino-Portuguese treaties were abrogated on the grounds given against the Sino-Belgian document, surtaxes were collected on foreign goods, and the old structure of treaties was crumbling. In the foreign settlements in Shanghai and in the British concession in Tientsin, moreover, the municipal councils, formerly exclusively foreign in personnel, now, yielding to pressure, admitted Chinese to membership.

The Nanking leaders still intended uniting the country under Nationalist rule and entered

into negotiations with Yen Hsi-shan and Fêng Yü-hsiang to such good effect that in the spring of 1928 these latter two and Chiang K'ai-shek attacked Chang Tso-lin and his supporters. All the armies showed signs of demoralization and the regions over which they fought, especially Shantung, were famine stricken.

Early in May, 1928, the Nationalist armies captured Tsinanfu on their northward drive. There a clash ensued — just how is not yet determined — between the victors and the Japanese forces that had been dispatched to protect Japanese residents, severe fighting followed, and numbers of Japanese and Chinese were killed. Japan sent more troops to Shantung and drove the Nationalist troops out of Tsinanfu. Both Japan and the Nationalists seemed eager to avoid open war. While Japan sent a note demanding an apology and the punishment of the offending Chinese commander she refrained from such extreme measures as she took in 1915, and the Nanking government, although it appealed to the League of Nations, sought to restrain the violence of the anti-Japanese agitation and boycott that were now renewed.

The Nationalists, now avoiding Tsinanfu, pressed on toward Peking, and Japan further aroused Chinese ire by notifying both the Peking and Nanking governments (May 18) that because of her interests in Manchuria she would not permit the spread of disorder to that region. Peking fell to the Nationalists in June, and the retreating Chang Tso-lin was wounded by a bomb and probably died soon afterward. His son, Chang Hsüeh-liang, succeeded to the command of the Fengtien forces. The Nationalists declared it to be their purpose to retain the capital at Nanking. Whether they could hold the country together was uncertain. Even in Nanking they could not entirely control their troops and their authority was ineffective over most of the territory claimed by them.

The political revolution which drove out the Manchus and which was to be followed by such disheartening anarchy was, as has been suggested, merely part of the great wave of change that was sweeping over China. Contact with the West was rapidly and profoundly modifying the older civilization. Every phase of Chinese culture was affected. The older intellectual, religious, social, and economic molds

were being broken or weakened and here and there were indications of what might succeed them.

Next to the political, the intellectual revolution was probably the most marked. The abolition of the old examination system effected by the Manchus after 1900 freed the Chinese from the embankments that had confined their intellectual life to a definite but narrow channel. With these removed, the Chinese mind was free to wander wherever its inclination or influences from home and abroad might lead it. Schools which combined Western and Chinese learning continued to multiply, for the Chinese possessed a traditional confidence in education and turned to it as a means of national salvation. In 1922–23, before the heightened civil strife brought grave interruptions, nearly seven million pupils were enrolled in institutions of all grades. The standards of many of the schools were low, discipline and the equipment of teachers were often poor, and salaries were frequently in arrears. Until about 1924, however, conditions were improving. Thousands continued to go abroad to study, the largest student migration in history. A large proportion went to Japan. Of those who jour-

neyed to the Occident the majority for a time were in the United States, but after the World War France attracted the largest number. "Mass education" of the illiterates was undertaken under the leadership of one of the returned students, a phonetic script, not much used except by the Christian Church, was devised, and newspapers and magazines, many of them in the vernacular, multiplied. A rapid growth in the use of the telegraph, the telephone, and the post office and the rise of great publishing houses helped further to spread the new ideas. Many terms were invented or were imported from Japan and the language changed and grew as it had not done for centuries.

One outgrowth of the new education was the so-called Renaissance, New Thought, or, to use an expressive Chinese term, "New Tide" Movement. It had many manifestations. Its aim was in part the critical examination of Western and Chinese culture. Nothing was too well established, too revered, or too commonly believed to pass unchallenged. Confucianism, Christianity, various social, political, and economic institutions such as the family, marriage, the state, capitalism, moral and social

conventions and beliefs, and older literary forms, were called upon to justify themselves. The movement was chiefly negative, a denial of and departure from the past, and disintegration in morals and in intellectual discipline often followed. The most radical writers of the West were translated and read with avidity and for a time a Sun Yat-sen University founded in Moscow for the Chinese poured back into the country students committed to Russian Communism. John Dewey and Bertrand Russell were brought in for extensive periods to lecture and help guide the new thought. The radicalism of the movement was accentuated by the fact that the majority of the students were in their teens and in secondary schools.

The New Tide was not without its constructive features, and had some mature and able leaders. For several years its center was the government National University at Peking and it was influenced by members of the faculty who combined excellent classical Chinese training with study in the Occident. One of the achievements of the movement, notably of an American-trained scholar, Hu Shih, was the substitution of a dignified form of the Mandarin vernacular for the language of the

Classics as the literary medium of scholarship. This was hailed as being as great an achievement as had been the displacement in Europe of Latin by the vulgar tongues. Concurrently went an attempt to teach this Mandarin in the schools throughout the country. Another accomplishment was the renewed study of China's ancient philosophers, an effort to preserve whatever of the past would prove useful for the present and to prevent too sharp a break in the ongoing flow of Chinese culture.

The new student class was active politically and intensely patriotic, and it organized locally and nationally to effect desired changes. In 1919 it led in the opposition to the Shantung award and in the anti-Japanese boycott, at least once it forced the resignation of cabinet ministers, it was vigorous in its support of the anti-British boycott of 1925, in its advocacy of the Nationalist cause, and in its protest against "capitalism," "imperialism," and the "unequal treaties."

In general students were more insubordinate and self-assertive than their predecessors, frequently going on strikes against school and political authorities, and often demanding a voice in the control of the school, including

such matters as the election and dismissal of teachers and the punishment of their fellows. They were rebellious against accepted social and moral standards and were more athletic and mentally were more alert, but on the average were less well trained than their predecessors had been. Numbers of them, particularly those educated abroad, were rising to prominence in the government.

The new ideas held by the students in part percolated through the masses. Lectures, newspapers, pamphlets, and posters helped to popularize the innovations. Liberty, democracy, and Communism were discussed on the streets and in the shops, even though the toiling populace went on its accustomed way whenever the civil strife would permit it to do so.

Religiously the nation was being altered. Confucianism, the established cult of the Empire, suffered from the political and educational revolution. With the coming of the Republic much of the state ritual was discontinued. Confucianism was, too, traditionally associated with the monarchy and bureaucracy, and was seriously weakened when these collapsed. The passing of the old educational system removed one of its strongest bulwarks, the civil service

examinations based upon its Classics, and many of the new students looked at it askance as part of the conservatism which they eschewed. Occasionally attempts to revive Confucianism were made, and associations of the older scholars maintained some of the sacrifices, but these were futile efforts to bulwark a disappearing order.

Taoism showed little new life, but in Buddhism reform movements gave some promise of a revival. Entirely new cults arose, attempts to syncretize the religious heritage of China with that of the West. All faiths, however, suffered from the increasing civil war and banditry. Buddhist and Taoist temples and monasteries as well as Christian churches and schools were occupied by rough troops or Communists. The traditional agnosticism characteristic of much of Confucianism was accentuated by contact with the scepticism of the West and many of the new student class forswore all religion. One phase of the Renaissance was an ardent discussion of philosophy in which agnostic and atheistic attitudes were predominant.

For more than a decade after the Revolution the Christian Church grew rapidly. The

popularity of things Western reduced the prejudice against it, missionary staffs were augmented, and the body of church members almost doubled. In 1922 the number of baptized Protestants was about eight hundred thousand and of Roman Catholics about two and a quarter millions.

Protestants held evangelistic meetings attended by thousands of students and officials. They greatly strengthened their schools: much of the best secondary and higher education in the country was, indeed, given by them. They continued to have almost a monopoly of the better medical education and in this were assisted by the China Medical Board, a body financed by the Rockefeller fortune. Protestant missions, moreover, although supported by several scores of different societies, coöperated more and more closely, in 1913 forming what was known as the China Continuation Committee and in 1922 the National Christian Council, bodies which successively coördinated the efforts of the majority of missionaries. A Church of Christ in China, formed by the union of several denominations, by 1928 included about a third of the Protestants. Chinese were rapidly being placed in positions of

leadership in the Church. Protestants, too, endeavored by public health education, famine relief, anti-opium campaigns, and other methods to influence wholesomely the entire nation.

Roman Catholics were reënforced by many new groups of missionaries, particularly after the World War and from the United States. They, too, effected a national organization, placed more stress upon education, and emphasized the creation of a Chinese body of clergy, in 1926 raising six priests to the episcopate.

Both Protestants and Roman Catholics suffered from the anti-Christian movement and the civil wars. Protestants particularly, partly because so many of their missionaries were British and partly because of the prominence of their schools, were singled out for attack in 1925, 1926, and 1927, and in 1927 the majority of the missionaries left the interior and in 1928 were only beginning to return. After 1922 Protestant boards were, moreover, troubled by a declining interest in some of the supporting constituencies in Great Britain and the United States, and by the failure of contributions to increase as rapidly as the cost of conducting their work. The Church suffered from the widespread brigandage, and numbers of mis-

sionaries and Chinese Christians were robbed, kidnapped and held for ransom, and even killed. From 1925 to 1928, therefore, the Church grew less rapidly than at any time in the preceding quarter of a century and in places declined.

The years subsequent to the Revolution were also marked by changes in social customs and institutions. Dress was altered. In the first flush of the popularity of Western culture which followed 1911, many of the men donned foreign clothes, and although with the nationalistic movement after 1925 Chinese costume once more became popular, it did not entirely supplant European styles. The queue, held to be a badge of subjection to the Manchus, disappeared in many sections, the Western custom of short-cropped hair taking its place. Old forms of courtesy died out, followed sometimes, but not always, by others modeled on those of Japan and the Occident. Women sought greater liberty. In some places following the Revolution they were granted the franchise and in others they publicly demanded it. Many of them refused to be as secluded as formerly, they were prominent in the councils of the more radical of the Nationalists, and

some of them were attached to the Kuomintang armies, usually as propagandists. To evidence their freedom, many of the girls "bobbed" their hair. Relations between the sexes began to be modified. No longer were adolescent boys and girls kept separate, with no opportunity of seeing each other socially. Young people began to choose their own mates, instead of having marriage arranged for them by their parents through go-betweens without the couple having seen each other until the wedding day. Coeducation appeared and even where it was not adopted boys and girls insisted upon mingling. Here and there the old patriarchal family, under which two and even three generations of married couples lived together under the same ancestral rooftree, broke up into smaller units: the traditional family, the basic social institution and the strongest agency for social control in China, was beginning to show signs of disintegration, and rampant individualism was taking its place.

Naturally some decay in morals followed. Young radicals argued that marriage and the family were outworn institutions, and the sudden removal of restrictions on intercourse between the sexes occasionally brought dis-

aster. With the collapse of government, moreover, not only did robberies and murders increase, but after 1925 the turbulent elements always present in every community made Communism an excuse for disregarding all time-honored rights of person and property. Grasping war-lords found the cultivation of the opium poppy a convenient source of revenue, and the drug curse once more appeared, more uncontrolled than ever. Political corruption and injustice multiplied, and venality and the abuse of irresponsible power were even worse than under the later years of the Manchus.

Economic changes inevitably attended the other phases of the transformation. Under the manipulation of self-seeking military leaders the coinage was debased and paper currency depreciated. Banks of Western types, however, multiplied rapidly, both under state and private initiative, and in some places not only helped to give a certain amount of much needed stability, but demonstrated the capacity of the Chinese for managing successfully Occidental forms of commercial organization. Partly because of trade with outside nations, price levels rose rapidly. With the ease and rapidity of

ocean transportation the time had passed when cotton and grain, and even meat and eggs, could be very much cheaper in China, particularly in the parts of China next to the sea, than in the rest of the world. Wages naturally followed the rise in the cost of living. During the first years after the Revolution the construction of railways continued, but it soon slowed down because of the absorption of foreign capital in the World War, and after the War the growing internal strife in China prevented further construction in the Eighteen Provinces and led to the rapid deterioration in the roads already in operation. Only in Manchuria where Chang Tso-lin and the Japanese maintained comparative order and the Japanese had peculiar economic interests did the building of railways continue. Here Japanese capital initiated new lines and even threatened to invade the former Russian preserves in the North. Better roads multiplied rapidly, partly as the result of foreign famine relief committees, partly through private enterprise, and partly because military necessity forced the rival war-lords to construct them. The automobile, accordingly, was no longer confined to a few ports, but could be used far in the inte-

rior. Broad streets were often taking the place of city walls or were being driven through congested quarters. Agricultural and forestry schools and experiment stations were founded to add to the quality and quantity of the output of field and forest. In several centers, particularly in and around Shanghai, Tientsin, and Hankow, modern factories arose. Cotton mills, silk filatures, match factories, ice and cold storage plants, iron and steel works, tobacco factories, and oil mills and bean cake factories were prominent on the list. Cities began to be equipped with electric light plants and even with water works. For better or for worse, the Industrial Revolution had entered China, and although political disorder had retarded its entry, many of the problems attendant upon it, such as the exploitation of labor, unsanitary factories and slums, the employment for long hours of women and children, and labor unions and strikes, had begun to make their appearance.

In spite of internal disorder, until 1927 foreign commerce increased. The proportionate share of various countries changed: that of the United States rose, and by 1928 that of Japan overtopped that of Great Britain — partly

because of the anti-British boycott, but chiefly because of the rapid industrialization of Japan and of proximity to China.

An interesting phase of the economic changes in China was the development of Manchuria. The three provinces of Manchuria had long been virtually virgin territory, with a sparse population, extensive forests, fertile plains and valleys, and fairly large deposits of coal. With the coming of Russian and Japanese railways and the investment of Japanese capital, the utilization of these resources proceeded rapidly, and Chinese poured in by the hundred thousand from the north of China proper, especially from Shantung. With the increase of civil strife south of the Great Wall, particularly in 1926 and later, this immigration swelled to still greater proportions. Koreans, too, cramped in their own rocky peninsula, moved West and North, somewhat to the dismay and annoyance of the Chinese. Comparative peace and order added to the other advantages were bringing about the most rapid economic growth in China.

All these changes were more in evidence near the coast, the main rivers, along the railways, and in the cities. Away from the chief centers

of population and the main highways of trade, the older customs and ideas persisted, often little altered. Even here signs of the impending revolution were to be seen. Petroleum, matches, cotton goods, cigarettes, and patent medicines had gone everywhere. China was at last being permeated by the civilization of the Occident, and with much travail the Chinese were entering upon the task of adjusting themselves and their culture to the ways of the industrialized West.

CHAPTER VII

PRESENT-DAY PROBLEMS OF CHINA

An account of the history of China is hardly complete without a discussion of the problems that the nation faces to-day. These have come partly from the past and partly from the new conditions of the present. They have resulted mainly from the impact upon the older civilization of China, whose development and characteristics were discussed in the earlier chapters, of the peoples and culture of the West, whose coming has been the topic of the last two chapters. Their name is legion and they affect every phase of China's life. Unless they are solved successfully, permanent disintegration may be the result, both for the state and for the economic, the intellectual, the social, and the moral life of the nation. No one can accurately forecast the future, and the descriptions of to-day may be vitiated by the events of to-morrow. One can merely analyze the situation as it exists at the moment and point out what seem to be present tendencies.

The problem most in the eyes of the world at large is the political one. Here the outstanding

impression is anarchy. Ever since the death of the Empress Dowager (1908) and, indeed, with the exception of a partial recovery during the latter half of the nineteenth century, from the close of the eighteenth century disorder has been on the increase. Disintegration has been particularly rapid since the death of Yüan Shih-k'ai. Two governments claim legitimacy and neither effectively controls more than a fraction of the country. Several of the provinces are practically independent and are in turn divided within themselves. The outlying dependencies are being lost. The last remnants of Chinese authority have all but disappeared from Tibet. The New Territory is ruled by a Chinese governor who is in fact autonomous, and Outer Mongolia has been lost to Russia. Probably not since the downfall of the T'ang dynasty, over a thousand years ago, has government so nearly collapsed over so much of the country. The causes for this deplorable state of affairs are, in the main, two. In the first place, China is repeating what has happened at the close of every dynasty, a struggle between military chieftains for the mastery of the country. As each dynasty has become weak, rebellions have arisen which have over-

thrown the ruling house, and a struggle has ensued until one aspirant for the throne has eliminated the others and has founded a new imperial line. After the fall of the Han dynasty division and strife lasted for nearly four centuries: usually they have endured for half a century or less. Wu P'ei-fu, Chang Tso-lin, Fêng Yü-hsiang, Chiang K'ai-shek, and the others, have been reënacting this time-dishonored story and no one is as yet dominant. Rapacious officials drive honest citizens to banditry, and the ranks of the brigands are swelled by disbanded and unpaid soldiers, by ne'er-do-wells and roughs, and by peasants and townsfolk deprived by the wars of their usual means of livelihood.

A second factor, new to China and more serious, is contact with the West. This has necessitated the complete reorganization of the government. The political structure of the older China, with all its imperfections, lasted for nearly two thousand years and on the whole functioned more successfully over a long period for a wide area and a numerous population than any other ever devised by man. It was, however, unfitted to serve the new day. It was too loose-jointed to enable China to act

as a unit in competition with the powerful and aggressive states of the Occident; its revenues were insufficient to support the many activities of a modern government and were inefficiently managed; and it was handicapped by the traditional venality and self-interest of officials and by intense provincial feeling. Moreover, Chinese imbued with new ideas from the West — democracy, representative assemblies, and other political theories — have insisted upon recasting the government. It is no easy task, nor one quickly accomplished, to devise and put into successful operation a new political structure for a fourth of the human race. Workable political institutions are usually the result of long evolution: that was true of those of the Romans and is true of those of Anglo-Saxons. Even the revolutionary innovations in modern Japan have been grafted onto the stock of the traditional Japanese monarchy. It is not surprising, therefore, that in China the process has been attended by anarchy. The situation has been rendered more difficult by the absence of an accepted ruling house to which the nation can turn as a center, by provincial jealousies, by the personal ambitions of generals, and by the illiteracy of the masses.

The present lamentable conditions do not necessarily argue any innate lack of political capacity on the part of the Chinese: the relative success of the older government, on the other hand, would lead one to expect that, given time, the Chinese will work their way through to a stable government. The Chinese are by tradition as politically minded as any people on earth. No nation has ever been confronted with a problem of such magnitude, and it is not strange that so far the Chinese have failed. It will not be surprising, indeed, if conditions are much worse before they are better, if China seems at times to be lapsing into another dark age, and if more than a century elapses before a united government is achieved for the entire country.

Here and there, however, are signs of progress, which, even though meager, are encouraging. The recodification of the law, embodying both Occidental and Chinese experience and precedent, has been proceeding, a few new law courts, including a national supreme court, have been set up, "model" prisons have begun to make their appearance, and police systems have been instituted for many cities. Until becoming involved in the civil war, Yen Hsi-

shan was conducting an excellent administration in Shansi. Some Western trained students are coming into power in the local and national governments, and while often leaving much to be desired both in integrity and judgment, occasionally they have wrought improvement. Then, too, the strong spirit of nationalism, although so far failing to take successful governmental form, is increasing and is at least professed by all. If it grows it may sometime develop permanent institutional expression.

Moreover, the Chinese are by tradition orderly, law-abiding, peace-loving, and adept at organization, and in their local units are largely self-governing. In the face of the civil strife these local units — the villages, clans, and guilds — have usually continued, and new ones — chambers of commerce and labor unions — have come into existence. So far the labor unions have mostly been enemies to order, but they show that the capacity for organization has not been lost.

The political situation is complicated by the presence of the foreigner. This is both an aid and a hindrance. Anti-foreign agitation has been about the only rallying cry on which the nation has been able to unite. The foreigner,

too, initiated and still in part directs two of the three or four structures which continue to function the country over — the maritime customs service and the post office. Through the missionary, the foreigner has provided much of China's best modern education and has instituted new and far-reaching social, religious, and moral reforms.

On the other hand, some of the powers are possessed of special privileges which most of the articulate Chinese deeply resent and which accordingly are sources of friction. "Face" means much to the Chinese, and it has been galling to them, a proud people, to be in partial and helpless subjection. Two of the principal sources of revenue, the maritime customs and the salt gabelle, are under the direction of foreigners and in large part are absorbed by the payment of foreign debts. Customs duties on foreign imports are fixed by treaty. The majority of foreigners are still not under the control of Chinese laws and courts, and large districts in several of the chief cities are under foreign jurisdiction. It is as if important business and residence sections of New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, and San Francisco, and the diplomatic quarter in Washington were gov-

erned by their foreign residents and guarded by foreign troops. A revision of the treaties by which these conditions are perpetuated is made difficult by the "most favored nation" clause whereby privileges granted to one are automatically given to all: the consent of most of the major powers is necessary to extensive alteration.

Some of the powers have been dispossessed of these privileges, notably the Germans, and the Russian Government has promised to relinquish them and makes no effort to protect "White" Russians, refugees of the old régime. The major powers, moreover, have agreed to the abrogation of the unusual features whenever China shall have established a stable government and reörganized her courts and laws in a way acceptable to them. In times past these concessions have been of at least some value to China and may still be. Exterritoriality and its attendant foreign settlements have prevented a great deal of the friction that punctuated pre-treaty days, when the restless alien was subject to courts and laws which seemed to him barbarous, arbitrary, and unjust. The maritime customs and the foreign settlements have been useful examples of fairly

honest and efficient administration. Cogent arguments are offered both for and against the revision of the treaties. However, Chinese nationalism regards the special position of aliens as humiliating and demands its surrender. It is gradually falling into abeyance and the only possibility of sustaining it would seem to be an extensive and costly use of force which the powers are unable or unwilling to apply.

Still other forms of foreign privilege remain, leased territories and the control of railways. France has Kwangchowwan and control of the railway to Yünnanfu, Great Britain has Weihaiwei and part of the mainland opposite Hongkong, British capitalists possess liens on various railroads, Japan holds Port Arthur and Dalny, hundreds of miles of railway in Manchuria and a lien on the former German lines in Shantung, and Russia has an interest in the Chinese Eastern Railway. Moreover, Portugal owns Macao and Great Britain Hongkong and Kowloon, all once Chinese territory and with predominantly Chinese populations, and Russia controls Outer Mongolia. Chinese nationalists object to these enfringements on independence and territory, and although for the mo-

ment they are making little headway against them, Russia has less voice in the Chinese Eastern Railway than formerly, and of the powers only Japan would at present venture on any marked extension of her holdings.

Of these possessions the chief potential danger center appears to be in Manchuria. Here the Japanese are increasing their already large investments in mines, railways, factories, and cities. They have in effect a condominium with China, and, to a less extent, with Russia. Chinese form the large majority of the population, a majority which is rapidly mounting with the enormous immigration from south of the Great Wall, and nominally and to a large extent actually still have sovereignty. The Japanese believe that by their costly war against Russia and their investments, they have acquired rights which they should not be asked to surrender. Russia, if she recovers her former strength, may seek to check Japan's encroachments on her preserves, and the other powers, notably the United States, may complain that the Japanese are pushing shut the "open door." Should Chang Tso-lin's rule collapse, and either the Nationalists seek to extend their control to Manchuria or anarchy

be threatened, Japan may take such action as will precipitate a major crisis.

To the political is added the economic problem. One phase of this is the huge population. No one knows just how many Chinese there are, but the number is probably about four hundred millions. In spite of famine, pestilence, and civil strife, it seems not to have declined in the past hundred and fifty years. During the earlier and more prosperous years of the Manchu dynasty it rapidly increased. Old custom and the nearly universal ancestor worship insure early marriage and numerous progeny, and for women respectability and marriage are practically synonymous. The wars of the past few years have already brought extensive famines and migrations, and should the disorder continue we may witness a sharp decline of population with all the attendant suffering and social and economic disintegration which that would entail. If civil war is once checked, population will probably multiply rapidly, especially if railways, motor roads, improved utilization of the soil, and modern public health measures should be extensively employed. Whether under those circumstances the standard of living could be improved and

even the present low standard be maintained is a question. Careful estimates appear to show that with the better agricultural machinery and methods of the Occident a very large additional amount of land could be brought under cultivation, but the Chinese might not be either able or willing to make the capital investment involved. The powers in possession of the vacant lands of the earth — Australia, the United States, and Canada, for example — would object to a Chinese emigration sufficiently extensive to remove the congestion, and Manchuria and the less forbidding parts of Mongolia can offer only a temporary relief. Chinese migration southward — to the Straits Settlements, Java, Borneo, and other tropical lands — while a marked feature of the past century, has not and probably cannot materially ameliorate the situation.

A partial solution may be found, as in Great Britain and Japan, in the industrialization of the country, but this again presents its problems. It is doubtful whether China has sufficient deposits of coal and iron to permit of the industrial development which Western Europe and the United States have enjoyed: the enthusiastic estimates of a generation ago

have been proved excessive. Properly utilized, however, the fertile alluvial plains in the Yangtze basin could produce great quantities of excellent cotton and silk and with the cheap labor available might lead to a fairly extensive factory system. Moreover, if improved methods of production and marketing were adopted China might regain the leadership which she once held in the export of tea, for the loss of that supremacy was due to competition with lands, such as Ceylon, to which better processes have given the advantage. At the present time the per capita foreign trade of China, although rising until the last year or two, is much lower than that of most Western lands and is less even than that of India. Through specialization and the growth of foreign commerce China may yet improve her standard of living.

If industrialization were to come at all rapidly it would undoubtedly bring many grave problems — the dislocation of labor, the exploitation of women and children, strikes, and the rapid urbanization of a country that is predominantly rural. Because of the extensive civil strife, however, the coming of the factory has been retarded: the bulk of the nation's

industry is still conducted by the handicraft method. Moreover, while often very bad, it is probable that labor conditions in the average modern factory of China are slightly better than in the majority of the older shops.

If the Chinese are to compete successfully in the modern economic world they will probably need to learn to use the stock company, with its convenient massing of the savings of many investors under the control of a board of directors. This only a few Chinese have yet learned to do. Business is organized by families, guilds, and partnerships. Family loyalty and the consequent temptation for the directors to place their kinsmen in sinecure positions is still too great to permit the efficient operation of Western large scale enterprises.

The economic situation is complicated by confusion in the currency. China is on the silver basis and subject to all the fluctuations in foreign exchange which that entails. The older standards of value, it will be recalled, were the ounce of silver (the tael) and the copper "cash." Only the cash was coined, and, being worth about one twenty-fifth of a cent, its use was confined to smaller purchases. Since for larger transactions silver bullion was

employed, in ingots which had to be tested and weighed for fineness each time they changed hands, and since the tael varied in weight with each district or city, there was need of a uniform coinage of larger value. This has been partially furnished by silver dollars. Most of the dollars of a generation ago were coined in Mexico, but there later came in the Hongkong, Straits Settlements, and American trade dollars, the Japanese yen, and other pieces of about the same weight and fineness. In recent years the central government and various provinces have coined dollars, dimes, half-dollars, five-cent and twenty-cent pieces, and copper cents. No one dollar is universally accepted as standard and the result is local exchange rates, often varying with each principal city and from day to day. Added to this is the debasement of the currency, especially of subsidiary coins — a form of income welcomed by irresponsible military chiefs. Conditions are made worse by an unregulated issue of paper money by banks and by various governments and war-lords. Much of this paper is hopelessly depreciated. The result of all this is, of course, that legitimate business is badly handicapped and the accumulation of mobile capital discouraged.

Currency reform is one of the pressing needs of China's commerce and industry, but there is little hope of achieving it as long as the government is chaotic.

The economic problem is further accentuated by a rise in prices, due largely, as has already been suggested, to adjustment to the higher levels of the West. Moreover, while the Chinese peasants and artizans show a remarkable capacity for carrying on their normal occupations in the face of civil war, the political disintegration has begun to have its effect. Famine is breaking out, aggravated in places by drought or floods, and domestic strife makes difficult or impossible the organization of the relief that has mitigated similar scourges in the past half century. Much of the banditry and lawlessness is due to men whom the civil wars have deprived of their usual occupations, the activities of the outlaws drive still others from their normal pursuits, and a vicious circle is set up which gives no indication of breaking.

The foreign capital needed for economic development is naturally disinclined to enter as long as political uncertainty jeopardizes investments. Its coming, moreover, may bring with it the protection of foreign governments

and so increase the threat of intervention and of the further sacrifice of Chinese independence.

The economic situation is not without its hopeful side. The Chinese seem to be men of business almost by instinct. In shrewdness and ability they are not a whit behind their Western competitors — as is demonstrated by their achievements in Hongkong, Shanghai, and the Straits Settlements, where they have successfully matched their wits against the European. The chambers of commerce, and — in spite of many failures — some of the banks, department stores, and factories that are beginning to appear disclose ability to adjust business organization to new conditions. The Chinese are a practical people, and may well develop in time and from prudential reasons the sort of honesty which is needed to utilize the joint stock company. Moreover, while often they allow machinery to fall into inefficient disrepair, many of them have proved to be competent mechanics, and by their industry, persistence, frugality, intelligence, and capacity for organization give promise of making excellent workmen for the factory system.

Then there is the problem of education. No

efficient and stable modern state, whether republic or monarchy, can be achieved without universal primary education for the masses and high technical education for the few. One of the secrets of Japan's success has been the excellent system of schools which she inaugurated early in the new era. China has, as we have seen, made much progress. Private and missionary initiative have supplemented the activities of the government, and, with their traditional trust in education, the Chinese have devoted much energy to the problem.

However, much superficiality and lamentable lack of preparation there undoubtedly are on the part of many teachers, and much lack of discipline on the part of students. The modern education, moreover, is not yet fully adjusted to China's needs but so far is too much an ill-digested foreign importation. The old style scholarship, which, with all its defects, at its best was at least thorough, is disappearing, and an equally creditable product has not yet taken its place. Civil strife is disrupting much of what progress has been achieved, the armies are absorbing funds that should be used for schools, politics have broken up some of the most promising institutions, and the masses

are too poverty-stricken to spare their children the time for school. The substitution of the vernacular for the classical style in literature is in many respects a great advance, but it may remove further even from the literate the treasures of China's past. The Chinese written character, moreover, is burdensome intellectual baggage, requiring years of a child's life for its acquisition and handicapping the campaign against illiteracy. So far the phonetic systems devised as substitutes have not been widely adopted. Much of the teaching is by the lecture system, even in science courses there is too little laboratory work by either student or teacher, the curriculum is overloaded, teachers, to eke out their insufficient salaries, often are on the faculties of several institutions and carry too heavy a schedule, and textbooks are sometimes in a foreign tongue. Students have expended so much energy on political agitation, especially in 1925, 1926, and 1927, that they have done little serious work at their books, and schools have often been used by the Nationalists for party propaganda. Student government in the schools, in principle an excellent idea, often results in utter lack of discipline, sometimes with objection to exami-

nations and to other serious academic requirements and insistence that an entire class be promoted, laggards as well as the diligent. Mentally and morally the results are deplorable.

Here, too, however, are encouraging features. Some schools have been able to persist in spite of the civil war, or have sprung again to life when once the scene of battle has moved on. The excellent records made by many Chinese in the universities in America and Europe in competition with the best students of these countries demonstrate the high caliber of the Chinese mind. Once given peace, the Chinese educational system would probably show a rapid improvement. Moreover, students are active in trying to educate the illiterate about them, either through the national Mass Education Movement — which has continued in spite of war — or through purely local efforts. Their very participation in political affairs, immature and injudicious as it usually is, may in itself prove an educative process by which, through painful trial and error, they will slowly learn to handle new forms of government. Moreover, some government bureaus, notably those having to do with geology and economics,

staffed by men of modern training, are doing excellent pieces of research. Then, too, to give to the country one spoken tongue, the schools in non-Mandarin speaking sections, under the impulse of nationalism, have often been teaching Mandarin.

There are also the problems of family life and of social relations, and the closely allied ones of morality and religion. The revolution has extended, as we have seen, to all phases of the nation's life. Old social conventions are disappearing, there is more freedom of intercourse between the sexes, and customs of engagement and marriage are being altered. There are new ideas of the status of women. With the passing of the ancient forms of social control moral restraints are apt to be loosened. Occidental customs may embody as high or even higher moral ideas, but the liberty which their introduction involves often breeds license. The family, the most stable of China's institutions, in places is breaking up, the older courtesy is disappearing, and much of that fine art of living which the best representatives of the past generation possessed to a high degree is passing. Rampant individualism commingles with mob action. Youths brought up in such

an atmosphere do not readily submit themselves unselfishly to the state or to the will of the majority, and are subject to the personal animosities and self-seeking which prevent any party or group from long uniting either the nation or a local community. Yet, by a strange inconsistency, they are often idealistic, and, moved by the persistence of the old tendency to group action, they are easily swayed by agitators and usually lack courage to stand out against the crowd. The old habits of compromise which have been of assistance in settling many a dispute seem to the Westerner at times to have bred a lack of moral fiber.

The older faiths, as we have observed, are also threatened. Taoism, except as a mass of superstition, seems doomed, Confucianism has been badly weakened, and Buddhism, while showing signs of revival, has been dealt serious blows. Much from these faiths will probably survive, for they have been deeply implanted in the nation's soul. It would, indeed, be a major misfortune if they were entirely to dissolve. Ethical standards have so long been bulwarked and spiritual insights so profoundly influenced by Confucianism and Buddhism that if these systems were immediately to dis-

appear moral disaster would undoubtedly follow. For the moment the educated classes seem inclined to cast off all religion. There are not wanting those who declare that the scholars among the Chinese outgrew religion earlier than has any other group of any other nation and that they are not disposed to submit again to the yoke of bondage. New indigenous sects such as the Tao Yüan give little promise of prolonged life.

Christianity shows more vitality than does any other religion. The rapid growth we have witnessed in the Church is, of course, the result of the efforts of the missionary and no one can tell whether it is a hothouse product which will disappear if the foreigner withdraws. During 1926, 1927, and 1928, moreover, under the stress of persecution and banditry, the Church has probably remained stationary and possibly has declined in numbers. At the most, Roman Catholics and Protestants together number less than one per cent of the population and for many of them conversion has been superficial. On the other hand, many Christians have exhibited such transformation of character and have so obviously begun to discover in their faith resources which have enabled them to

withstand persecution and to remain undaunted and hopeful in the face of the political and social disintegration around them, that it is clear that Christianity has begun to take root. Its permanency is not yet guaranteed, but, without abjectly compromising, it has begun to adjust itself to its Chinese environment and to develop a capable Chinese leadership. Protestantism particularly, with its schools, its Young Men's and Young Women's Christian Associations, its medical and public health activities, and its many other forms of social service, has shown itself akin to some of the more prominent features of the teaching of Confucius and his followers. In both Buddhism and Confucianism, moreover, are teachings which partly coincide with the ethical and mystical phases of Christianity. Christianity, if it is true to its founder, is revolutionary, and it contains much which is not to be found in any of the older faiths of China. It can, however, in no small degree build on the foundations laid by the religions that have preceded it, incorporating and strengthening much of the best in these, and aiding in nourishing the courage, the faith, the initiative, the self-control, the patience, and the self-forgetfulness

which are so sorely needed by the China of to-day.

These, then, are some of the problems of China. They are many and serious and it is not at all certain that they will be solved. The old China and its culture are passing, seemingly never to return. For nearly a thousand years the nation has achieved no fresh advance in civilization worthy of comment. Since the Sung dynasty the only notable contribution to philosophy has been that of Wang Yang-ming, of the Ming dynasty, and he represented an essentially Buddhistic reaction from the school of Chu Hsi: there was little if anything in his teaching that was really new. The Sung also saw the last hopeful attempts at innovation in political science. In painting, the Sung artists have had no successors who are in any respect their peers, and in poetry no age has equaled the T'ang. In architecture the early reigns of the Ming dynasty witnessed the last high peak of achievement. There seems to have been no religious genius of the first water since the Chou. No great mechanical inventions have appeared since the Sung, and no revolutionary economic ideas.

The question naturally arises whether the

creative ability of the Chinese has died out. Has the race deteriorated, and, if so, has it done so past hope of recovery? Numerous the Chinese certainly are, more so under the Manchus than at any other time in history. Does the lack of advance since Sung times mean that while the race has increased in bulk it has hopelessly declined in quality? Or, on the other hand, has the stagnation been due to lack of intimate contact with new ideas from without and to a political and educational structure which has discouraged the growth of new ideas from within? After the Sung and until the latter part of the nineteenth century China's conquerors were barbarians who, while vigorous enough, brought few if any new cultural contributions. Until the nineteenth century Buddhism with its Indian thought was, indeed, the last foreign influence to plough deeply into the Chinese mind and to stimulate it to fresh productivity. Will the coming of Occidental culture, working, as it has, an even greater destruction of the old moulds than that which paralleled the introduction of Buddhism, be preparatory to an outburst of fresh genius and lead to a new and creative culture?

No one knows. China may pass through

centuries of disorder, and, if it preserves any civilization, possess one which merely combines a few pale remnants of a glorious past with uninspired reproductions of what it sees in the West: it may prove another Egypt or Mesopotamia. On the other hand these years of sorrow may be the precursors to fresh contributions for which the entire race will be grateful. All that can honestly be said is that some foreign observers are in despair, while others, and among them many who know the Chinese most intimately, even in these days of disillusionment have faith in the race. They believe that the natural stability of the Chinese, the admirable qualities of their head and heart, the achievements of their past, the ability of many individuals of the present, and the physical resources of the land augur a great future. Whatever the outcome, it cannot be without momentous consequences for the rest of mankind: a fourth of the human race and one of the most fertile sections of the globe are involved. It may well be that a thousand years from now the most significant events of the twentieth century will be seen to have been, not in Europe or America, but in China.

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